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Abstract 
The primary question that this thesis looks at is to what extent and what manner of influence has 
Buddhism had on Burmese political history? Issues surrounding the difficulties and nuances of 
the relationship between Buddhism and the Burmese state are assessed throughout. Rather than 
just a retelling of a certain aspect of Burmese political history this study places an overarching 
Buddhist model of the Two-Wheels of Dhamma upon Burmese politics. This enables a pattern of 
relations between Buddhism and the state in Myanmar to be drawn out. 
The method used to develop these ideas has been to break the political history down into various 
phases beginning with the monarchical period through to the contemporary context and examine 
the nature of the relationship between Buddhism and the state and its various changes within 
these eras. The analysis of the monarchical period establishes the basic ideas that uphold the 
overall nature of the Buddhism and state relationship. The following phases that are examined 
look more closely into the challenges the Two-Wheel structure faces and the movements it makes 
when confronted with these challenges. 
Key ideas that develop throughout the study are the importance of maintaining balance between 
the Two Wheels of Dhamma, in particular, in maintaining a balance between Buddhism's ability 
to criticise the state - Buddhism's antagonistic capabilities - and the state's support for 
Buddhism - a symbiosis between Buddhism and the state. Another of the key ideas developed is 
the importance of the moral ideal Buddhism provides politics not only to benefit the way politics 
is carried out but it is seen that the moral appeal of Buddhism is a crucial part of understanding 
the Two Wheel structure. 
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Buddhist Influences in Burmese Political History. 
Political history in Myanmar, from the magnificence of the Pagan kingdom to scenes of a 
present afflicted with discontent, has at its side a rich history of religious culture that has in 
many ways embedded itself into this world of Statehood. Whether it be in a quest for 
legitimisation, to fuel a sense of nationhood, or to be a voice for the oppressed, Buddhism has 
played a part in serving the needs of the State and acted as its prosecutor. Buddhist thought has 
been used in its broadest sense, as an ethos or an ethical approach, as well as in a narrower 
sense as a mode of political activism. From the emotive appeals of U Nu to reinstate nibbiinic 
goals as a means of social reform, symbolised in the Padeytha or Wishing Tree, to the 
militancy of nationalist monks an uneven path has been laid in the interplay between the 
culture of religion and that of politics.
1 
The purpose of this study from the outset will be to examine the relationship between 
Buddhism and the state that has developed from the earliest kings up until the contemporary 
context. Although there has been much written on the political history of Myanmar and as of 
late, much written about the current political crisis where democracy and human rights are 
called for against what most see as an oppressive authoritarian state, this will not be the focus 
here. These aspects can certainly not be avoided especially when this study will be set well 
within an historical context ofMyanmar's politics. However, the main thrust of the study will 
be looking at what extent and in what manner of influence has Buddhism had on Burmese 
politic life. Furthermore, it will examine what patterns of appeal to Buddhism have evolved 
out of a long history of association between religion and the State, or in other words, is there a 
continuity in how Buddhism and the state have related throughout Myanmar's history? Issues 
surrounding the conflicts of a religion advocating 'non-attachment to worldly affairs' which at 
the same time has directly involved itself in worldly affairs through politics will come into 
focus also. 
Questions such as these have had their share of coverage. From Weber's insights that in the 
earliest traditions Buddhism has little to offer the world of politics, through to contemporary 
1 U Nu's public speeches 1949-50 cited in Sarkisyanz, E., Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution, pp. 
210-12. 
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discussions on the nature of 'Engaged Buddhism' which has become likened to a Buddhist 
version of Christian Liberation theology, the meeting of the religion with political culture has 
had a wide range of approaches. Specifically, in the Burmese context, especially in the works 
of Mendelson, Sarkisyanz and Aung Thwin, much has been covered on the connections that 
have developed between Buddhism and politics from the earliest kings up until recent events. 
Much of this study has developed from the ideas provided by them and authors like them. 
However, what will be somewhat different in the approach taken here is that one primary 
model of relations, that is, the model of the Two-Wheels of Dhamma structure, and how this 
structure fits into the various phases of political history in Myanmar will be looked at. Whilst 
this model of relations has been discussed extensively by writers such as Aung Thwin, 
Reynolds and Clifford, in relation to the pre-colonial monarchy and in the moves to 
independence from colonial rule, I have not found it applied to more recent events. This is 
what will be done in this study. This application through a variety of phases in Myanmar's 
political history up until the contemporary context I think helps to highlight the many nuances 
of the Two-Wheel structure as it moves with the ebbs and flows ofMyanmar's history and as 
it comes face to face with challenges of modernity, foreign ideals and Myanmar's own internal 
crisis. Whilst this model of relations is not exhaustive in understanding the nature of Buddhist 
and state relations in Myanmar I think it provides a useful key to understanding the pattern of 
relating in both the monarchical context as well as in the contemporary context and allows for 
a continuity to be seen. Others aspects of the relationship such as those approached by writers 
like Lucian Pye, who focuses on power relations, and the notions of awza (influence) and 
charisma, from a more psychological approach will not be dealt with here. These are important 
also in the nature of Burmese politics and its relation to Buddhism but because of space 
limitations I have chosen to focus predominantly on the intricacies of the Two-Wheel model 
of relating. 
Before the Two-Wheels of Dhamma model can be placed upon the various contemporary 
phases of political history, the significance of it in Burmese tradition and its establishment in 
the monarchical era, needs to be looked at. This will be the purpose of the first chapter. Here 
the models of kingship and structures of the state will be placed against a background of 
cosmic order and the intricacies of how the two realms relate will be established. This period 
does not signify a 'golden age' where the Two-Wheel structure is perfectly balanced and given 
the vast time frame that this era covers I will not be dealing with specific rulers' balancing the 
2 
Two-Wheel structure. Rather Chapter One will be merely setting up the idea of the model, its 
ideals and a brief insight into some of its difficulties that will be more fully developed and 
applied to in the later chapters. Chapter Two will then look at the effects of the British policy 
of religious neutrality on the Two-Wheel structure, and the development of Burmese 
nationalism and its adoption of Buddhism as a form of cultural identification in a response to 
British rule. In particular, the development of highly politicised monks and the secularist 
reaction of the Thakin group centring on the national hero, Bogyoke Aung San, will be looked 
at. Chapter three will examine the Two-Wheel structure in the following phases of Burmese 
political history from independence and the democratic rule of U Nu, through to the military 
take-over of 1962 and the establishment of the 'Burmese Way to Socialism' which dominated 
Burmese politics up until 1988. The final chapter will look to the period since 1988 where 
democracy issues have come to the fore. It will examine how the military have modified their 
relationship to Buddhism in a crisis context and how the main democracy movement, the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, have used Buddhism in 
their quest for democratic change. 
Prior to examining the Buddhist relationship to politics proper a further brief clarification of 
the approach taken here in relation to Myanmar's current political situation I think is 
necessary. It is difficult at the present time to speak of Burmese politics without being 
inextricably linked to certain political biases. The activities of the last decade or so in the 
political sphere have been fraught with violence, corruption and for most it seems a deep sense 
of fear of how Myanmar will see its way out of its current crisis. Information that is seeping 
out ofMyanmar, whether it be in the form of the Burmanet News that is updated daily on the 
Internet, or through human rights groups such as Amnesty International, illustrates just a 
fraction of the negative press the present regime is incurring. In the pushes toward democracy 
and the military regime's reaction to this the issue of democracy being a foreign concept, an 
inappropriate model for a country which has spent much of the last fifty years withdrawing 
itself from the global village has also reared its head. It is difficult to avoid these issues when 
writing on Burmese politics and one cannot help be troubled by reports of children being 
raped and having their necks broken by government forces, pregnant women being beheaded 
3 
and hideous accounts of torture in infamous prisons such as Insein. 
2 Many of the recent 
writings on Myanmar also fervently attend to these issues and much discussion is given to the 
blatant human rights abuses stemming from the military government. With all of this in mind, 
the primary aims of this thesis will not be to illustrate the faults of the present regime but 
rather, within this traumatised context, to draw out an aspect of Burmese culture that to some 
extent has had something to say about Myanmar's political history. Although in the final 
chapters it will bt: impossible to avoid some opinion in these matters, these issues are rather a 
consequence of the discussion rather than the main focus. 
Mention needs to be made here also in that the name used to designate Myanmar often 
functions as an assertion of political opinion. Although the name of the country officially 
changed in June 1989, and was recognised by the United Nations at this time, those on the side 
of democracy under the example of the NLD and ASSK, continue to speak of Burma rather 
than Myanmar. For this reason the use of the title 'Myanmar' or rather the lack of the title 
'Burma' has come to denote a certain political orientation, in particular, one who is not 
"politically aware"? Thus, there is more to the naming issue than a mere label. Politically the 
complexities of this name use are vast but grammatically it also is far from being 
straightforward. Distinctions between 'Bama' ('Burma' in English) and 'Myanma' 
('Myanmar') in the Burmese language according to Aung San Suu Kyi are more of a matter of 
the distinction between literary and colloquial usage and therefore are interchangeable.
4 The 
purpose of the name change in most accounts is an attempt to remove British associations 
from Myanmar's cultural heritage and at the same time to avoid excluding Myanmar's ethnic 
minorities from being labelled under the one title of 'Burmese' that did not maintain their 
distinctiveness from the ethnic majority. In light of these factors, according to Houtman, the 
name change in the Burmese language is somewhat redundant as it really makes little 
difference to the language practices of the majority of Burmese.
5 The issue is further 
complicated by little continuity in the designated names used for the language itself. The 
SPDC calls the language and nationality 'Myanmar' and the dominant ethnic group 'Bama' or 
2 Rohingya Solidarity Organization, RSO News Service, News Sheet No.2/May, May 24, 2000, and Moeng Zay, 
"More than Five Hundred Dead in Kunhing Township", Burma Courier, June 5, 2000, cited in Burmanet News 
Report, June 51h and 141\ 2000. 
3 Houtman, Gustaaf, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for 
Democracy, p. 47. 
4 Houtman, Mental Culture, p. 50. 
5 Houtman, Mental Culture, p. 50. 
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'Bamar'. However, the NLD and almost every writer I have come across speak of the 
'Burmese' language and of the 'Burman' ethnic group. In keeping with the majority of writers 
I will use the terms 'Burmese' and 'Burman' in speaking of the language and major ethnic 
group respectively and also when speaking about the culture in general, as in 'Burmese 
political history' and so on. Furthermore, the title 'Myanmar' will be used throughout to 
designate the country unless 'Burma' is used in a reference or quotation. However, this is not a 
political statement, as to a certain extent this is to be avoided here, but rather keeping in line 
with 'Myanmar' as the officially recognised title used by the United Nations.6 
A brief mention needs to be made here also on the diacritical marks used. I have followed the 
usage of marks generally along the same lines as Collins and Sarkisyanz. 7 Although, more 
common words like sangha and Asoka are sometimes shown with the diacritical marks I have 
chosen to leave them out here in keeping with the majority of writers I have come across. In 
quotations I have followed the authors own format, thus differences may occur between my 
format and theirs. 
6 Cf. Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, Chapter Two, for greater detail on the naming issue. 




Pre-colonial Myanmar: Buddhism and Kingship. 
A monarchy that focussed predominantly on centralised control dominated Myanmar's 
historical background of statecraft prior to the annexation of the region by Britain in 1886. 
From the rise of Pagan in the 1oth - 11th centuries up until the final dethronement of King 
Thibaw by the colonials, the monarchy had over many centuries enmeshed itself into the 
cultural nuances of Burmese society. Buddhist thought was one of the most dominant aspects 
of these nuances that not only served to legitimate kingly rule but also supported the 
centralising structures of the state. It is the purpose of this chapter, as outlined in the 
introduction, to examine in detail the relationship between Buddhism and the king. In doing so 
a background will be laid for a contextualised examination of Buddhist and political relations 
in Myanmar. 
Kingship and Buddhism 
The monarchical state in Myanmar prior to British rule is traditionally understood to consist of 
four or five distinct periods of dynastic rule. The periods are as follows: the Pagan period 
(1044-1287); the Ava period under Shan rule (1287-1531) and Mon hegemony in the Pegu 
region (1323-1539), and the First Toungoo period (1486-1531) 1; the Restored Toungoo period 
(1531-1752); the Konbaung dynasty (1752-1885).2 The dating of the Pagan era begins with 
rule under Anawrahta that in many ways defines the beginning of what is known as the 
'classical' era of Burmese history. This is not the absolute beginning of monarchical rule, 
which in reality began with Sawyahan (956-1001), then Kyaunghpyu (1001-1021).3 The 
founding of Pagan is usually noted to have its beginnings somewhat earlier as well, that is, in 
1 This 300 year period was not ruled by consecutive dynasties but rather the dynasties overlapped frequently and 
existed as rival states each with their own capital and royal family. The discrepancies of attributing either four or 
five distinct periods of dynastic rule to the monarchy lies in whether or not the Toungoo period was seen as one 
period or split into two. 
2 Hall, D.G.E., Burma, p. 28-37, and Taylor, R., The State in Burma, p. 13. 
3 Aung Thwin, M., Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma, p. 22. 
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849C.E .. 4 However, little is known about these early rulers and traditionally Anawrahta (1044-
1077) is understood to be "[t]he founder of the greatness of Pagan", and as such we will begin 
our study of kingship from this point. The even earlier Pyu civilisation that dominated central 
and lower Myanmar in the preceding centuries will not be looked at either for the same 
reasons as given above. Also Anawrahtha's conquest over Mon ruled Thaton brought the 
Tipi_taka texts to Pagan along with much of its sangha, which signified "the starting point of 
pure Burmese Theravada culture". 5 It is this form of Buddhism that has dominated Burmese 
history and consequently the form of Buddhism this thesis is concerned with, thus we begin 
from this point. 
Despite the fact that monarchical rule dominated this entire period, the numerous dynasties, 
the frequency of usurpation, the constantly changing boundaries of the region and the 
frequency of warfare amongst rival states has given the impression of a certain lack of 
continuity in Myanmar's history. Even in the stable Pagan period Aung Thwin lists twelve 
kings that ruled between 1044-1300.6 Certainly in reading the works ofhistorians such as Hall, 
and also of Cady, who comments that "The concept of the state as a continuing political 
personality from reign to reign was lacking" and even when one looks to the modem history of 
Myanmar, periods of stability seem few and far between.7 However, in the traditions of Aung 
Thwin and Taylor the approach here is not to focus on the countless 'events' of the periods, 
but to focus on the structure of the state, the principles that underpinned the social order and 
institutions that supported the structure. These principles all remained remarkably consistent, 
thus this approach is more useful here. Despite frequent leadership changes, Khin Maung Kyi 
and Tin Tin note, "the mode of administrative machinery and the personnel comprising it 
remain unchanged".8 Aung Thwin perhaps states it most clearly when he says that, 
Conceptions of order and disorder; of legitimacy, authority, and justice; of 
history, time, man and salvation did not change; neither did the larger structures 
to which these conceptions were attached and in which they were embedded. 9 
4 Hall, Burma, p. 14. 
5 Mendelson, E.M., Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership, p. 34. 
6 Aung Thwin, Pagan, p. 22. 
7 Cady, J., A History of Modern Burma, p. 19. 
8 Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns in Historical Burma, p. 53. 
9 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit, and Human: Conceptions of Classical Burmese Kingship", in L. Gessick (ed.), 
Centers, Symbols and Hierarchies: Essays on the classical states of Southeast Asia, p. 46. 
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The continuity in all of these themes is for our purposes crucial in looking at the relationship 
between Buddhism and the politics in this early era. For what we are attempting to assess is 
what kind of relationship was there between Buddhism and the state. If we were to focus on 
the many events of the period - who killed whom and which portion of land was added on to 
the kingdom - it would not aid us greatly in assessing the patterns of relations between 
Buddhism and kingship. However, if we take the approach of looking at the wider structures, 
the administrative, the social and the religious, a greater sense of the relationship can be found. 
So for our purposes this section will not detail in great depth the 'events' of this period but 
rather look to the continuities as outlined in Aung Thwin's above quotation. 
A brief synopsis of this section may be helpful at this stage. Firstly I hope to show that the 
monarchy with its well defined hierarchy, its tightly controlled administrative structure and its 
quest for centralised power are inextricably bound up with Buddhist ideology.
10 The notion of 
embeddedness mentioned above by Aung Thwin is of primary concern here. Moreover, 
Buddhism did not only impact on the state through the influence of its sangha, but supported 
and maintained the fundamental principles that upheld the notion of centralised control and 
functions and position of the king. Secondly, the problem ofwhat seems to be a conflict of an 
'other-worldly' religion entering into 'worldly' affairs' as put forward by Weber and others, I 
believe is at least to a certain extent resolved when one looks to the tradition of the Two-
Wheels of Dhamma that is present not only in the 'real' history of Burmese kingship but that 
is present in the scriptural traditions of the Pali canon. The third part of this section will 
attempt to breakdown somewhat the relationship between the sangha and the king. It will not 
only discuss the 'facts' of their relationship, but look at what pattern of relation is involved, in 
particular, to look at what Gunawardana calls being in an antagonistic-symbiosis relationship. 
This will provide an important base for an understanding of the Buddhism and state 
relationship that later chapters will develop further. In order to address each of the issues this 
chapter will be structured as follows: 1) a brief overview of the administrative organisation 
including its divisions of labour and its economic system; 2) the principles that maintain the 
10 The term Buddhist ideology is borrowed from Steven Collins work, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities (in 
particular see pages 16-25). Collins' use of the terms is a reflection of the fact that the relationship between 
Buddhism and the political rule is more often than not an expression for the elite class of society rather than for 
the general populace, or what Sarkisyanz terms 'Folk Buddhism'. Sarkisyanz, E., Buddhist Backgrounds of the 
Burmese Revolution, p. 9. That is, Buddhist ideology refers to the kind of Buddhism that is used in an ideological 
sense. As this chapter, and many of the following chapters are predominantly concerned with this elite class of 
Myanmar and we are trying to examine here how Buddhism is used by this elite group, rather than being 
concerned with 'Folk Buddhism', it seemed appropriate to use Collins' term here. 
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structure- kamma and merit; the utopian Jambudipa and macrocosm/microcosm symbolism; 
the cosmology of kingship - the Two Wheels of Dhamma; the ideals of kingship; 3) sangha 
and state interaction -legitimisation, s as ana reforms, and a developing pattern of antagonistic-
symbiosis. 
Administrative Structure 
As stated above the pnmary goal of the state was to maintain a significant degree of 
centralised control, whether or not this was successful or not was another matter. Not only 
were there an elaborate structure of administrative officials and a detailed revenue system to 
maintain this centralised control, but also the divisions of the entire territory were geared to 
focus on the capital, the power hub of the state. Of course, at the top of this hierarchy sat the 
king. The importance of the king's position in relation to the state as a whole cannot be 
underestimated, as "[t]o the popular mind the monarchy, and often the monarch himself, was 
seen as the state". 11 
The basic system of the state was controlled by way of patron-client ties maintained through 
fiefs. 12 Administrative appointment and land distribution was governed predominantly by the 
king who could keep relative control of the system by the constant threat of withdrawing the 
positions and grants given. The structure that maintained the centralised control was on several 
levels. On one level the territory itself was ordered into various categories. Taylor discusses 
four general regions that shaped the state. These are 1) the nucleus; 2) secondary settlements; 
3) strategic stockades; 4) conquered foreign areas. 13 The latter three areas radiated out around 
the nucleus in their respective order, and of course at the centre of the nucleus was the capital 
city, the palace and in the centre of that, the king. The nucleus for the majority ofpre-colonial 
era was positioned around the central dry zone of Myanmar that had an elaborate irrigation 
system that kept this region as the heart of agricultural production, and consequently the area 
of most benefit to the state and its revenue base. 
11 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 14. 
12 Aung Thwin, "Jambudipa: Classical Burma's Camelot", in J. Ferguson (ed.), Contributions to Asian Studies, 
Vol. 16, Essays on Burma, 1981, p. 42. 
13 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 20. Most of the outline of the hierarchy of the administrative structure has been 
taken from Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 20-37, unless otherwise stated. 
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The social/administrative structure complemented this territorial layout. Below the king, but at 
the top end of the hierarchy were the princes and royal entourage that included the myo sas 
(dukes- who were appanage holders). The next tier down consisted of the state appointed 
officials (in descending order), that is, the Privy Council, the Council of Ministers, a territorial 
department and a general administrative department that dealt with issues pertaining to certain 
ethnic groupings rather than to territorial regions. The territorial section oversaw the 
administration of the divisions of labour. The core providers of labour, centred around the 
capital, who worked crown land and also provided the bulk of military servicemen, were the 
ahmu-dan. On the outskirts of the nucleus were the athi who although exempt from military 
service (unless in absolute necessity) were subject to a higher level of taxation. Each group 
within the structure formed what Aung Thwin has labelled 'cells', all of which had their own 
particular hierarchy but always had some link with the central administration. 14 These cells, 
Aung Thwin states were bonded together by "occupation, class, and religion" which had 
replaced the older tribal bonds. 15 Each area that expanded out further away from the centre had 
an increased level of autonomy from the state. But even in these outer areas the administrative 
structure controlled the feeding of resources into the centre. This was achieved predominantly 
by the lowest level officials, the 'local hereditary officials', known as the myo-thu-gyi (town 
head) and the ywa-thu-gyi (village head). The conquered foreign regions and those areas on 
the peripheries of the state however, were much more difficult to maintain through 
administrative structures and this is perhaps reflected most aptly in the frequently shifting 
borders of the state. Another significant landmass that was difficult to control and that was 
free from taxation was sangha land, however, this issue and the king's attempts to control the 
land through siisana reform will be looked at in more detail later in the chapter. 
The primary sources of revenue for the state were from agricultural production, from land, and 
from trade - especially in later periods with the southern ports being utilised further. 16 Taylor 
describes the general economy as subsistent in nature providing only a moderate surplus, but 
that still allowed for a generous amount of financial patronage to religious and military 
14 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit, and the Human", p. 46. 
15 Aung Thwin, "Kingship, the Sangha, and Society in Pagan", in K. Hall and J. Whitmore, Explorations in Early 
Southeast Asian Statecraft, p. 205. 
16 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 40, & Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns, p. 31. 
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considerations. 17 Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin extend the assessment of the less than buoyant 
economy to assert that keeping 'the lid on' the economic increase, particularly through trade, 
actually was a part of the state keeping centralised control. As they state, 
Should trade and commerce be allowed to prosper, the social division of labour 
would be precipitated and the system of countrywide dependence on land and 
agriculture would disappear. On the heel of this disappearance would follow an 
increase in the number of merchants . . . This would have a negative 
repercussion on the system of royal absolute power.
18 
Just as the revenue sources were restricted to maintain centralised control a tight control of 
consumption was attempted. Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin note that what an individual could 
buy depended often on where he was placed within the hierarchy. For example, only the 
ahmu-dans and other members of the elite could buy silk and velvet.
19 Moreover, because it 
was of central importance to the king to maintain the labour/territorial divisions that supported 
his central rule, the people, particularly the nucleus region, were restricted from moving out of 
their area, and thus taking with them the revenue and labour opportunities for the state. 
20 
From this brief overview of the structures of the state it is obvious that a quest for the 
centralised authority of the king was of prime concern. The ideal placed the king at the centre 
of a nucleus that provided him with a consistent source of labour, military service and 
revenue, and as the structures of his administration radiated outwards so did his power. The 
ideal of this tightly ordered state provided the foundations for monarchical rule in pre-colonial 
Myanmar. 
However, before we move on to the next phase of discussion it must be noted that despite this 
tightly bound design there was indeed room for the decentralisation of power and instability 
concerning centralised rule. The countless numbers of ascensions to the throne by violent 
means, the frequently changing boundaries and the many ebbs and flows of fall and decline 
that permeated the entire monarchical period accentuates the imperfection of this structure. 
17 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 38. 
18 Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns, p. 38. 
19 Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns, p. 39. 
20 Khin Maung Kyi and Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns, p. 38. 
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When one looks closer to the 'events' of the period fluctuations certainly do appear. Taylor 
also comments on the realities ofkingship that, 
In practice, the king's ability to control the behaviour of his subjects was 
limited, as his authority was mediated through a chain of subordinate 
authorities of varying kinds. The king's clients had their own interests to pursue 
and their own sources of extra-state personal authority as well as state-
sanctioned power. As the monarch made little differentiation between his 
property and that of the state, so his subordinates made scant distinction 
between their official responsibilities and their private interests. And when they 
did so, private interests often took primary place in their calculus of duty.
21 
However, despite the imperfections, on the whole the ideal, what was strived for, was the 
consolidation of authority in the central figure of the king by way of a hierarchically structured 
society, and it is this that remained consistent throughout the era.
22 With this ideal outlined it 
is necessary to look at what legitimated this mode of statehood and in doing so we shift to 
looking at what Buddhism had to offer monarchical rule. 
Buddhism and the King 
The relationship between Buddhism and the state in pre-colonial Myanmar can be best 
reflected in the assertion that the ideal striven for in kingly authority and the structures needed 
to maintain that authority were supported, maintained and in many ways provided for by 
Buddhist ideology. This is not an out of place blend of the 'sacred' and 'profane' that has 
corrupted their boundaries but a relationship where "the ideal merges with the real and 
pragmatic".23 Where the praxis of the salvation quest upholds the world it is grounded in. 
At the forefront of Buddhist notions that supports the structures of state is the concept of 
kamma. The concept of kamma, the unavoidable interplay of cause and effect, and its role in 
21 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 25-26. 
22 There is a tension that exists between the ideal and the reality, but this tension is an important aspect in the 
relationship between Buddhism and the State that I will draw out further in later sections and throughout the rest 
of the thesis. 
23 Reynolds, F. and R. Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration: Burma and 
Thailand", in Transitions and Transformations in the History of Religions: Essays in Ho nor of Joseph M. 
Kitagawa, p. 60. 
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pre-colonial statehood and society can be seen to manifest in two ways. Firstly, the hierarchy 
of the state, with the king at the top is justified because of the accumulation of good kamma or 
lack of it if you were at the bottom of the social ladder. Secondly, because of the king's high 
status due to his accumulation of good kamma, he was also expected to be the one most 
responsible for order in the state, especially through his moral action. As he sat atop the social 
hierarchy he was expected to be the moral exemplar and in this way Buddhist ethics became 
unavoidably linked to the actions of the state and in particular, to the actions of the king. 
The first manifestation of kamma gave the king atop the social hierarchy the legitimacy 
required to have his position, his power and his wealth. Even in instances where the king 
gained succession to the throne by violent and insidious means the fact that he succeeded was 
enough to assert his right to be there. In such circumstances the balance of merit in his past 
lives was considered to be weighted in his favour despite the fact that he may have in his 
present one led a life of immorality. An example of this can be found in the kingship of 
Bodawpaya ( 1782- 1819) who, at his coronation, stated that, "In proportion to the meritous 
deeds done in past existences, my Kamma has designated the exalted kingship for me in the 
present life".24 At the same time Bodawpaya is attributed with murdering all of his rivals in 
the royal family including women and children?
5 On the flip side of this legitimisation coin of 
course are the effects of negative kamma. As Sarkisyanz states, "as soon as that past Merit 
became exhausted through a lack of additional Merit as against growing demerit of the present 
life, they would perish ... ".26 So if a King was murdered it was accepted as a consequence of 
his own actions- an effect of kammic law. 
The negative implications of kamma and merit making were so widespread that they even 
entered into the ethos of the legal system. In the area of criminal punishment the notions of 
kamma and merit had a significant place. As one's position in society was greatly determined 
by their accumulation of merit in past lives, so too was the punishment received for criminal 
offending based upon this accumulation or lack of it.
27 As Aung Thwin states, "The legal 
24 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 68. 
25 Hall, Burma, p. 92. 
26 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 71. 
27 Despite the rejection of the caste system in Buddhism, with the adoption of the laws of kamma and merit 
making beliefs in many ways the distinction between classes is still reinforced here. This is especially obvious 
when Aung Thwin comments that "Because people are endowed unequally with merit ... birth determines one's 
station in life". Aung Thwin, "Jambudipa", p. 47. 
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motto in Burmese law might well be "Let the punishment fit the man", rather than "Let the 
punishment fit the crime".28 Sarkisyanz gives an unusual example of this rule. In the 14th 
century there was a bandit, Nget-pya, who like a Burmese version of Robin Hood, stole from 
the rich and gave the proceeds to the poor and towards building a pagoda. Of course, as these 
goods deeds warranted a considerable gain in merit, when he was finally caught, rather than 
being imprisoned and such like he was acquitted and in time became a minister of state!
29 
Of course, as implied by this example, one was not always doomed to be under the sway of the 
bad action in a past life. One could escape this bind especially by giving financially and of 
one's time to religious causes. The extent to which people gave towards pagoda building or 
directly to the sangha was substantial, as we shall see later in the discussion on sangha-state 
relations. This merit-making practice was not merely a religious matter that impacted only on 
one's path to salvation or to secure a superior status. It made a distinct impression on the 
nature of economic behaviour for much of the population. Spiro comments that to a large 
extent the Burmese populace saw (and still see) investing money in Buddhism, by way of 
either providing for monks or putting funds towards pagoda building or restoration, as not just 
a means of attaining salvation - in fact he gives the impression that this is an uncommon goal 
-but as a way to ensure wealth and prosperity for future lives.
30 Because of the dangers of 
being robbed of one's money by unstable governments and general lack of economic stability, 
an investment in Buddhism is seen economically as a more viable way of making a 
worthwhile return.31 At least in your future you would be better off. Buddhist kamma brings 
on a new meaning to long term investment! 
One can conclude that the notions of kamma and merit were much broader in their impact than 
just concerning issues of salvation. The king, by way of his merit, was legitimated in his 
status, power and wealth. Moreover, these principles flowed into the legal system, the 
economic practices of the populace and justified the structure of society with inequality as part 
of its foundation. 32 
28 Aung Thwin Pagan, p. 125. 
29 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 70. 
30 Spiro, M., "Buddhism and Economic Action in Burma", in American Anthropologist, 68, 1966, p. 1168. 
31 Spiro, "Buddhism and Economic Action in Burma", p. 1166. 
32 Aung Thwin, "Jambudi:pa", p. 47. 
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The second point referred to above regarding kamma was that the king, on account of his 
position was expected to be the moral exemplar for the state. The Buddhist principle of kamma 
was understood to be inextricably linked to all life as it was considered to be a 'universal' law 
of the cosmos and nothing could escape it, including the realm of statehood and kingly reign. 
Moreover, order in the cosmos was thought to be reliant on moral action. Because the king 
was a part of the elite in society he, in particular, had a greater responsibility to act morally 
and was even held responsible for the state of the natural world. Reynolds and Clifford have 
expressed this link when they state, 
An important implication of the law of kamma is that, as a cosmic law that 
includes the regulation of human action within its jurisdiction it links causally 
in the Buddhist universe what are kept distinct in the rational, scientific 
universe, namely morality and physics, or the social and natural orders. Social 
action and reaction, therefore, are not played out strictly within the realms of 
humans. On the contrary, they rebound along moral lines throughout the realms 
of the cosmos, including the realm of nature ... [P]ure, selfless action generates 
resplendent order ... [this order] is indicated as much through social categories 
such as material wealth and status as through natural, or environmental 
categories such as fertile land and timely rain?
3 
In Theravada Buddhism no ultimate god can be propitiated in order to repel chaos- one's own 
actions bound by kammic results are ultimately responsible. 
With the law of kamma linking human action, morality, the natural world and material wealth 
together it is difficult to claim a complete separation between politics and a Buddhist ethos. 
The view that Buddhist 'otherworldly' matters are of no concern to the state and politics in 
general becomes obsolete when existence is seen in this light.
34 As stated earlier this should 
not be viewed as a corruption in the boundaries of the 'sacred' and 'profane', as these terms 
lose their relevance in this context, but rather through the law of kamma the 'ideal' impacts on 
the 'real' in the quest for order in the cosmos. The king by virtue of his place within the social 
realm is linked to this Buddhist universe and its ethical demands. His position commanded a 
moral responsibility for the maintenance of order not just of society but also of the natural 
world. 
33 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", p. 58. 
34 In my discussion on the Two Wheels of Dhamma I will attempt to expand this argumen~ by looking in more 
detail at how the cosmos is understood to encompass both the nibbiinic and salpSiiric paths and the overarching 
hierarchy that links both realms together. 
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On a practical level the concepts of kamma and merit aided the king's claim to the throne and 
also demanded from him a responsibility for the maintenance of the kingdom in more ways 
than one. However, there is much more depth to the relationship between Buddhist ideology 
and kingship than this, which we will now examine by looking at the broader aspects of the 
cosmology of kingship, namely in the notions of microcosm/macrocosm and Jambudipa. Also 
in order to expand on the issue of the ideal merging with the 'real' and pragmatic and to view 
some of the ideals provided by Buddhism for the state, I will be discussing the Two Wheels of 
Dhamma and the cakkavattiand the dhammarifja ideals. 
Cosmology of Kingship 
The ideal of pre-colonial Myanmar is very much bound together by a variety of cosmological 
beliefs based on a geographical level as well as on a more abstract conceptual level. The first 
level that we will attend to here will be on the geographical level. This involves broad 
conceptions of the geography of the world, the state, the capital and the palace. The second 
level of the cosmology, the more abstract, will have a narrower focus on the conceptions of the 
king himself, and bring the Two Wheels of Dhamma into the discussion. 
The basic belief in the way the universe was ordered and how the state related to the wider 
cosmos in pre-colonial Myanmar centred on the macrocosm/microcosm idea. That is, the 
entire cosmos both affects and is affected by human behaviour. Heine-Geldem speaks of this 
more fully when he states that, 
According to this belief [in the macrocosm/microcosm relation] humanity is 
constantly under the influence of forces emanating from the directions of the 
compass and from stars and planets. These forces produce welfare and 
prosperity or work havoc, according to whether or not individuals and social 
groups, above all the state, succeed in bringing their lives and activities in 
harmony with the universe .... Harmony between the empire and the universe 
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is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on 
a smaller scale.35 
Through their actions the people and in particular, those at the head of society, are directly 
responsible for maintenance of order in their own world as well as in the wider universe. This 
concept was far from being a new invention in pre-colonial Myanmar and much of the 
Burmese view of the cosmos was grounded in Brahmanic traditions and was familiar to both 
Theravada and Mahayana traditions of Buddhism. The basic Buddhist cosmology from Pali 
accounts posits at the centre of the universe the axial Mount Meru. Horizontally, there are 
seven concentric circles of mountain ranges that radiated outward from Mount Meru and 
between each are seas. Beyond these mountain ranges and seas is the ocean within which are 
four island continents, Pubbavideha (East), Aparagoyana (West), Uttarakuru (North) and 
Jambudipa to the South, and surrounding the ocean on the perimeter of the universe is an iron 
wall.36 All four island continents are inhabited by humans. However, it is Jambudipa that is 
considered to be 'our' world albeit an idealised version.37 Whilst each island is conceived of as 
an ideal, as a utopia, Jambudipa in the Cakkavatti -s1haniida Sutta, is said to succumb to 
decline when immoral actions dominate the world. At the lowest ebb of Jambudipa's decline 
the inhabitants are said to only live till the age of ten years. However, the redeeming factor for 
the island of Jambudipa is that it is the only place that nibbiina can be sought and hence, where 
a Buddha can appear. It is at this lowest ebb that Maitreya (the Future Buddha) is said to 
appear and revitalise the island and the life expectancy of the islands inhabitants increases. At 
the centre of Jambudipa is the Jambu or bodhi tree under which Gautama was said to have 
gained enlightenment. Although Jambudipa traditionally was conceived as 'our' world Aung 
Thwin notes that for the Burmese Jambudipa became equated with the Burmese state rather 
than the wider Indic world, that is, it saw itself as the centre of the world. As Aung Thwin 
asserts, 
in Burmese political ideology it [Jambudipa] was Burma's paradise on earth ... 
its own Camelot, an idealized, perfect state on earth .... The "nucleus" of the 
kingdom, the region of Central Burma, at whose center was the capital city, had 
35 Heine-Geldem, R., "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", in The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 
2, Nov. 1942, p. 15. 
36 Kloetzli, R., Buddhist Cosmology, pp. 24-25. 
37 Sarkisyanz notes that there are several smaller islands that are believed to surround Jambudipa. Those who 
inhabit these islands are considered to be the British and non-Indic people. Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 
83. 
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to be Jambudipa, for here was temporal paradise, the "take-off point" for 
nibbapa, the result of sacred energy emanating from sacred space.38 
As the universe radiated out around Mt Meru, the axis that connected the world to the cosmos, 
the Burmese king radiated his power and authority throughout the kingdom. Moreover, the 
physical structures of the state directly reflected these cosmic structures. Reynolds speaks of 
the 'architectural symbolism' that dominated kingship ideals and this is most aptly represented 
in the design of the capital city and palace.39 The power, both secular and sacred, that was 
assigned to this city was immense, as there are instances where the kings were virtual 
prisoners within their own walls- such as Thibaw (1879-1885), who Cady notes never left the 
palace at all in fear of being overthrown - as what legitimated his rule was his physical 
presence within the four walls.40 The design of the capital city, detailed extensively by Aung 
Thwin and from whom the information here is mostly derived, corresponded to the ordering of 
the cosmos and remained very uniform throughout the entire pre-colonial era.41 In most of the 
ten capital cities of pre-colonial Myanmar the city consisted of a square mile fortress-like 
structure that formed the central core of the kingdom. Each wall that corresponded to each of 
the cardinal directions had three gates of entry. In the centre of each wall was the largest gate 
and this was flanked on either side by two smaller gates (see Figure 1 for an example of this). 
The twelve entrances in the four cardinal directions maintained the order of the cosmos by 
representing each of the signs of the zodiac and that encompassed Buddhist cosmological 
concern with the four directions. Moreover, at these entrances eight groups of guards stood 
who represented the guardian spirits of Mount Meru.42 In the centre of the walled fortress were 
the palace buildings that represented much more than an elaborate home for the king. The 
residences of the differing groups within the court were consistent with the wider 
cosmological structures of the universe. The royal family each were assigned a specific 
cardinal direction for their residences with the Heir Apparent residing in the east (the most 
auspicious direction), the head Queen and princess residing to the south and so on. The most 
important throne (amongst many) was the Lion throne (no. 1 in Figure 1, and pictured in 
Figure 2), facing east, which in relation to the boundary walls of the city lay directly in the 
38 Aung Thwin, M., "Heaven, Earth, and the Supernatural World: Dimensions of the Exemplary Center in 
Burmese History", in B. Smith and H. B. Baker (eds.), The City as a Sacred Center, pp. 98-99. 
39 Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels ofDhamma: A Study ofEarly Buddhism", in G. Obeyesekere, F. Reynolds 
and B. Smith, The Two Wheels of Dhamma: Essays on the Theravada Tradition in India and Ceylon, p. 20. 
4° Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 12-13. 
41 Aung Thwin, "Heaven, Earth, and the Supernatural World", p. 89-94. 
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centre. Directly above this throne the palace spire reaches up in a symbolic representation of 
Mount Meru as the axis of the cosmos (see Figure 3).43 Outside of the palace proper but within 
the walls of the city a monastery or temple was usually built at each corner, with the exception 
of Mindon (1852-1878) who only built one monastery within the city walls of Mandalay.44 
The significance of this was that the palace and capital was to be viewed as a representation of 
the entire cosmos that encompassed both the spiritual realm as well as the 'worldly' realm.45 
Also these four-fold divisions corresponding to the four cardinal directions were only a few of 
those that dominated the palace and court structure. The King had four principal Queens, 
administrators, councillors and so on. However, this is not where the cosmological ties stop.46 
Aung Thwin and Cady both make mention of the capital city and palace being representations 
of the city of the gods in Buddhist mythology, headed by Sakka (Indra) king of the heaven 
Tavatirilsa. Aung Thwin gives a few examples of the correlation between the two such as, 
the Burmese king dressed as Sakka when he re-enacted the annual ritual 
ploughing prior to the monsoons, demonstrating his power to insure ... the land 
and rainfall be productive - Sakka's dominant roles; ... [he] built a "glass" (or 
crystal) palace imitating Sakka's in Tavatirilsa ... built temples specifically for 
the Buddha's hair-relic, as Sakka was believed to have done ... Sakka's "court" 
created the essential configuration used repeatedly in organizational and 
architectural structure [that is] the five point paradigm (four points and a 
center) ... [and the] coronation ritual [is] named after Indra [and because of this 
the king] was [considered to be] Sakka on earth.47 
The overall conclusion to be made here is that the structures of the capital city and palace 
represented the wider structures of a centralised society as well as representing the cosmos as 
42 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 7. 
43 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 7. 
44 Aung Thwin, "Heaven, Earth, and the Supernatural World", p. 91. 
45 These two realms will be discussed in more detail later. 
46 It must be noted here also that the Buddhist beliefs were not the only form of religious symbolism to have 
significance for kingship in Myanmar. The presence and place of the Nats (the Burmese animistic tradition) in the 
images of kingship were a significant part of the spiritual mixing with the temporal. The Thirty-Seven primary 
Nats played an important role in maintaining order in the state. Aung Thwin also states that people were buried 
alive under the city gates to provide 'green death' (death by violent or unnatural means) spirits to guard the city 
and palace. Aung Thwin, "Heaven, Earth, and the Supernatural World", p. 90. Brahmanic presence in court was 
also significant as much of the ritual requirements of the court were done by the Brahman priests rather than by 
Buddhist monks. Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p.4-6. There has also always been a presence in Burmese 
society of the more 'occult' practices such as astrology, spells, alchemy and numerology, etc. This is present even 
in the contemporary political arena with General Ne Win being known to have consulted his astrologers in his 
political career. See Ferguson, J., & E. M. Mendelson, "Masters of the Buddhist Occult: The Burmese Weikza's" 
in Contributions to Asian Studies: Essays on Burma, Vol. 16, 1981, p. 62-87. However, as the focus here is on 
Buddhist influences I have avoided a detailed discussion of these other traditions. 
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Figure 1. Mandalay Palace Plan. 
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Figure 2. The Lion Throne, Mandalay Palace. 
Source: Scott O'Conner, V., Mandalay and Other Cities of Burma, p. 85. 
Figure 3. The Mandalay Palace spire. 
Source: Scott O'Conner, V., Mandalay and Other Cities of Burma, p. 25. 
a whole. From being seen as an idealised Jambudi:pa, a parallel of the abode of the gods, 
Tavatirilsa, and Mount Meru, the axis around which the cosmos is ordered the Burmese state 
with the king atop was viewed as the power hub of the world both politically and religiously. 
It played a vital role in maintaining order not only within its own borders but within the entire 
cosmos - at least in their eyes. Political power was embedded within a wider cosmological 
belief system that justified and legitimated it, but there is more to the relationship between the 
political and the Buddhist than the 'cosmo-geographical'. 
The Dhamma-realm and the Cakkavattf 
At this stage it is necessary to elaborate somewhat on the intricacies of the king's relationship 
to Buddhist ideology and to look at some of the ideals provided by Buddhism to the world of 
political rule. Firstly, I think it is appropriate to discuss in more detail what it means to speak 
of a Buddhist cosmos or in other words, a dhamma-realm. How does it encompass an ideal as 
well as something more pragmatic, and how do the two relate? 
To get down to basics dhamma in a Buddhist sense translates to Truth or Law and sometimes 
Teaching. This Truth or Law is that which was supposedly discovered or realised by the 
Buddha Gautama in his enlightenment. This dhamma contains within it all the laws and 
workings of the cosmos (at least according to Buddhism), from the Paticca-samuppiida 
(theory ofDependent Origination) to the idea that desire is the root of all suffering. Within this 
field of dhamma, this cosmic order, sa1ps iiric existence, that is, the realm of rebirth, suffering 
and material being, and nibbiinic existence, that is the enlightened state, flow in a thesis and 
anti-thesis relationship respectively.48 These modes of 'existence' are not devoid of any sense 
of relation. They are not seen as two never touching realms but rather that the goal of 
enlightenment must begin in the material world, the world of salJlS iira, which includes in it, 
~ .-,...,.,\.c.""' 
political life. As we saw- in the discussion on the cosmo-geography of Jambudi:pa, 
enlightenment can only be sought by beginning one's quest in 'this' world. Another way of 
putting it is that the dhamma-realm encompasses essentially both salJlSiira and nibbiina. They 
are considered to be the Two Wheels of Dhamma. The Buddha sets the nibbiinic or spiritual 
48 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", p. 62. 
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wheel in motion, and the temporal or salJlS aric wheel is set in motion by the cakkavatti, that is, 
the ideal universal king. Moreover, for dhammic order to be maintained the Two-Wheel 
structure needs to be balanced.49 In seeing this Two-Wheel link, the earlier discussion of 
kammic law also comes into play here as kamma is one of the key facets that link the two 
together. As we saw in Reynolds and Clifford's quote earlier, kamma essentially bound 
morality to physics, the natural world with social action, and the spiritual and the temporal. 5° 
The power relation between the wheels however, is not equal. The nibbiinic path is considered 
to be the superior wheel. It is that which is aspired to. Because one is grounded in the other 
they are not mutually exclusive but rather the entire cosmos forms what Reynolds and Clifford 
call an "inclusive hierarchy", that is, the entire dhamma-realm includes both the ideal and the 
pragmatic.51 Nibbiina is at the top and salJ1Sara is below. This two-tier hierarchy on the 
historical stage can be reflected also in the distinction made between the sangha or monastic 
path and the lay path, headed by the king. 52 The sang ha or monastic path is seen as superior to 
the lay path. Tambiah expresses this superiority of nibbiina when he comments that, 
The dharma of cosmic law and its transcendence (nibbana) are larger in scope 
and in superior to the dharma of righteousness as practiced by the ruler; this 
heirarchical arrangement parallels the gradient from spirituality to gross 
materiality in the genesis myth [the AggaiJffa Sutta story], and the dichotomy 
between lokuttara and laukiya in the cosmology. 53 
However, this power relation is not without its tensions. Especially when one considers that, 
as I have spoken about already the king, his palace and the capital certainly showed an attempt 
to be viewed already a part of the spiritual path - to be seen as the axis of the cosmos and a 
representation of the Sakka, king of the gods. But despite the king's attempts to incorporate 
himself into the spiritual path, essentially his place still remained at the top of the lay path. 54 
However, for the majority the lay path suffices and the king in his place on top was far from 
49 This idea of balancing the Two-Wheel structure becomes crucial and will be examined in much more detail in 
the following chapters. 
50 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and Struggle for National Integration", p. 58. 
51 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", p. 67. 
52 This is also paralleled in the division between the Buddha and the Cakkavatti 
53 Tambiah, S., World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 41. 
54 This tension will become more apparent when our discussion turns to the relationship between the sangha and 
the state. and it will also become very apparent in later chapters as well. 
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being regarded as lacking in stature. This is obvious especially when one considers some of 
the ideal images that were placed upon the king, such as the cakkavatti. 
Textually the cakkavattiideal is concentrated in the Cakkavatti-s1haniila Sutta ('Discourse of 
the Lion's Roar on the Wheel-turning King') which forms a part of the Digha Nikfiya. The 
cakkavatti figure also appears in Brahmanical and Jain literature. 5
5 As far as Theravada 
Buddhism is concerned the cakkavatti concept forms a kind of evolution from the kingship 
idea present in the Aggaffm Sutta where Mahasammata was the first elected king to rule in a 
degraded world. 56 Mahasammata's role was primarily to maintain order by taking control of 
matters of law and justice and the more practical matters of property and food distribution. 
57 
The cakkavattihowever, has a much more elaborate role and description. The cakkavattilike a 
Buddha has the thirty two marks of a Mahapurisa or Great Man. In actuality, if the auspicious 
marks are present the being can choose to follow either path. The cakkavattiis viewed as a 
universal monarch who rules over all four corners of the world. 
58 Harris notes a wide array of 
positive attributes such as strength of nobility, wisdom, and mind to the cakkavatticharacter.
59 
He must also be an adherent of the Ten Virtues of the good king which are "alms-giving, 
morality, charity, justice, penitence, peace, mildness, mercy, meekness, and patience".
60 Also 
"[s]ince he is proficient in the four meditational stages (jhiina) he suffuses his realm with love, 
compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity . .. and he engages in conspicuous and frequent 
acts of generosity". 61 Moreover, his conquests are not usually seen to be achieved through 
violent means but rather by living according to dhamma or doing what is right [dhammena].
62 
55 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, p. 470. 
56 Harris, Ian, "Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots", in Buddhism and Politics in 
Twentieth-Century Asia, p. 4. 
57 Aggaffiiz Sutta, § 20, translation in Collins, Nirvana, Appendix 5, p. 632 . 
58 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit and Human", p. 55. 
59 Harris, "Buddhism and Politics in Asia", p. 4-5. 
60 Harris, "Buddhism and Politics in Asia", p. 4. 
61 Harris, "Buddhism and Politics in Asia", p. 4 
62 Cakkavatti-s1haniida Sutta, §2, translation in Collins, Nirvana, Appendix 3, p. 603. There does however, seem 
to be some discrepancy with this non-violent aspect. Tambiah makes note of an instance in The Book of Gradual 
Sayings where the Buddha discusses a past life as a wheel-turning king (cakkavattJ) who "had more than a 
thousand sons, ... [who were] crushers of enemy-hosts. And when I had conquered it [the four directions of the 
earth], I dwelt within this sea-grit country (ruling), righteously, not needing rod or sword". (p. 45) Tambiah then 
goes on to say that this is denoting that the non-violent rule comes after the violent conquest and how this is a 
problem that historical rulers are faced with. However, all of the other writers I have found to discuss the 
cakkavattiideal have expressed quite strongly that the cakkavattfconquers without violence just as the 
CakkavatU-s1haniida Sutta asserts . Moreover, in Collins' discussion of the cakkavattfhe too quotes this particular 
part of the Buddha's discussion of his past life as a wheel-turning king but his translation says, "He will dwell 
conquering this sea-grit land without violence, without a sword, (but) by righteousness." (p. 472) This rendition 
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Tambiah notes how this non-violent ideal king has been looked to for a guide to historical rule 
when he states, 
As a model of conduct for historical Buddhist kings it is the policy of 
pacification after conquest that has been of greater relevance [ Asoka is a prime 
example of this]. The cakkavatti in effect grants back their domains to the 
subdued kings when they submit to the basic five moral precepts of Buddhism. 
We thus see the king represented as the propagator of the Buddhist precepts 
and as the overseer and the guardian of the morals of his subdued tributaries. 
Indeed, in a sense the king must let conquered rulers keep their thrones, since 
only as a king of kings is he a world monarch.63 
This model king's rise to cakkavattistatus textually is signified primarily by the appearance of 
the Wheel-jewel that once appearing is set to roll over each of the four directions. The 
appearance of the Wheel-jewel however does not come automatically. The man with the thirty 
two auspicious marks after taking the throne must prove himself to be a worthy follower and 
perpetuator of the dhamma and show his personal charisma before the wheel rises up out of 
the ocean. 64 Thus the cakkavattistatus is not hereditary but must be earned. Nearing the end of 
the cakkavatti's life, the Wheel-jewel disappears again. This disappearance signals the time 
when the king must renounce his throne and take the monastic path just as the wheel-turning 
king Da~hanemi in the Cakkavatti -s1hanada Sutta exclaims, "I have enjoyed the pleasures of 
human life, now it is time to seek the pleasures of life in the heavens ... I will cut off my hair 
and beard, put on yellow robes, and go forth from home to homelessness".65 This final act of 
renouncing material wealth and pleasures reinforces the supremacy of the monastic or spiritual 
path despite the magnificence and the righteousness of the cakkavatti 
In the Burmese context there were several instances where references were made to cakkavatti 
n ideals and characteristics. Aung Thwin notes several such as "King Aniruddha [Anawrahta] 
of Pagan [who] was called "cakravartiy Aniruddha"... Mailkhoil II of A va in 1485 was 
implies that the conquering was achieved without violence. I think one has to conclude that the translation 
differences - Tambiah using E. M. Hare ' s 1935 translation and Collins using K. R. Norman's 1992 translation-
are the main cause of discrepancy here. For our purposes here, I have resigned myself in favour of Collins' 
translation, as Tambiah's interpretation is the only one I have come across that claims this violent conquest 
aspect. So I have sided with the majority on this issue with the modification that one could say that this non-
violence is usually the way the cakkavatticharacter is portrayed. The problem of this violence/non-violence 
aspect of kingship is an important issue for kingship that I will attend to later as well. 
63 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 46-47. 
64 Reynolds, "The Two Wheels ofDhamma", p. 21. 
65 Cakkavatti-sihan!ida Sutta, §3, Collins, Nirvana , p. 603. 
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referred to as "Lord of the Four Islands, the cakravarti"."66 Aung Thwin also mentions the 
stupa built for the funeral of King Thalun of the Toungoo Dynasty. Only four great beings can 
be honoured in this way, one of which is a cakkavatti He was also spoken of as "the cakka 
king, lord of the Four Island [sic] [who] departed to Tavatirilsa".67 But despite the titles used 
and the use of other references to cakkavatti status on the whole the cakkavatti ideal 
historically has remained exactly that - a mythical ideal. Other epithets provided historical 
kingship with a somewhat more 'human' figure. The figure of the dhammari§a fitted the bill 
in a more realistic fashion and a brief discussion of it here will help to fill out somewhat the 
Buddhist notions of an ideal king that are impmiant in the Burmese context. 68 
Dhammari§a (Righteous Ruler) like the cakkavattiideal focuses strongly on the importance of 
moral action and of upholding and maintaining the dhamma. He must make an effort to follow 
the ten virtues of the good king and rule in a just manner. The dhammar !§a figure harks back 
once again to the Aggaiiffa Sutta story of the declining world order and the rise of kingship to 
reduce the downslide. As I mentioned above, Mahasammata seemed to have a more practical 
function than the cakkavatti ideal portrays. Rather than being expected to bring about the 
perfect state Mahasammata is portrayed as making the best out of an imperfect world. As 
Reynolds implies when he states that Mahasammata's election to kingship is "a rule which 
actualizes as much of the dhamma as is possible given the fallen state ofhumanity".69 Neither 
is the dhammari§a necessarily attributed with completely non-violent conquest. Although it 
would very nice indeed, non-violent conquest is probably the most unrealistic aspect of the 
cakkavattipersonality for practical kingship. In most accounts the dhammariga description 
allows for this flaw. 
There are several examples in the Burmese tradition that show this flaw of violent conquest 
but at the same time make some attempt to act righteously and, at least in public, to be seen to 
be a protector of Buddhism and upholder of the dhamma. Anawratha is probably the most 
66 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit and Human", p. 56. 
67 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit and Human", p. 55 . 
68 The title of dhammarifja or righteous ruler does however certainly come under the description of the cakkavattl 
but in most of the works I have viewed it is also spoken of in its own right as a somewhat watered down version 
of an ideal king. Aung Thwin especially, who is one of the few writers I have come across that looks specifically 
at the Burmese context rather than a 'pan' Theravada Buddhist perspective, certainly has the dhammarifja figure 
as a related but yet distinct and more human character than the cakkavatti 
69 Reynolds, "The Two Wheels ofDhamma", p. 19. 
27 
prominent example of this with his conquest into lower Myanmar and the extraction of the 
'pure' Tipi_taka texts and most of the members of the sangha from the area in an attempt to 
purify Buddhism throughout the rest of his kingdom. From this he was seen to be preserving 
the Theravada tradition, and like the cakkavatti could be seen to be a "propagator of the 
Buddhist precepts and as the overseer and the guardian of the morals of his subdued 
tributaries".70 Aung Thwin extends this further to state that "wars became variably effmis to 
seek the holy relics, proselytize Buddhism, and acquire the "pure texts" and that "[t]hese were 
dharmavijaya, "righteous conquests"" which were all useful ways of legitimising what many 
would see as political tasks. 71 But despite this flaw the figure of the dhammari§a remained an 
ideal that several of the Burmese kings attempted to reach - at least in public view and in the 
accounts as kept in the chronicles. An example of this is found in a wall inscription of 
Myanmar's most famous Pagoda, the Shwedagon, which is a prayer attributed to Alaungsithu 
( 1112-1167) which says, 
But I would build a causeway sheer athwart 
The river of Samsara (illusion), and all folk 
Would speed across thereby until they reach 
The Blessed City. I myself would cross 
And drag the drowning over. Ay, myself 
Tamed, I would tame the wilful; comforted, 
Comfmi the timid; wakened, wake the asleep; 
Cool, cool the burning; freed, set free the bound. 
Tranquil and led by the good doctrines I 
Would hatred calm. The three immoral states, 
Greed, hate, delusion, rooted all in self, 
0 may they die, whenever born in me. 72 
Alaungsithu certainly gives the impression that he desires to be an ideal king- a dhammari§a 
- acting with compassion to all those caught in the river of salJlSiira. Beyond the Burmese 
borders to India however, Asoka, with his legendary Buddhist rule and mission, provided 
kingship in Southeast Asia with the most important example of rule according to the dhamma. 
70 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 46. 
71 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit and Human", p. 52. Another method of staking one's claim on a kingdom was to 
build a stupa in the area so to show one's moral and religious superiority. Reynolds and Clifford cite 
Dhammaceti, a king of the lower Mon kingdom, who did this as a means to "ovenide the local powers by 
incorporating them into the dhamma-realm of the capital". Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the 
Struggle for National Integration", p. 73. 
72 Cited in Hall, Burma, p. 22 . 
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Through his rock edicts he espouses a morality and benevolence that should radiate to all 
within the kingdom. Asoka wrote that, 
There is no gift that can equal the gift of Dharma, the establishment of human 
relations in Dharma, the distribution of wealth through Dharma, or kinship in 
Dharma. That gift consists in proper treatment of slaves and servants, 
obedience to mother and father, liberality to friends , acquaintances, relatives, 
priests and ascetics and abstention from the slaughter of animals. (Rock Edict 
XI.)73 
Like a dhammaraja after a violent conquest, namely the Kalinga war of 262 B.C.E., Asoka 
renounced violent rule and turned his position towards the dhamma path. Even though Asoka 
was not Burmese his historical precedence as a dhammaraja and image as one of the most 
esteemed Buddhist rulers did not detract from the example he provided for kingship within the 
Burmese borders. This is true even in contemporary Myanmar. 
In summary, I have attempted to show some of the ways Buddhism has related to political life 
in pre-colonial Myanmar and to illustrate to some degree how some important facets of 
Buddhist thought reinforced the state' s quest for centralisation. By looking at the figures of the 
cakkavattiand the dhammaraja - a somewhat mythical figure and a more realistic figure- I 
have tried to highlight some of the ideals that Buddhism gave to the identity of the king. Also I 
have shown by way of the laws of kamma how the king was seen as an important figure in 
maintaining order in the cosmos or in the dhamma-realm. However, before I go on to discuss 
the relationship between the sangha and the state, I think it is necessary to discuss briefly that 
despite the ideals given by Buddhist ideology the figure of the king is also seen in a very 
negative light in Buddhist thought. Also, it can be said that very few, if any, of the actual 
Burmese kings ever came close to the ideal of dhammaraja let alone to cakkavattistatus. The 
example of Asoka, as mentioned already would have to be the closest in any respects across 
the entire Buddhist world. And from most accounts there doesn't seem to be any Burmese 
king that would quite measure up to Asokan standards even though the rule of Anawratha and 
Mindon certainly included many Buddhist concerns. The majority it seems illustrated well the 
conflict between an ideal Buddhist dhamma-realm and the practical realities of political rule. 
Such an example is the case of Alaungpaya (1752-1760) who was responsible for compiling 
the Dhammathat law code, modelled India' s Law of Manu, and which took a strong Buddhist 
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ethical approach in its orientation. At the same time Alaungpaya was considered one of the 
most ruthless rulers. 74 
The early textual tradition is also certainly aware of the pitfalls of kingship. Sarkisyanz notes 
that in the early Vinaya texts ""danger from kings" is put before danger from robbers, from 
fire , from water ... ".75 Another text goes on to say that the greed of a king will never be 
satisfied, "A king, even if he has conquered the whole earth with seas and mountains full of 
unlimited riches and now rules over it, wishes to possess the land which lies beyond the sea; 
because all is not enough for him, he will not be filled".
76 The Buddha himself of course 
rejected kingship for the spiritual path. In the Miigapakkha (Temiya) Jiitaka the story is told 
of how in a prior birth into a royal family the Buddha acted as if he was dumb, crippled and 
deaf so as not to inherit the royal throne. He does so because he remembers back to another 
life when he was a king and after his death he had spent eighty thousand years in hell. 
It is not difficult to understand then how the spiritual path is seen to be superior to the lay path 
where the king reigns supreme. The next section on the relationship between the sangha and 
the state will help to illuminate this even further. But what I can conclude so far is that, despite 
the difficulties involved in the meeting of Buddhism with kingship and political realism, the 
ideals and conceptions of the cosmos that Buddhism has offered pre-colonial politics have 
played a part in maintaining its structure, its legitimacy and provided it with an ideal to strive 
for- albeit a difficult one to achieve. 
Sangha and State Relations 
The relationship between sangha and state in pre-colonial Myanmar centres on kingly 
protection and monastic legitimisation. The King as the head of the lay path was expected to 
be the primary supporter of the sang ha and played an important role in maintaining its purity 
and ensuring its survival, which according to Buddhists should be for a five thousand year 
duration. The sangha, whilst in one sense it resides outside the concerns of 'worldly' affairs 
and should essentially be focussed on nibbiina, because of its reliance on the support of the 
73 Cited in Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 60. 
74 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 7. 
75 Mahiivagga, II, xv, 4, cited in Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 78. 
76 Taphlfmahantatiiya, Jiitaka V, cited in Collins, Nirvana, p. 423. 
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king and the laity in general must engage with society. The relationship between the two is 
described by Tambiah; 
Kingship as the crux of order in society provides the conditions and the context 
for the survival of sasana (religion). They need each other: religion in being 
supported by an ordered and prosperous society is able to act as a "field of 
merit" in which merit making can be enacted and its fruits enjoyed, while the 
king as the foremost merit maker needs the sangha to make and realize his 
merit and fulfill his kingship.77 
As the main representative of the Buddhist tradition the sangha served to legitimate kingly 
rule and also functioned as a perpetuator of the moral order and teacher of the dhamma. 
Morally the sangha had superiority over the king and because of this it had the uncommon 
ability to criticise the king and his actions. This antagonistic ability becomes a core feature of 
the Buddhism and state relationship throughout Burmese political history and, as we shall see 
below, allows Buddhism a voice in politics. But for now it is important to note how the 
sang ha and the king had begun to play out the Two-Wheel structure on the historical stage. 
On the Burmese historical stage the interplay between the king and the sangha had varying 
degrees of tensions and as well as cordial relations. Collins' comment that relations between 
the king and the sangha were "seen as co-operation and/or feud between rival factions of the 
elite", fits well into Myanmar's context. 78 Early on the sangha and Buddhism in general took a 
dominant place in the concerns of the monarchy in its establishment of the great kingdom of 
Pagan, where pagodas and monasteries are estimated to have numbered at least 13,000 
surrounding the capital. 79 Although later dynasties did not go to this extent in building 
religious structures, they still maintained close links with the sangha, and also instigated 
several s iisana reforms that endeavoured to purify the Order. One of the dominating factors 
contributing to the state's concern with the monkhood was on account of their influences in 
many areas of Burmese life and their status amongst all levels of society. They were the ones 
who could share merit most effectively, they were seen as morally superior and perhaps more 
importantly, it was the sangha who provided the people with education. Literacy was 
extremely high as Spiro notes that Burmese literacy levels would have been the highest in all 
77 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 41. 
78 Collins, Nirvana, p. 415. 
79 Hall, Burma, p. 14. 
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of Asia and possibly had one of the top levels of literacy in the world. 
80 All this was due to the 
education given by the monks. 
Although the monastic life should focus primarily on individual nibbiinic pursuits and the 
general rule is not to interfere in politics, monks throughout Burmese kingship history have 
deliberately involved themselves in political affairs. Cady notes that there were instances were 
monks played significant roles in removing kings from the throne and in some cases "acted as 
interim regents".81 Such was the case in 1747 in the Pegu court where for a few days a monk 
named Neko took the throne before Binnya Dala took over.
82 On other occasions monks were 
used as mediators in negotiations- a practice still used today.
83 But there are also instances 
where monks came under attack from rulers because of their involvement in politics. One 
example is given by Harvey when Alaungpaya threw 3000 monks into the path of elephants to 
be trampled as the monks had aided a town in resisting Alaungpaya's army.
84 Predominantly 
kingly tolerance of the sang ha was the norm though, despite the political roles they .sometimes 
took. Because of the influence of the sang ha in society as a whole and its role in legitimising 
political rule, most rulers needed to support the sangha well, as Harvey states, "they 
represented the public conscience, and every good king strove to win their approval".
85 
Whilst deliberate intervention by monks in political affairs was one way the sangha affected 
kingly rule, there were more indirect ways in which they impacted on state affairs . At one 
extreme, Aung Thwin argues that the impact of the sangha, or more specifically, the sangha 
lands and the inability of kings to achieve successful s iisana reforms were a consistent and 
major factor in the downfall of the major dynastic rules throughout the entire kingship period. 
Harvey's mention of the Burmese proverb "the pagoda is finished and the great country 
ruined", which came out of this period, reflects this.
86 Aung Thwin asserts that one of the main 
thrusts behind the siisana reforms, which will be discussed in more detail below, was to 
reclaim land and wealth that had been donated to the sangha, in efforts to gain merit, whether 
80 Spiro, M., Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes, p. 307. 
81 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 53. See also Harvey, History of Burma, p. 182, for another example of 
the monks being involved in the removal of a king. 
82 Harvey, G., History of Burma, p. 215. 
83 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 52. 
84 Harvey, History of Burma, p. 235. 
85 Harvey, History of Burma, p. 199. 
86 Harvey, History of Burma, p. 63. 
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it was through royal patronage or through private benefactors. The main problem was that 
sangha land was unable to be taxed. Aung Thwin provides statistics that show a minimum of 
65 percent of cultivatable land had been donated to the sangha by 1301.
87 Moreover, this 
pattern of patronage continued throughout the history of the monarchy because, "[t]he political 
ideology surrounding the concept of the kammari§a required that the king continue to build 
works of merit at least equal to those built by his predecessors, and to perpetuate the system of 
royal endowments".88 However, Victor Lieberman disputes these statistics claiming that Aung 
Thwin has quite possibly misinterpreted these figures and records that have previously been 
considered to show much less sangha patronage.89 Although Lieberman does accept Aung 
Thwin's argument that the plenitude (whatever the precise figures) of sangha donations in the 
Pagan period may have impacted significantly on its downfall, he does not accept this fact for 
later dynasties . He states that cash rather than land was given which did not have quite the 
same impact on revenue collection that land had had. Aung Thwin replied to this by stating 
that cash may have been given because the amount of land accessible for donation had 
decreased because of prior donations. It is difficult, albeit impossible, to come to any certain 
conclusion on the discussion without looking back to the original records and texts, which is 
an impossible task here. Probably Lieberman' s comment that "[c]ertainly a note of caution is 
in order" is not an unreasonable stance to take.90 The least that could be said is that the issue of 
sangha land was enough of a problem that the kings felt a need to do something about it. 
Another area of indirect impact of the sang ha on the state was on the labour front. Religious 
slaves (hpaya kyuns) had, at least in earlier pre-colonial history, a reasonable status in society. 
The donation of one's labour to the religion would have ensured good kamma. They were 
exempt from military service, from the paying taxes and from corvee service, and in a labour 
scarce area had obviously not been a welcome aspect of sangha support in the eyes of the 
king. For by the 1 ih century the king had outlawed intermarriage between these slaves and the 
king was the only one who could place new slaves into service, which Lieberman states, was 
probably reserved for punishment of criminals and rebels.91 Thus, in later dynasties the 
87 Aung Thwin, "The Role of Sasana Reform in Bmmese History: Economic Dimensions of a Religious 
Purification", in Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, August 1979, p. 677. 
88 Aung Thwin, "The Role of Sasana Reform in Burmese History", p. 685. 
89 Lieberman, "The Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History: Some Further Thoughts", in 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 39, no . 4, August 1980, p . 754. 
90 Lieberman, "The Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History" , p. 754. 
91 Lieberman, "The Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History", p. 761. 
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religious slaves did not receive such a high regard in society, numbers decreased and their 
impact on the state revenue and labour sources could be nullified. 
Overall, the general pattern of sangha and state relations over the monarchical period seems to 
be that because of the sangha 's ability to stand outside of the state, its economic ties and the 
ability to criticise kingly rule it was imp01iant for the king to exercise more control over the 
sang ha as time went on. The appointment of the thathanabaing, or head of the sang ha, which 
was firmly established in the later dynasties, illustrates this point as only the king could make 
such an appointment.92 Moreover, the appointee was more often than not the monk who had 
taught the king rather than a monk with the greatest seniority, that is, the personal preference 
of the king was the method of choice usually used. Thus, the king had direct control of sang ha 
leadership for a considerable time. 
The primary role of the thathanabaing was as an intermediary between the king and the 
sangha. He headed the sangha hierarchy and remained in his position for as long as the king 
wished or until the death of the king and removal by the succeeding monarch. As head of the 
Order he also had the role of appointing monks throughout the kingdom, which served an 
important function of the king, via the thathanabaing, achieving a widespread influence. 
Ideally the appointment of the thathanabaing was a part of the king's attempt to maintain a 
strong unified sang ha, which he could consistently and effectively control. As a general rule, a 
divided sangha meant the king did not have such a widespread influence. This desire for 
control through the appointment of a thathanabaing is illustrated well in the reign of King 
Bodawpaya whose appointment of a thathanabaing of the 'two-shoulder' faction was a 
significant factor in ending the longstanding factionalism between the 'one-shoulder' and 
'two-shoulder' parties within the sangha.93 The decision on orthodoxy was not made by the 
monks themselves but by the king. Bodawpaya's instigation of the Thudhamma council 
(Council of Elders) of monks whom he had personally chosen was also another sign of his 
92 Exactly when the title thathanabaing came into use is not altogether clear. Mendelson notes that in the earlier 
dynasties, generally speaking, the head of the sangha was called the 'royal preceptor' or in some cases the 
sanghar~a, and that it wasn't until Bodawpaya's reign (1782-1819) that the title came into common usage, at 
least this is how the chronicles have recorded it. However, Mendelson also notes that some Burmese sources do 
cite thathanabaing 's dating back to the reign ofMinkyiswasawke (1368-1401). Mendelson, Sangha and State in 
Burma, pp. 53-54. 
93 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 59. 
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desire to maintain widespread control of sangha organisation.
94 The thathanabaing was still 
superior in status to the Thudhamma council but Mendelson notes that it was not uncommon 
for the thathanabaing to act in a more "primus inter pares" manner - especially when it was 
not ideal for a monk to stand out as a leader.
95 
The desire for a unified sang ha and strong leadership in the figure of the thathanabaing in the 
closing stages of the Burmese monarchy however was beginning to fall to pieces. Under 
Mindon (1852-1878) divisions increased. A significant part of the problem was the 
disintegration of the kingdom - the division between upper Myanmar which was still under 
Mindon's direct mle and lower Myanmar which was being controlled by the British. This 
disintegration paved the way for factions within the sangha to be somewhat independent from 
'orthodox' groups that were focussed around the king, the thathanabaing and the capital. 
Another part of the divisive nature of the sangha and the weakening of the thathanabaing's 
authority was that, as Mendelson suggests, there seemed to be a backlash at Mindon's 
interference into sang ha matters and his desire for loyalty from the entire sang ha. 
96 Although 
Mindon is often cited as a good example of an ideal Buddhist king and as Stewart states, "[h)e 
made liberal monthly offerings to the monks ... commenced his revision of the scriptures in 
1860" and allowed the sangha to be exempt from his household tax, this concern seems to 
have backfired in some respects.97
 Several groups in the sangha turned against Mindon 
because they considered him to hold too much power. Stewart even goes on to say, "For the 
greater pari of his reign he [Mind on] was his own Thathanabaing". 
98 Such power should have 
resided with those who followed the monastic path rather than those in the lay path.
99 
Consequently these monks formed new factions in lower Myanmar, which in many ways was 
out of Mindon's reach. Mindon's call for the Fifth Buddhist Council, following the Asokan 
model, still did little to achieve unity in the sangha. These divisions within the Burmese 
sang ha would later become the norm of Burmese Buddhism and provided the political figures 
of a Myanmar fighting for independence with an eclectic base in the drive towards Burmese 
nationalism, which will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
94 I have not been able to find any specific dates for the instigation of this Thudhamma Council. At best one can 
say that it appeared at some stage through Bodawpaya 's reign. 
95 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 56. 
96 Mendelson, Sang ha and State in Burma, p. 102. 
97 Stewart, cited in Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 82. 
98 Stewart, cited in Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 83. 
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The general pattern of control of the sangha by the king through the appointment of the 
thathanabaing, and the eventual breakdown of the unity of the sangha in the Burmese 
monarchy's closing scenes, however, was not the only method of control utilised by the 
Burmese kings. Siisana reforms, unlike the appointment of the thathanabaing, were one 
method of control that appeared throughout the entire monarchical era. Beginning in the Pagan 
era with Anawratha in the 11th century and ending with Mindon's Fifth Buddhist Council in 
the 1850s. 
Siisana reform was one of the few methods kings could employ that was an accepted way of 
reclaiming funds and land from the sangha. They were seen as purifying a wealthy and sect 
ridden order, which reinforced the king's role as protector of the religion by ensuring the 
monks maintained strict adherence to the Vinaya rules. Kings could have increased legitimacy 
in carrying out such reforms, as Aung Thwin asserts, 
Successful purification implied strong leadership at the center, and 
unsuccessful reform, weak central leadership . . .. it is not without reason that 
Buddhist history has conceptually equated strong kings with pure Buddhism 
and weak kings with impure Buddhism. 100 
Reforms also had the added advantage in weeding out 'false ' and ' impure' monks who may 
have been opposed to the state or who may have been in danger of leading heretical factions 
and also of ridding the sangha of wayward beliefs and practices, which included Tantric 
practices and the consumption of forbidden foods and drink.101 Lieberman suggests that the 
reforms also played a role in protecting the sangha from the laity, who in some instances may 
have illegally claimed sangha land and used it for their own purposes.
102 
The general methods of reform used were on two levels. One level dealt with the records of 
donation transactions, and their authenticity- basically an audit. The other level was aimed at 
religious purification, wherein the kings usually chose a small group of monks, usually under 
99 This is a problem that will be looked at futiher in the next chapter in more detail when the possibility of a 
collapsing Dhamma-Wheel structure occurs as one realm crosses too far over the boundaries of the other realm. 
100 Aung Thwin, "The Role of Sasana Reform in Burmese History", p. 683 . 
101 Harris, "Buddhism and Politics in Asia", p. 2. Aung Thwin, "Kingship, the Sangha, and Society in Pagan", p. 
229. 
102 Lieberman, "The Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History", p. 767. 
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twenty, who were sent to Ceylon to be reordained. On their return to Myanmar they proceeded 
to reordain the rest of the sang ha. However, in this reordaination, all monks were wiped of all 
prior status regardless of seniority and any monks who practised such things as magic, 
medicine and such like were defrocked. 103 An impmiant aspect of reform was also that the 
king was able to put a limit on the number of monks that were to be reordained and thus 
maintained a little more control on the number of subjects who were outside the reaches of the 
tax system and civillaw. 104 
Overall, siisana reform was an important means of controlling the sangha, to limit its land and 
general wealth, to keep control of the numbers of monks and the number of factions which 
made controlling the order difficult. Aside from this aspect of control it also aided the 'purity' 
of the sangha by ensuring the Vinaya rules were closely kept and that a lid was kept on 
heretical factions that may have weakened the sangha 's unity and ultimately the survival of 
the religion as a respected force in society. From this conclusion, one could say that the king's 
influence on the sangha may have predominantly come from political motivation but it also 
had benefits for the sangha as we11. 105 
The overall relationship between the sangha and state seemed to be predominantly one where 
whilst on the one hand the sang ha maintained some sort of independence from the state, at the 
same time they needed protection and support from the king. On the side of the king, the 
sangha provided him with legitimacy but at the same time it was important he establish 
himself as a strong king, that there be a unified sangha and one that he could at least to some 
extent manipulate and keep under control. The most appropriate way of looking at this 
relationship is by considering the two as being in an 'antagonistic-symbiosis'. This manner of 
relations between the sangha and the state was first put forward by Gunawardana in his 
103 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 52. 
104 Aung Thwin, "The Role of Sasana Reform in Burmese History", p. 682. 
105 It is difficult to assess exactly what motivated the king to instigate siisana reform. Aung Thwin gives the 
impression that it is primarily motivated by economic concerns. Lieberman and Mendelson assess it both as 
political concern and also from concern for the sangha itself. An example of this sangha concern is found in 
Mendelson's description ofDhammaceti's (151h century) wherein he, once a monk himself, proceeded the reform 
by studying in detail the Vinaya along with all of its commentaries to ensure correct reform. Mendelson, Sang ha 
and State in Burma, pp. 50-51 . Mendelson certainly gives the impression that there was some sincerity in 
Dhammaceti's reform at least. I think it is realistic to assume that the intentions were economically, politically 
and religiously minded - the weighting of each no doubt varied for each ruler. 
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research into monasticism and kingship in medieval Sri Lanka.
106 Collins follows through his 
assessment further in relating it to the Pali texts in general, and not surprisingly, it also seems 
to fit in well to the Burmese context. Both parties were reliant on one other whilst at the same 
time remaining distinct. Just as Collins quote earlier suggested that the relationship include 
both "co-operation and/or feud", and this is essentially at the heart of the antagonistic-
symbiosis.107 
A further important aspect of this relationship put forward by Collins that I think is necessary 
to examine further is the question of what allowed the sang ha to stand outside of the state to 
such an extent in the first place? How did they have the means to provide an alternative 
structure in society and to be able to criticise the kings? Collins, in his reply, likens the 
sangha 's ability to do this the role of the clown or court jester, in that "they are structurally 
situated to say things to and about kings which others cannot".
108 He goes on to explain that 
one of the ways the sangha achieved this was because it provided a transcendental ethic for 
temporal existence. He calls this a 'transcendental vision', 
a rationalizing, holistic analysis of life in the here-and-now, both individual and 
social, based ethically on a realm of values and metaphysically on a locus of 
aspirations structured independently of and differently from the here-and-
now.l09 
This reiterates again what was said earlier about the sangha 's status by way of its superior 
morality. It is this transcendental vision that allows the sangha to stand outside of the state and 
at least to some extent outside of its control. The sangha 's ability to criticise lay centrally in 
this transcendental ethic. The king however, because of the sangha 's place in society and its 
ability to criticise had to some extent to keep hold of the reigns of the sang ha to maintain his 
legitimacy and power. This is why siisana reform became an important part of the relationship. 
This relationship however, cannot only be expressed in the relationship between the sangha 
and the king. Rather it can be seen to bring together what I have discussed in earlier sections. 
Just as the discussion so far has worked its way from wider cosmological and ideological 
106 Gunawardana, R., Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka, p. 344. 
107 Collins, Nirvana, p. 415 . 
108 Collins, Nirvana, p. 35 . 
109 Collins, Nirvana, p. 20-21. 
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conceptions to the historical stage of Myanmar's monastic and kingly interaction, so too can 
this antagonistic-symbiosis idea work its way back to the wider themes. The Two Wheels are 
in an antagonistic-symbiosis. They are distinct realms but are bound by together in the all-
encompassing dhamma-realm. Overall one could say that the nibbanic path whilst grounded 
and beginning in the sa1J7S iiric wheel, stands above and beyond the wheel of rebirth. The 
cosmo-geography spoken of earlier reinforces this, as it is only Jambudipa where the nibbanic 
path can begin and it is the only place where the Buddha can appear. In the 'inclusive 
hierarchy' the spiritual wheel is considered superior to the 'temporal' wheel. It is Buddhism's 
moral status that gives it this edge over the state. With this it could act as a "safety valve" for 
Burmese society safeguarding against political abuse. 110 Moreover, these different components 
of the antagonistic-symbiotic relationship are essentially all expressions about the same issue, 
the merging of an ideal with the pragmatic. Buddhism provides the ideal for the pragmatism of 
kingship. It is not an easy relationship. It includes within it many tensions and in many ways 
irresolvable difficulties. But Buddhist ideology, in particular by way of its expression of the 
'Two Wheels of Dhamma ', I think, allows and accepts this. 
Overall, it is this development of the idea of the antagonistic-symbiotic relationship in this 
pre-colonial era that provides the core structure and pattern of relating in later Burmese 
political history also. It becomes integral in understanding the consistent dynamic of the Two-
Wheel structure as it is played out in Burmese political life. In the following chapters the need 
to balance the antagonistic and the symbiotic and the difficulties and problems associated with 
this balancing become central. 
110 Aung Thwin, "Divinity, Spirit and Human", p. 74. 
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Chapter Two. 
Colonial rule and the Burmese Reaction. 
The onset of Colonial mle into Myanmar created a dramatic shift in the administrative 
stmctures of the state, but also in the way that Buddhist ideology interacted in state affairs. 
Chapter one established the notion of the Buddhism/state interaction as being in an 
antagonistic-symbiotic relationship. Essential to the stmcture of this relationship was the need 
for the sangha, and Buddhist ideology to remain at a certain distance from the state to enable it 
to act as the "safety valve" for society. At the same time it needed the king to act as its 
protector, as one of its key providers and as a promoter of the faith. With the delicate balance 
maintained between independence and dependence the Dhamma-Wheel stmcture was 
maintained and an ordered cosmos, at least in theory, ensued. However, with the British entry 
into Myanmar, the cord between Buddhism and the state was effectively severed and the 
Dhamma-Wheel stmcture came under threat of collapse. 
What I will show in this chapter is how under Colonialmle the lack of support, protection and 
promotion that Buddhism had become accustomed to under the monarchy caused a dramatic 
swing to the other side of the relationship, that is, Buddhism's ability to criticise. The 
symbiosis between Buddhism and the state was dissolved and antagonism came to the fore. 
This dramatic shift is illustrated most effectively in looking at the significant role political 
monks took in the nationalist movement throughout the Colonial period. The threat posed to 
the Two-Wheel stmcture by this swing was primarily in Buddhism's crossing of boundaries 
too far into the lay wheel which subsequently endangered Buddhism's status as an alternative 
stmcture. With this threat Buddhism's moral integrity or transcendental vision lay in jeopardy. 
As Reynolds and Clifford state, "When the two wheel stmcture collapses the typical reason is 
that one path has sought to incorporate the other rather than uphold its qualitative difference."
1 
The ideal that Buddhism offered to the pragmatic world of politics came under threat because 
those who upheld this ideal became too involved in this pragmatic world. Furthermore, I will 
argue that the development of the lay nationalist movement, led by the Thakins, that 
eventually brought about independence for Myanmar, in its strict advocacy of the secular 
1 Reynolds, F., and R. Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration: Burma and 
Thailand", p. 68. 
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politics, can be understood as an attempt to counterbalance the political monks' crossing of 
boundaries - effectively re-balancing the dhammic-order. 
To illustrate the Dhamma-Wheel structure predicament, in particular, the cutting off of the 
'symbiotic' part of the relationship, the first part of the chapter outlines the British 
administration's policy of neutrality. It was this policy that was primarily responsible for 
taking away the state's traditional role of supporting, protecting and to some extent, 
controlling Buddhism and the policy that led the Burmese to view the British as anti-Buddhist. 
Next, I will examine the dramatic swing to the 'antagonistic' side of the relationship by many 
within the nationalist movement, and in particular, the politicised pongyis (monks) who 
dominated nationalist politics in the 1920s and early 1930s. Finally, the Thakins' approach 
will be discussed as a counter-reaction to the politicised sangha. 
British Entry- Taking Away the 'Symbiotic' 
British entry into Myanmar was not a fast moving single conquest but rather took three moves 
to complete full annexation of the region. The Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824 - 1826, 1852 -
1853, and 1885 step by step brought British rule over the entire region. Tenasserim, Assam, 
Arakan and Manipur were first, Pegu, including the sought after Rangoon port were second, 
and finally after the exile of Thibaw in 1885, Upper Myanmar fell to the British. The 
annexation of the entire Burmese Kingdom heralded a new beginning in Anglo-Burmese 
tension. From beginning to end the entire colonial period was dogged with Burmese 
disaffection with its foreign rulers. Not only did British rule impact severely on the 
administrative structures of the state but also on its ideological structures, in particular, those 
concerning Buddhism. 
Under British rule, the structures of social mobility and of administration were knocked down. 
The Hlutdaw (Royal Council), the ahmudan and athi, who as outlined in chapter one, formed 
the crux of the centralised state and were upheld by Buddhist ideology, were dissolved. In 
place the British installed village headmen who became the primary point of contact between 
the colonial administration and the village. Economically the country had a dramatic overhaul. 
Rather than keeping the 'lid on' trade and economic increase Myanmar became a "full 
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flowering ... capitalist economy". 2 However, despite the increased wealth of the country few 
Bmmese benefited from it. Many of the peasants of Lower Myanmar succumbed to the 
sophisticated business skills of the South Indian Chettyar money lenders who had given the 
farmers credit to expand their rice production areas. After charging exorbitant interest rates 
(up to 50 percent) and after the 1930 collapse in the rice market much of the land went directly 
into the hands of the moneylenders.3 Simone and Thompson Feraru state "by 1938, the largest 
landowners [Indian] in the Irawaddy River delta owned two and a half million acres or about 
27 percent of all the land in lower Burma".4 This land alienation was to become an important 
contributor to the nationalist fervour and was at the heart of many of the anti-Indian attacks 
that frequently occurred in the latter part of British rule. 
The importance of discussing the social, administrative and economic impact of the Colonial 
rule here lies in the fact that under the monarchy, as was outlined in Chapter One, these 
structures of state were tightly woven and maintained by Buddhist ideology. The centralisation 
structures under the king were bound together by the notions of kamma and by viewing the 
royal throne as the sacred Mount Meru and the Burmese nation as the utopian Jambud.ijJa. 
Moreover, economic practices were often concerned with merit making with a view for long 
term investments in a future life unlike the sharp business concerns of the Chettyar 
moneylenders and British rulers. With the onset of British rule, the attack of the traditional 
structures of statehood consequently brought an attack on the ideas that supported these 
structures - Buddhist ideology inadvertently came under fire. No longer was the ideal needed 
in the realm of the pragmatic. 
Overall, in conquest and pacification Aung Thwin asserts that "For the British, the ultimate 
goal was revenue and its concomitants of power, prestige and so on .. .. In contrast the goal of 
indigenous pacification was essentially to preserve and continue a tradition ... ".5 Buddhist 
ideology that was intimately tied up with this tradition, with the onset of Colonial rule, was 
pushed out of its place of legitimator of the state. The British legacy was one where church 
and state should remain wholly separate, whereas for the Burmese, although Buddhism in one 
2 Taylor, R., The State in Burma, pp. 68- 69. 
3 Sar Desai, D., Southeast Asia: Past and Present, p. 176. 
4 Simone, V., and A. Thompson Feraru, The Asian Pacific: Political and Economic Development in a Global 
Context, p. 85. 
5 Aung Thwin, M., "The British "Pacification" of Burma: Order Without Meaning", p. 253. 
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sense needed to be separate from state affairs, it still was inextricably bound to the ideal of 
statehood. The British view of the separation of church and state ultimately, and not 
surprisingly, led to a policy of neutrality towards Buddhism. It was this policy of neutrality 
that ultimately set the Dhamma-Wheel structure askew.6 The antagonistic-symbiotic 
relationship that Buddhism and the state once had was being recast- without the symbiosis. 
The Policy of Neutrality 
Early on in the colonial period it did seem that Britain was to make an attempt to play the role 
once assigned to the king in his protection and support of Buddhism. A report, which 
Woodward suggests was probably written by Colonel Sladen, a British officer who was 
appointed to head the Hlutdaw prior to its dissolution, asserts that, 
... the Pongyi or religious body would be protected, and allowed to carry out 
their religious duties unhindered, and that all religious buildings and precincts 
would be preserved, while Buddhism would remain the national religion, and 
would be respected. 7 
This statement of good intent however, was short lived. The dominant policy that the Colonial 
government soon took was a neutral stance towards Buddhism. The general attitude is 
apparent in the statement made by Queen Victoria that asserts " ... we do strictly charge and 
enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with 
the religious belief or worship of any subjects on pain of our highest displeasure."8 The 
Burmese did not see the British policy of non-interference as a generous gesture of tolerance 
but rather they saw it as slur against their religion. As Woodward states, "while the British 
attempted to treat Burmese Buddhism as a bounded domain, Burmese continued to interpret 
British actions in terms of classical notions of Buddhist polity, or in the case of the colonial 
state, anti-Buddhist polity".9 This 'anti-Buddhist' stance in the view of the Burmese set the 
course for Buddhism to become an integral part of the nationalist movement's reaction. It 
6 The notion of an 'skewed dhamma-realm' is borrowed from Aung Thwin, "The British "Pacification" of 
Burma", p. 255 . 
7 Cited in Woodward, M., "When One Wheel Stops: Theravada Buddhism and the British Raj in Upper Burma", 
p. 65. 
8 Cited in Smith, D., Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 42. 
9 Woodward, "When One Wheel Stops", pp. 60 - 61 . 
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fuelled the fire building in the antagonistic side of the dhammic-order. One of the most 
important groups that this stance impacted on, of course, was the sangha. 
Neutrality's impact on the Sangha 
There were two primary problems that Burmese Buddhism faced with British neutrality. These 
were the failure by the British to appoint and support the thathanabaing in the traditional 
Burmese manner and the extending of civil court jurisdiction to include power over the 
sangha, which subsequently weakened the sangha 's legal authority. 
As we saw in Chapter One the position of thathanabaing had by latter times become an 
important facet of sangha-state relations. Prior to 1886, when Lower Myanmar was under 
British rule the only thathanabaing appointed was in Upper Myanmar. 10 After the annexation 
of Upper Myanmar this position came under threat as its traditional provider, the monarchy, 
was non-existent. Initially Colonel Sladen, proposed that the position of thathanabaing be 
maintained and a new thathanabaing be elected in Lower Myanmar to take control of the 
faction ridden sang ha of the lower regions. Sladen' s reasoning is clear when he stated that, 
We have studiously refused to recognize the Buddhist ecclesiastical code .... 
The result . .. is that the power of the priesthood to regulate church affairs is 
almost nil, their influence for good has vastly deteriorated, and Buddhism ... is 
broken up into numerous sects and schisms, without and beyond all 
ecclesiastical control. The worst of it is, that the members of all these sects 
divide themselves socially as well as religiously, and the domestic relations of 
life have in many cases been materially disconcerted. 11 
Despite Sladen's proposal, after the death of the Upper Burmese thathanabaing in 1895 the 
British government refused to accept responsibility for making the appointment of the new 
head of the sangha. Sir Hugh Barnes, the lieutenant governor of Upper Myanmar asserted 
that, 
10 Most of the information about the thathanabaing has been from Mendelson, E. M., Sangha and State in 
Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership, pp. 179 - 196. 
11 S1aden, extract from the Simla document cited in Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma , p. 180. 
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We English, you must remember, have our own Religion, our Christian 
religion, in which we firmly and devoutly believe; and though, in accordance 
with the wise policy enjoined by the Great Queen Victoria in Her Majesty's 
famous Proclamation of 1858, ... we extend to all religious communities alike 
the equal and impartial protection of the law, and refuse favour to one rather 
than the other; that is the whole extent of our obligation, and no Religion but 
our own can claim from us anything more. Therefore, you must clearly realize 
that we cannot interfere with the Buddhist Heirarchy, and that it is not our 
business to interest ourselves in the selection of its chief ... We merely ratify 
the selection made by the monks themselves, and we grant our official 
recognition of it for purposes of administrative purposes only .... 12 
Eventually, in 1902 a new successor to the position of thathanabaing was decided upon by the 
sangha, and the Colonial government acknowledged the primate's appointment, but not until 
after several years of disagreement and divisions amongst the differing sangha factions on 
who to appoint. The tension between the sangha and the British on the position of the 
thathanabaing went further than just a problem of election. In 1903 a sanad (restrictive 
agreement) was given to the thathanabaing that set out a new ruling that the thathanabaing 
and all members of the sangha were no longer independent of civil court jurisdiction. The 
problem with the imposition of the civil comis on the sangha was that traditionally the sangha 
dealt with most of its own disputes and infringements. In many cases the hierarchy was able to 
punish the wayward member or in severe cases the monk was forced to disrobe and then 
turned over to the civil courts to be tried. 13 In 1935 the authority of the thathanabaing was 
pulled back even further by a ruling that the "Buddhist Community in Burma has no 
constitutional or legal status". What this meant was that, "No member of the hierarchy 
therefore had any jurisdiction to determine disputes of a civil nature whether among monks or 
between monks and laymen". 14 Moreover, the 1903 recognition of the newly appointed 
thathanabaing by the British had been officially withdrawn in the 1935 ruling. The overall 
effect of the Colonial government's ruling was, as Reynolds and Clifford aptly state that, 
the sangharaja [thathanabaing] had no authority over any monk's actions, only 
over his beliefs! ... As a result, their [the British] attempt to universally 
impose civil law created a situation which, in fact, fulfilled their worst fears 
and cetiainly precluded any hope of their tolerance of a separate vinaya law. 
12 Bames, Sir Hugh, cited in Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 185 . 
13 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 47. 
14 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 192. 
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Many monks rather than withdraw from the political arena, militantly entered 
it. 15 
Ultimately, the Colonial government's refusal to appoint the thathanabaing and bringing the 
sang ha under civil law were two of the crucial steps that put the Dhamma-Wheel structure 
askew. No longer could the sangha rely on the kingly support it was accustomed to and by 
Britain's 'hands off policy towards Buddhism in general it was understood by the Burmese as 
anti-Buddhist. From the perspective of the British, the inclusion of the sangha under civil law 
was a legitimate stance to take and one that Reynolds and Clifford assert was based on the 
assumption that to be outside the civil courts was to be equated with lawlessness. 16 The Vinaya 
law had no standing in the eyes of the British - proper order was maintained only by proper 
civil law. This misunderstanding of the relationship Buddhism had traditionally had with the 
legal system and with the state in general, in the long run, fuelled well the nationalist fire that 
spread fast from the turn of the twentieth century. By not acknowledging the thathanabaing 
and by misunderstanding the sangha 's place in the legal system, the tie between Buddhism 
and the state had its first swing from the Colonial axe. The symbiosis was disappearing. 
The issues of the thathanbaing and sang ha entry into the civil courts were not the only points 
of tension between the sang ha and the British. Education was also of prime importance in the 
strained relationship and was an important factor in the British undermining of Buddhism's 
role in society. Prior to Colonial rule the monastery schools took sole responsibility for the 
education of the populace. Traditionally the schools' curriculum was focused around the 
teachings of Buddhism, learning to read and write and very basic mathematics. Only boys 
were allowed to be taught and not until the age of eight. 17 The social impact on the schools in 
the promotion of Buddhism was significant. As the only formalised setting for education 
Buddhism was ensured a captive audience - if nothing else the student would know the 
essentials of the religion. Moreover, the extensive network of the schools throughout the entire 
country would have reinforced the importance of the sangha in each community. 
After the complete annexation of the country in 1886 steps were soon made by the British 
government to become directly involved in the education of the people. During 1886 the 
15 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", pp. 81-82. 
16 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", p. 82. 
17 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 57. 
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Department of Education was set up and the decision was made to extend the educational 
curriculum to include more secular subjects such as geography, astronomy, geometry and such 
like.18 However, the pongyis (monks) overall would not co-operate with the British. Smith 
states that they had a general distrust of the British and that the thathanabaing in 1891 ordered 
that any new secular subjects were not allowed to be taught in the monastery schools and that 
lay teachers who were appointed to the schools to help would not be accepted. 19 At this failure 
to integrate Western style education into the monastery schools the Department of Education 
decided to open up their own secular schools, which by 1918 numbered 4,650 compared with 
2,977 monastic schools.2° Christian missionary schools were also supported and became 
another outlet for Western-style education. Taylor accords the popularity of the secular 
schools with the view that they were thought to provide a better education and open up more 
opportunities to the students than would the traditional monastery schools. 21 The primary 
means to get a well-paid government job was through Western-style schooling, and this no 
doubt was a strong motivator in the schools' high numbers. Mendelson notes that the secular 
schools' openness to girls would have also been a factor in their popularity.22 
The impact of the newly introduced educational system on the sangha was once again to 
undermine its position. Cady comments that the introduction of Western-style education 
"discredited in the eyes of the educated elite the prescientific lore of the pongyis".23 Perhaps 
more important for our discussion here is the fact that both Cady and Smith make mention of 
the social impact the monastery schools had in imparting ethics into society which were in 
danger of being lost under the secular school system where moral instruction was lacking. 24 
Cady goes as far as saying that a significant part of the growing lawlessness and general social 
degradation that was occurring in Burmese society at the time was due to the absence of 
Buddhist ethics being taught. As he states, 
18 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 158. 
19 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 59. 
20 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 113. 
21 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 113. 
22 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 158. 
23 Cady, J., A History of Modern Burma, p. 171 . The divisions between the Western educated Burmese and those 
taught under the traditional school system, also in the nationalist quest, became a sign of the growing rift between 
the Anglicised, and often urban Burmese and the general masses centred around village life where the sangha had 
its stronghold. 
24 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 171, Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 62. 
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The social loss incurred from the weakening religious influence was universally 
deplored, for Buddhism was potentially the humanizing, tempering, and 
integrating social factor, intangible but very important. The situation was at its 
worst, of course, in Lower Burma's newly developed agricultural areas, where 
disorderly migrant communities were engaged in the demoralizing speculative 
scramble for economic advantage and usually included no pongyi kyaungs 
[monastery schools] at al1.25 
Not only was Buddhism losing its place in upholding structures of statehood but also its 
influence on society as a whole was being threatened. The morality that Buddhism once 
conveyed on mass to the Burmese people through education was now being replaced by a 
secular system. 
Overall, the impact ofBritish rule by way of its policy of neutrality towards religion on the life 
of the sangha, either through an undermining of its hierarchy or by its take-over of the 
education system, severed the ties that the sangha had been accustomed to under the 
monarchy.26 The wheel set in motion by the Buddhist king, and who was supposed to support, 
protect and promote Buddhism, had effectively been stopped. The Burmese did not just have a 
problem with the economic impact of foreign rule nor just the psychological harm brought 
about by being conquered. What had occurred was a slander on what had often been 
considered a core part of Burmese identity for over a thousand years - its religion. No longer 
could Buddhism play its part in upholding and legitimising the structures of the state, as under 
British rule it was no longer needed. The symbiosis of the religion and the king was no more. 
All that was left of the dhammic order, of course, was the antagonism- Buddhism's ability to 
criticise. This antagonistic side of the relationship came out most clearly in the nationalist 
movement both through the politicised monks and lay Buddhist groups to which I will now 
turn. 
25 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 171. 
26 Both Woodward and Taylor note that the economic impact of Colonial rule also was felt by the sangha. The 
major donor in traditional Myanmar, that is, the king, was absent; therefore, the sangha had to come to terms 
with its financial patronage being heavily reduced. I have chosen not to discuss this issue here in greater detail 
because of space limitations and because the thathanabaing and education issues seem to dominate most 
discussions on British!sangha relations it seemed most appropriate to discuss these in detail. Woodward, "When 
One Wheel Stops", p. 65ff, and Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 181. 
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The Nationalist Cause and Sangha Involvement 
Sangha and also lay Buddhist involvement in political affairs in the nationalist cause took on 
an unprecedented role that Myanmar really has never seen since. The nationalist movement in 
general was grounded upon a common goal of self-rule, independent of any foreign power as 
Cady asserts, "the basic views of all Burman nationalists were much the same. All wanted 
genuine home rule, free of interference from both Britain and India".27 
As mentioned above, nationalism was not just a problem with a foreign administration 
controlling the state but concerned the ideological orientation of the country. The nationalist 
reaction to this impact on Burmese Buddhist ideology can also be seen as a sign of a problem 
with the impact of modernisation and the introduction of technological and scientific ideas 
never realised before in Burmese history. Up until British annexation Myanmar had never 
been invaded with so many new ideas of the world as it was confronted with under Colonial 
rule. As time went on many of these new ideas became incorporated into Burmese society 
often with the help of Buddhism, but at the early stages the impact was overwhelming. As 
Matthews states, 
The heartland of Buddhism and Burmese culture had little time to adjust. 
Classical Buddhist rationalist philosophy and village-level pantheism were both 
uncongenial to Western science as well, thereby delaying acceptance of 
technology and modernization. Additionally, as Sarkisyanz has pointed out, an 
anachronistic 'Burma-centrism', supported by an entirely mythological 
cosmology, had given the Burmese a 'disproportionate overestimation of their 
own power in a world of Victorian imperialism' ... when Burma lost its 
'cosmic prototype' under the British, Burmese society and culture were 
'thoroughly shaken under the impact of Copernican modernity".28 
Under such a significant threat to Burmese political as well as cultural identity Burmese 
nationalist aspirations spread quickly. With limited means to achieve this goal, Buddhism 
became, at least in the early stages, the primary platform upon which to base and mobilise the 
populace. Buddhism's ability to stand outside of the state as an alternative structure and its 
moral high ground or transcendental vision, which gave it its ability to criticise, came to the 
fore. 
27 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 299. 
28 Matthews, B., "The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", pp. 29- 30. 
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In the face of a seeming moral and social decay it seemed understandable that Buddhist 
principles were appealed to in order to reasse1i the moral integrity of the nation. But this 
manying of Buddhism to nationalism was not essentially a new phase in Burmese history, 
although the extent to which it surfaced was certainly unseen under the monarchy. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the idea of the righteous conquest (dharmavijaya), could ce1iainly 
be seen to fit into a nationalist/Buddhist blend of a sort where the conqueror claims to be 
reasserting a threatened Buddhist purity and values. The use of Buddhism in the nationalist 
cause, especially in its early phases, thus can be seen to some extent as a continuation of a 
tradition that desired the preservation of moral integrity and Buddhist purity. Overall though, 
neither under the monarchy nor under Colonial mle, could one say that Buddhism was the 
defining motivator in these movements. Moreover, as we also saw in Chapter One, Buddhism 
did not lend itself wholeheartedly to political intentions and this involvement did indeed 
become a problem towards the end of Colonialmle as will be discussed below. But what was 
cmcial to Buddhism's role, particularly under much of Colonialmle, was that it provided an 
important means of reconsolidating a uniquely Bmmese identity, which was under threat. As 
Aung San Suu Kyi comments, 
It has often been remarked that, while Indian nationalism was essentially 
a product of British mle, there had always existed a traditional Burmese 
nationalism arising from Burma's cultural homogeneity. Buddhism 
obviously played a large part in creating this homogeneity, but it could 
not be said to have supplied ideas to support nationalism; rather it 
provided an essential component of the self-concept which enabled the 
Burmese to see themselves as different from foreigners. 29 
This 'setting themselves apart' and the use of Buddhism to consolidate an identity that was 
uniquely Burmese expressed itself both in many of the lay nationalist organisations and by 
political monks. In the earliest stages of the nationalist movement lay groups dominated. 
29 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear and Other Writings, p. 103 . 
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The Buddhist Lay Movement and the First Nationalist Issue 
The first main expression of Buddhist nationalist sentiment was seen in the Young Men's 
Buddhist Association (YMBA), founded in 1906. A close sign of the Buddhist connection is 
shown in the Burmese title of the organisation, the Budda Bat ha Kalyana Yuwa A thin, which 
translates literally as the Association to Take Care of the Wholesomeness of Buddhism?0 The 
YMBA started off as a group of urban Western educated men who were concerned with 
maintaining Burmese culture. Specifically they concerned themselves with religious and social 
issues and also developed a desire to revitalise the study of Burmese literature and art. 
Although, the YMBA did not until 1916 show any significant activity in the political arena, it 
became the breeding ground for many of the politicians that were to come to the fore in the 
years following its inception. 31 One of the main religious issues that they became involved in 
was the shoe wearing controversy that had arisen periodically from as early as 1901 and which 
came to a head in 1916 - 18. The shoe controversy centred on the problem of the British 
refusing to remove their shoes on entering pagodas. The outcry at this behaviour spread 
throughout the entire country and it was the YMBA who led a united front of political 
agitation against the irreverent British. Eventually in 1918 the British left the decision of 
wearing shoes or prohibiting them up to the monk in control of each pagoda. The primary 
importance of the shoe incident was that, 
The question ... could and did unite all branches of the Y.M.B.A. in a common 
cause, ostensibly a religious one, capable of capitalizing on the hypersensitivity 
of the Burma Buddhist population to any suggestion of disrespect to their 
religion or to the revered Buddhist sangha . .. . It was on such a religious issue 
that Burmese nationalism first expressed itself?2 
With a religious issue being at the forefront of the beginnings of the lay nationalist movement 
in relation to the dhammic-wheel structure one could say that the lay and nibbiinic paths came 
closer together. Buddhism had taken its first major step into the political realm. However, 
despite this lay concern with Buddhism it was members of the sangha who most fervently 
wielded the antagonistic sword in the nationalist movement. In the shoe-wearing incident they 
had become involved and co-operated with the YMBA, and it was monks who had, in a 
30 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 162. 
31 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 177. 
32 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 190. 
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pagoda, violently attacked shoe-wearing Europeans, which no doubt contributed to the 
concessions made by the British only one month later.33 On the part of the politically active 
monks matters such as the shoe incident, that is, anything that could be seen as a threat to 
Buddhism, provided them with the legitimisation they needed for their entry into politics and 
they certainly took up this challenge. 
The Sangha Shift onto the Lay Wheel 
Inadvertently, by having a policy of neutrality towards Buddhism Bechert asserts that, "the 
colonial regime made possible what the ancient Buddhist regimes had always tried to prevent, 
namely, a completely independent Sangha with all its traditional influence and resources 
remaining intact".34 No longer could the state control the sangha. Its traditional forms of 
control through the choosing of the thathanabaing and of the use of siisana reforn1 were no 
longer valid to a government who had pushed all responsibility for religious affairs out of the 
state's hands. The sangha 's ability to criticise was left unchecked and politically they had the 
potential to be a formidable force. Unlike groups such as the YMBA, what was at the disposal 
of the political monks was a nation-wide organisational network that had for centuries been 
embedded into every village within Myanmar. Its members also had the added advantage of 
having an in-built authority based upon the moral exemplar of one on the superior path of 
enlightenment.35 Other important points that Smith mentions in the political monk's favour 
were the fact that "[i]t was difficult and embarrassing for the government to prosecute 
Buddhist monks in view of widespread popular indignation which this invariably aroused" and 
also that the monks had little to lose.36 They had no families relying on them or many 
possessions to be taken away. This consequently gave them all the freedom they could want 
from having to act in a 'responsible' manner. With the potential of the sangha for mass 
mobilisation, in-built authority and a certain extent of freedom to act, when the dhammic-order 
came under threat, it was no wonder that politically minded monks became dominant players 
on the nationalist playing field. 
33 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 30, Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 88. 
34 Bechert, H., "Sangha, State, Society, "Nation": Persistence of Traditions in "Post-Traditional" Buddhist 
Societies", p. 90. 
35 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 179. 
36 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 93 - 94. 
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The political activity of monks had occurred at the very start of Colonial rule. Smith notes the 
open involvement of monks in the rebellions of 1886-87 although the majority of activity 
happened sometime later.37 Methods of action used by these politicised pongyis ranged from 
boycotts, sometimes by way of turning up their alms bowls in order to prevent one from 
receiving merit, to widespread agitation and even to the point of violence, as shall be seen in 
the case ofU Ottama discussed below. It must be pointed out at this stage, though, that not all 
within the sangha became politically active. Mendelson discusses this in detail and asserts that 
the political monks, which he called 'active' really were more the minority, whereas the 
majority, the 'passive', as a general rule, reacted to Colonial rule by withdrawing from society 
and out of the hands of lay collaboration.38 Although, when saying that a minority were 
involved it should not be assumed that there were only a handful of monks who participated in 
politics. One account states that at one political conference 20,000 monks were present and 
many others speak of monasteries all over the country being used for political affairs, as will 
be seen below.39 
Spurred on by Myanmar' s exclusion from the political reforms taking place in India in 1917, 
the 1920s saw the advent of the more militant monks and a period where this 'active' group 
dominated many areas of the nationalist cause or at least their support was essentia1.40 In the 
early 1920s there were many politically active monks who were imprisoned on sedition 
charges.41 Such was the case of U Thawbita, who told his audiences that the British would 
take unmarried girls who couldn't pay a capitation tax, send them to Mesopotamia, make them 
have children with soldiers, then sterilise them and send them to work as nurses in hospitals.42 
Another instance was when the monk U Tiloka attempted to persuade villagers not to pay their 
37 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 46. 
38 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 195- 196. Here Mendelson also makes the suggestion that this 
distinction between a passive and active sangha may have always been present. He goes on to state that this may 
signify that to some extent Colonial rule may not have impacted much on those of the sangha who were not 
concerned with the authority of the thathanabaing and focussed more on following the Vinaya only, that is, the 
passive group. While indeed this is possible the general structure of sangha/state interaction and its reaction to 
Colonial rule I think still applies as it is the 'active' section that is being dealt with primarily here. 
39 Herbert, P.; The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930 -1932) Reappraised, p. 10. 
40 Matthews, "Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 30. 
41 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 100. 
42 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 99. 
53 
taxes and break the legs of the village headman who came to collect them.43 Both monks were 
sentenced to prison for eighteen months. 
Around 1920-22 the General Council of the Sangha Sametthyi (GCSS) was formed for the 
precise purpose of providing a vehicle for those pongyis who had become politically active. 
The extent of their influence was wide. Outside the urban areas the YMBA, which was now 
called the General Council of Buddhist Associations (GCBA) (and later the General Council 
of Burmese Associations), had developed local branches called Wunthanu Athins. The GCBA 
were much more politically involved at this stage. These local branches provided the rural 
peasants with their own outlet for nationalist sentiment outside of the more urbanised 
movements that were dominating the nationalist scene at the time. The Wunthanu Athins were 
often controlled or at least influen~ed heavily by politicalpongyis, many of whom were GCSS 
members and who were frequently viewed as the village authority, in place of the headman 
who became viewed as a collaborator and pawn of the British.44 An example of the close 
connection between the pongyis and the Wunthanu A thins can be seen in the Preachers' 
Handbook which was distributed by the Wunthanu Athins to the monks and which contained 
"model sermons" the pongyis could give that related stories of the Buddha with nationalist 
intentions.45 Some of the most notorious political pongyis were intimately connected to the 
GCSS and these Wunthanu A thin groups. They had begun to take the antagonistic side of the 
dhammic-order to an extreme. U Ottama was perhaps the most notable political pongyi to be 
involved in this movement. 
A Militant Monk- U Ottama 
U Ottama, a monk originally from Arakan, was considered to be one of the founding members 
and inspirations for the GCSS. For the most part of the first twenty years of Colonial rule U 
Ottama lived outside of M yanmar. Much of his time was spent in India and Japan, but he also 
made several visits to Europe. In 1919 he returned to Myanmar and wrote several articles that 
appeared in nationalist papers such as Thuriya and Myanma Alin. His articles were of an 
43 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 99. 
44 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 199. 
45 Herbert, The Hsaya San Rebellion, p. 9. 
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agitational nature inciting the population to have no fear against the British govemment and 
such like.46 In 1920, whilst in India, he sent messages and eventually travelled to Rangoon 
University where the students were striking and proceeded to "inspire the students with the 
aggressiveness and anti-colonialist experience of the Indian Congress Party leadership".47 
Smith states that U Ottama frequently used his status and perspective as a monk to espouse 
nationalist sentiment, and perhaps most significantly he used it to justify his own and the 
political monks' involvement in the political arena.48 Speaking on nibbana U Ottama 
commented that, "When Lord Buddha was alive, man had a predilection for Nirvana. There is 
nothing left now. The reason why it is so is because the govemment is English ... Pongyis 
pray for Nirvana but slaves can never obtain it, therefore they must pray for release from 
slavery in this life".49 This means to justify his political activity, and which was also common 
for many political pongyis, is summed up by Taylor as, 
Ottama's simple argument had clear appeal, particularly to monks in the 
villages who shared the peasants' declining standards of living. He argued that 
since the well-being of the religion was dependent upon the well-being of the 
people who suppmted it, the monkhood, like the king who claimed to be a 
Bodhisatta, had to involve itself in secular affairs until such time as conditions 
were appropriate to resume purely religious obligations. 50 
However, this pongyi approach to political involvement was not liked by all within the 
sangha. At one stage U Ottama was refused asylum by the more 'passive' monks.51 Despite 
this opposition Ottama did make a significant contribution to the nationalist movement and 
came to be known as "the first popular hero and martyr". 52 But with all of Ottama's attempts 
to inspire the nationalist spirit in his speeches and articles, it seems that his impact was most 
effective after he was arrested and imprisoned on sedition charges in June 1921 where he 
stayed until 1922. The reaction that followed his arrest was dominated by boycotts, which 
included closing down all businesses at one stage and also a boycott of the Prince of Wales' 
visit to Myanmar. Rallies were also held at the Shwedagon Pagoda where pongyi supporters of 
46 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 203 . 
47 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 203. 
48 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 95 - 96. 
49 U Ottama, Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, July 11 and September 19, 1921, cited in Smith, Religion and 
Politics in Burma, p. 96. 
50 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 182. This justification is very prominent in what is now called 'Engaged 
Buddhism', which will discussed in detail in Chapter four. 
51 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 231. 
52 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 95. 
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U Ottama would speak out against British rule. 53 Moreover, about 200 GCSS pongyi members 
travelled the country continuing U Ottama's message of defiance. 54 
In 1924 U Ottama was agam arrested and imprisoned after instigating a violent riot in 
Mandalay. This once again triggered a ground swell of popular discontent against the 
authorities, as in Cady's words it "aroused great popular excitement and set the stage for 
widespread revolutionary disaffection which developed in the dry season (November to May) 
of 1924- 1925".55 In 1927 Ottama was released and is thought to have travelled to Sagaing in 
order to access arms and ammunition for the nationalist cause. 
56 Whilst U Ottama is often seen 
to have a Gandhi-like orientation in espousing less confrontational methods of protest, it does 
seem that he was willing to go so far as supporting the use of violence where necessary. 
Although, Mendelson does note that in taking care not to break Vinaya rules he did not 
personally acquire weapons but rather was thought to have given the GCBA members advice 
on how to get them- the intention here is not debated!
57 In 1928 U Ottama was arrested for 
the final time. He remained in prison until his death in 1939. 
Despite spending much of his time in Myanmar in prison, U Ottama is considered to be one of 
the most influential political pongyi that appeared under Colonial rule. His inspiration to the 
nationalist cause saw the political monk come to the fore and consequently brought the general 
populace collectively into the fight against the British. His methods of boycott, appealing to 
Buddhist principles such as nibbiina and using his status as monk to frame his political 
motives led him to set a precedent for expressing disaffection with Colonial power. Such 
influences are apparent in the development of a nationalist newspaper, Wunthanu, by a group 
of political pongyis, who spoke of the need "to pledge remembrance of English lawlessness, 
and to meditate on the impermanence of all things [a fundamental Buddhist principle] 
(including, it must be presumed, the British raj)". 58 Others who followed in his footsteps such 
as U Wisera, who died due to a hunger strike in prison, continued on his anti-government 
53 Moscotti, A., British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1917-1937, p. 32, and Smith, Religion 
and Politics in Burma, p. 98. 
54 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 183 . 
55 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 253. 
56 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 205. 
57 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 205. 
58 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 205 . 
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agitation to the extreme. Moreover, by the late 1920s over 120 monks had been arrested on 
sedition related charges. 59 
U Ottama's political practice had seen him step over the nibbiinic boundary well and truly. For 
the politicised sangha he became a figure of inspiration and to the nationalist movement as a 
whole he brought, at least in part, traditional Buddhism in step with contemporary nationalist 
ideas. However, by stepping over the nibbiinic boundary onto the lay wheel the danger of the 
complete collapse of the dhammic-order entered as well. The negative reaction to him by some 
within the sangha reflected an awareness of this problem. He antagonised to such an extent 
that his integrity as a monk came under question by some. Another way of understanding this 
in relation to the Dhamma-Wheel structure is that, the transcendental ethic which gave those 
on the nibbiinic path a moral superiority, and which ultimately allowed them the ability to 
criticise was, in the view of some, in danger of being lost. And as shall be seen later, this 
danger eventually became more pronounced. 
Ottama' s methods and influence were not the only kind of political pongyi related practices to 
develop widespread appeal during Colonial rule. The appearance of setkya min (a Burmanised 
form of cakkavattJ) pretenders, such as Saya San, which is worth mentioning here, also had an 
important place in the history of nationalist discontent. 60 
A "Folk-Buddhist" Revival- Saya San 
Saya San, an ex-monk who was once a member of the executive committee of the So Thein 
GCBA faction, in 1929 instigated a large-scale peasant uprising against the British. He began 
his crusade in the Tharrawaddy district of Lower Myanmar where he had set up secret 
organisations, called Galon Athins, in the villages. After failed attempts to receive permission 
from the Governor to withhold tax payments for the peasants who were struggling financially, 
Saya San led the peasants in a violent revolt, armed initially with only thirty guns. It was not 
59 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 183 . 
60 These movements were not necessarily led by monks but as in the case of Saya San, an ex-monk himself, 
monks and Buddhist notions were used extensively during these uprisings, so Saya San's inclusion here I think is 
applicable. 
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long before Saya San's movement had gained momentum and eventually led to its spread 
throughout much of Myanmar. His uprising took almost two years to get under control and 
required thousands of British forces, including battalions brought in from India, to suppress 
the zealous agitators. 
The main characteristics of the movement were quite different in nature to the political 
practices used by monks such as U Ottama. Rather than being a reaction guided by outside 
ideas of nationalism, as U Ottama's was with his Indian borrowings, Saya San's movement 
was distinctively of traditionalist Burmese origin. The central idea was based around the 
notion of the Setkya Min figure who in the age of decline and degradation of the religion 
would appear and reinstate a Golden Age and rule as the ideal Buddhist king. 
The movement fell under the auspices of a Buddhist revival movement but one that Sarkisyanz 
termed militant 'folk' Buddhism.61 The motivations obviously concerned Buddhism, which is 
illustrated in the oath that each member had to take that states, "We are banded together to 
drive out all unbelievers ... Grant that I may help destroy all ... unbelievers. Protect and help 
our religion 0 ye greater and lesser Nats".62 The appeal to the Nats in the oath, as well as the 
rebellion's use of tattoos which were supposed to protect the wearer against bullets, and other 
such 'magical' practices where all methods used by those in the rebellion. Much of this 
practice was supported by political pongyis, for example, it was common for monasteries to be 
used as tattooing places. 63 Despite the rebellion's failure at ove1ihrowing the British, it 
certainly succeeded in bringing the voice of the masses clearly into the nationalist scene. 
Overall, a main characteristic of Saya San's movement that differed from U Ottama tradition 
of political pongyis was that what it desired was a return to the structures of the past and in 
order to achieve that required a rejection of the present. He used symbols of the past such as 
the white umbrella, which denoted divine kingship and the great galon bird figure of ancient 
origins to legitimate his quest for a renewed ideal Buddhist rule.64 This is a distinct contrast to 
U Ottama's method of agitation. One can say that U Ottama's approach reflected a modernistic 
61 Sarkisyanz, E. Buddhist Backgrounds to the Burmese Revolution, p. 160. 
62 Cited in Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 311 - 312. 
63 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 213. 
64 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 311. 
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reaction to Colonial rule, which did not try to restore the Burmese kingship and all of the 
structures of traditional Myanmar, but rather used contemporary models with the goal of 
independence. Nowhere have I found it stated exactly what Ottama's ideal was as far as the 
structures of the state, but he certainly does not seem to have desired a return to kingship and 
all of its trappings, as Saya San so obviously did. Saya San's approach throughout was 
orientated from this pre-Colonial 'folk-Buddhist' ideal. The differences between the two 
illustrate well the two sides of the nationalist coin. One side that rejected the modem world 
and desired a return to the traditional order in the goal of self-determination and one that 
embraced ideas within the contemporary world and used them as a tool to lead to self-
determination. 
The British response to the Saya San rebellion with a plenitude of forces brought Saya San and 
many of its leaders to their death. In August 1931 Say a San was arrested and in November of 
that year he and several other leaders of the movement were hung. In total, the rebellion saw 
up to 3000 killed or injured, 8000- 9000 arrested and 128 executed.65 Although unsuccessful 
in its attempts to rid Myanmar of its British rulers the Saya San rebellion made a significant 
impact on the morale of the people. This impact is aptly summed up by Cady when he states, 
The perpetrators of the uprising breathed new vitality into Burmese nationalism 
simply by demonstrating the courage of their political commitment against 
impossible odds. The heat of their frenzied resistance welded a connecting 
bond, between the culturally disparate pongyi-led masses and the W estemized 
elite. Although the uprising did not reconcile political differences, it 
undoubtedly constituted an important landmark in the development of Burmese 
nationalism. 66 
Saya San's and U Ottama's contribution to the nationalist cause was the tip of the iceberg for 
pongyi or pongyi related activity throughout the twenties and early thirties. V on der Mehden 
notes that in describing the nationalist cause in the twenties one political monk stated that "all 
was yellow".67 In 1934 there was an instance where political pongyis took over the Legislative 
Council rooms to pressure the Council members in voting against a bill that the monks 
considered to threaten their autonomy from lay control. Few voted in favour of the bill under 
65 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds , p. 163. 
66 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 318. 
67 V on der Mehden, F., "The Changing Pattern of Religion and Politics in Burma", p. 64. 
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the weighty pressure of the political pongyis.68 Other examples of pongyi involvement 
included them being involved in the financial dealings of parties, of lay politicians requiring 
pongyi approval before standing in elections, and using pagodas and monasteries for fmis and 
political meetings. 69 One of the most extreme examples, and one that later came under fire of 
the secularist lay politicians was the involvement of monks in anti-Indian activity. Here the lay 
wheel boundary had been crossed too far. One account describes the monks inciting violence 
in anti-Indian riots and beating Muslims with sticks.7° Cady notes that in the report of the anti-
Indian riots of 193 8, "It cited more than 132 specifically authenticated cases of the misuse of 
the yellow robe in acts of incitation to violence, actual assaults, looting, arson and murder".71 
It is difficult to assess though exactly how widespread this sort of behaviour was as accounts 
seem to vary on who were the main perpetrators. Smith states that "Monks everywhere played 
a leading role in instigating and directing the rioters" but in opposition to this Matthews 
comments that "Although there were several serious anti-Indian riots . .. the sangha was not 
in the forefront". 72 All accounts do however, agree that a group called the Young Monks 
Association (YMA) was definitely involved in this sort of behaviour. This kind of practice 
was very characteristic of the YMA. No doubt this extremity was heavily influenced by one of 
the YMA's leaders, a monk U Pandita who was notorious for his anti-government stance and 
arrested for making explosives.73 
Overall, our assessment so far illustrates that under Colonial rule and in the face of the British 
policy of neutrality which effectively cut off the traditional ties between the king and the 
sangha, the response by an undermined sangha was an unprecedented swing into the political 
sphere. The realm of the ideal crossed over dramatically into the realities of the pragmatic. 
68 Mendelson, Sang ha and State in Burma, p. 210. 
69 V on der Mehden, "The Changing Pattern of Religion and Politics in Burma", p. 63. 
70 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 212. 
71 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 395. 
72 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 111, Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 32. 
73 Spiro, M., Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes, p. 390. A problem of 
assessing exactly how many monks were involved in the anti-Indian riots and in political affairs in general is the 
question of whether or not these monks were authentic or were they just "political agitators in the yellow robe". 
Considering the status and influence the monk had, and the apprehension the Colonial authorities had in 
reprimanding members of the sang ha, it is not unreasonable to assume that there were cases of the laity picking 
up the yellow robe to make the most of these benefits. However, the difficulty involved in making such 
judgements as a 'true' or 'false' is by what measure is the political monk seen to be a 'real' Buddhist monk, as 
opposed to an un-Buddhist one. It is clear though that with the examples shown so far and the extensive use of 
monasteries for political purposes that certain sections of the sangha had become politically active, especially 
when contrasted with their pre-Colonial involvement in politics but this must also be kept in mind here. For more 
discussion of this issue see, Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, pp. 174 ff. 
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The capability of Buddhism to stand outside of the state as an alternative structure based on its 
transcendental vision came to the fore when it lost its protector, its supporter and in some 
sense, its controller - the delicate dhammic-order had been threatened. However, in making 
this dramatic swing into the realm of the pragmatic this very notion of an alternative structure 
begins to weaken. 74 As the political pongyi took the centre stage and began to dominate certain 
areas of the political scene, their integrity inevitably came into question. This idea of the 
alternative structure being weakened by the increased involvement in political affairs is 
reinforced also by Reynolds and Clifford in their discussion of the reform movements in the 
sangha as opposed to the politicised pongyis. They note how the withdrawal of these 
movements from the political arena under Colonial rule, their strict adherence to ideals of 
monastic life and their ability to form close-knit hierarchies enabled them to maintain their 
autonomy from the state. They still remained an alternative structure, however, one that did 
not actually make use of the critiquing ability that this autonomy would have given them. By 
removing themselves from society their moral integrity was upheld and they maintained the 
strength as an alternative structure. By taking their political activities to the extreme the 
political pongyis had become too involved in the lay path and thus could no longer be seen as 
upholding such a moral superiority. An interesting paradox occurs here in that by criticising to 
the extreme the political pongyis began to lose what legitimated this ability to criticise. 
Whereas the reform movements maintained the legitimacy but by withdrawing so far from 
society did not actually make use of the critiquing ability the moral integrity gave them. 
Herein lies one of the difficulties of maintaining balance between the antagonistic and the 
symbiotic, between withdrawal from the world and engagement with it. 
However, despite the weakening integrity of the politicised pongyis it does not mean that the 
influence of Buddhism and the sangha could have no place at all in the reaction against 
Colonial rule. The main idea put forward in Chapter One was that it was allowed its place - as 
the ideal merging with the pragmatic. Moreover, why should it have the ability to criticise and 
not be able to use it? Rather it is the extent to which it was used and the form of its use that 
caused a problem. The political pongyis, especially in cases such as the YMA and U Pandita, 
had crossed too far the boundaries of the lay wheel. As the pragmatic got stronger the ideal 
was fading. However, at this stage the Dhamma-Wheel structure did not entirely collapse. 
74 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", p. 83- 84. 
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Rather, the developments of the 1930s and 1940s saw a dramatic shift in the place of the 
political pongyi and which ultimately set to re-balance their extreme shift onto the lay wheel. 
Nationalism by that stage had become dominated by the very secular Thakins, who pushed the 
pongyis back to an ' otherworldly' life and who will now be discussed. 
Re-balancing Dhammic Order- the Thakins and the Secularisation of Politics 
The Thakin group began its life in the student political movement at Rangoon University with 
Aung San, who affectionately became known as the 'father of independence', and U Nu, who 
was to become independent Myanmar's first prime minister, as two of its core members. After 
taking over the students' union and leading a total student strike against the university in 1936 
these young men began to figure dominantly in the political arena. At the time the Saya San 
rebellion was sweeping the country, these student activists had formed the Dobama Asiayon 
(We Burmans Association) and eventually took on the title Thakin (Master), a title usually 
reserved for the English only. In opposition to the British imperialist/capitalist statehood these 
new initiates into politics began drawing on Marxist notions found in leftist literature that was 
brought into the country, some of which was funded by Saya San's estate. 
Concerning Buddhism the Thakins emphatically stressed the need for religion, of the type 
surrounding the political monks' activities, to remain outside of politics. Although the Thakins 
were fervently nationalist and demanded complete autonomy from the British Empire, its main 
grouping, the Anti-Facist People' s Freedom League (AFPFL), did not want to return to the 
pre-colonial days of the monarchy. With the help of Marxist ideas they wanted to bring 
Myanmar into the modem world with a socialist democratic state. An essential part of that 
democratic ideal for these Thakins was to uphold a united Myanmar but one that allowed for 
all of the country's differences, including that of religion. This view is illustrated in Aung 
San's speech where he discusses the idea of nationhood. He asserts that "[t]hough race, 
religion, and language are important factors it is only their traditional desire and will to live in 
unity through weal and woe that binds the people together and makes them a nation and their 
spirit of patriotism".75 Nationhood was not viewed as being particularly concerned with 
75 Aung San, cited in Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 115 . 
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Buddhism. There were particular political benefits to this approach towards Buddhism. An 
example of the benefits was apparent in the Panglong Agreement of 194 7 which 
acknowledged the different ethnicities' involvement in the independence process and which 
saw a rare unity of the ethnic minorities, not all of whom were Buddhist, with the Burman 
Buddhist majority. To bring Buddhist issues into the discussion here would have shown a 
definite lack of diplomatic tact. 76 
Aside from abstaining from stressing religion as a unifying force in the processes of political 
diplomacy and in a concept of nationhood, the AFPFL, in particular, Aung San, strongly 
admonished sangha involvement in political affairs as had been seen in the Saya San rebellion 
and in the anti-Indian riots. In his writings he spoke of the problems of priestcraft, that is, 
clergy who become involved intimately in matters usually thought of as strictly in the domains 
of the secular, which he saw as interfering and confusing affairs of the state with concerns of 
religion.77 For him religion, in particular, Buddhism, was about matters of the absolute, that is, 
ideas that surrounded Buddhism's transcendental vision. These were such things as the 
"doctrines oflove, truth and righteous living". 78 These were the primary gifts that religion had 
to offer the world of politics, not politically minded pongyis who stirred up the populace and 
controlled political parties. Overall, Aung San's view of religion and its involvement in 
politics is best summed up in his comments that, 
Religion is a matter of individual conscience while politics is a social science. 
Of course, as a social science, politics must see that the individual also has 
rights, including the right to freedom of religious worship. But here we must 
stop and draw the line definitely between politics and religion, because the two 
are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, this is against 
the spirit of the religion itself, for religion takes care of our hereafter and 
usually has not to do with mundane affairs which are the sphere of politics. 
And politics is frankly a secular science. That is it.79 
Despite these harsh words on the place of religion in politics and the problems of 'priestcraft' 
he does not send the entire sang ha to the 'sin bin ' but goes on to speak of the wonderful 
76 The problem of ethnic divisions and the stressing of Buddhism as a unifying force becomes patiicularly clear in 
the next chapter where U Nu and his policy of instating Buddhism as the State religion comes into discussion. 
77 The term 'priestcraft' is opposed here to 'priesthood' , which connotes the sang ha proper. Aung San, Burma's 
Challenge: 1946, p. 55 . 
78 Aung San, Burma's Challenge, p. 54. 
79 Aung San, Burma's Challenge, p. 53 - 54. 
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benefits that the sangha has given the country and that their job is to spread "the doctrine of 
unity and love ... to every nook and corner of the country . . . and spread the Dharma 
anywhere and anytime". 80 Reinforcing their role in education and the need for them to look 
after the people' s spiritual needs he redefines their task in society and this new definition left 
no place for political involvement. 
It must also be noted though that even though Aung San's secularism certainly dominates his 
speeches he does still make mention of the values that Buddhism espouses - not just regarding 
the role of the sangha but also in his own role as a politician. Two examples of this are found 
when he states that "I will govern with loving-kindness [metta] and truthfully" and that "We 
will not destroy our metta for the ethnic minorities".81
 Houtman also notes that in the Burmese 
versions of Aung San's speeches Buddhist terminology and moral concepts are used to a 
greater extent than in the English versions - no doubt these were modified to suit their 
particular audiences. Overall though, in light of the usual symbiosis created between the 
traditional Burmese state and Buddhism Aung San's approach definitely takes on a secularist 
weighting. 
Despite this weighting and the pushing of the sang ha out of politics Matthews comments that 
in return the sangha did not make any specific demands on those who were pushing this 
secular line. 82 It did not require a vast amount of sang ha approval to be viewed as legitimate. 
Mendelson states that the AFPFL did have sang ha support but the party's direction did not 
concern itself with such issues.83 This is reflected aptly in the party's stance of neutrality 
toward religion as laid out in the AFPFL manifesto, which states that, "Freedom of conscience 
should be established. The State should remain neutral on religious questions".
84 Unlike the 
British policy of neutrality, the Burmese people and the sangha accepted the AFPFL's 
secularism. With both the British and the AFPFL legitimacy given by Buddhism was not 
essential and with the policy of neutrality that both adhered to Buddhism was not outwardly 
acknowledged as it had been accustomed to under the monarchy - the symbiosis between the 
80 Aung San, Burma 's Challenge, p. 56- 57. 
81 Aung San, The Speeches of Aung San, (Burmese translation), pp. 287, 224, cited in Houtman,G., Mental 
Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, pp. 253 , 262. 
82 Mattthews, "Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 32. 
83 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 214. 
84 Cited in V on der Mehden, "The Changing Pattern of Religion and Politics in Burma", p. 67. 
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lay wheel and the nibbiinic wheel was lacking. But the responses of the Burmese people to 
both of these policies of neutrality were completely different. No doubt the secularist AFPFL's 
acceptance by the Burmese populace was largely due to the indigenous nature of the 
movement. But also with Aung San and the AFPFL, the neutral stance was a result of some 
members of the sang ha encroaching too far onto the lay wheel and can be seen as a method of 
ensuring the preservation of Buddhism. Under British rule the neutrality was being seen as 
anti-Buddhist and had disturbed the dhammic-order, whereas with the Thakins the approach 
was an attempt to re-balance the already askew wheel structure. One could say that the Thakin 
approach was akin to the process of siisana reform carried out under the monarchy, that is, it 
had the goal of maintaining purity within the sangha. This of course was a legitimate action on 
the part of the lay leaders. 
The purification of the sangha that occurred with the Thakins' approach can overall be 
understood as a sign of the weakening integrity of politically active monks. Mendelson 
reinforces this point in his discussion of the satirical novel Tet Pongyi, written by Thein Pe 
Myint in 1937, with the preface written by U Nu.85 It makes cutting remarks at the nature of 
the modem monk, which Mendelson says represented a view that many of the urban elite had 
regarding the sang ha and their role in politics. 86 Smith also notes that the political monks 
supported the Japanese entry into Myanmar because of their place as "fellow Buddhists". As 
the Japanese came to be despised by the Burmese so too did the credibility of these monks 
decrease.87 With this the lay wheel increasingly became wary of the political pongyis and 
consequently the symbiosis became weakened. 
What also becomes apparent here is that with the AFPFL's policy of neutrality toward 
religion, the re-defining of the pongyi 's role in society, and the push of the sangha back onto 
the nibbiinic wheel there appears a reassertion of the need for the sangha to remain as an 
alternative structure in society. In focusing on the doctrines of love, unity and truth for the 
sangha, Aung San was reinforcing the transcendental vision that Buddhism needs to maintain 
this alternative structure. In order to stop the collapse of the nibbiinic wheel completely 
Buddhism was pushed back into its place as an ideal and away from the realm of the 
85 Nu 's attitude toward the sangha dramatically changed after independence though and by 1954 he banned the 
book completely from circulation. Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 244. 
86 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 214- 221. 
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pragmatic. However, it must be noted here that this does not mean that it was necessarily a 
conscious effort on Aung San and the AFPFL's part to re-balance the dhammic-order as 
understood in these terms. No doubt the policy of neutrality was also influenced by over sixty 
years of Colonial rule which enforced the idea of the separation between church and state and 
also of the more traditional notion of the sangha being concerned with the 'otherworldly' 
matters. Although, whether the approach came about consciously or unconsciously makes 
little difference here, the important point is that the effect still remained the same. 
Another point that must be made here about the Thakins ' approach is that there is more to their 
stance than a mere return to the same pre-colonial balance of the dhammic-order. Of 
significance here is that Aung San pushed the sangha so far back into their own side that he 
effectively cut off their ability to criticise. That is, in reinforcing the transcendental vision and 
at the same time excluding Buddhism completely from the realm of politics he is actually 
disallowing Buddhism, in particular, the sangha, the benefits of this vision, that is, the ability 
to act as a 'safety valve'. However, this is not to say that Aung San and the AFPFL's reaction 
was wholly negative and one that again threatens the collapse of the Dhamma-Wheel 
structure. Rather, this action was needed in order to counterbalance the activity of the political 
monks who by using their ability to criticise to the extreme, were threatened with the loss of 
the transcendental vision. 88 In other words, the secular move was necessary in order to 
rebalance the dhammic-order which had been set askew with the entry of Colonial rule. One 
extreme needed to be responded to by another extreme. It was this extreme secularisation of 
politics that eventually saw the Burmese nation arrive back into their own hands. 
87 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 116. 
88 The loss of the critiquing ability of the sangha also links in with what was said earlier regarding Reynolds and 
Clifford's discussion of the reform movements . 
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Chapter Three 
Independence - From Democracy to the 'Burmese Way to 
Socialism', 1948- 1988. 
January 4th 1948 saw Myanmar attain complete independence from British rule. However, this 
momentous achievement was not ushered in by the secularist Aung San. On July 19th 194 7, he 
was assassinated along with six other cabinet ministers by the workings of one time Prime 
Minister U Saw. U Nu, a devout Buddhist, took over Aung San's role as leader of the AFPFL 
and subsequently saw Myanmar to the dawn of independence. However, with this new leader 
the AFPFL secularist position was drastically modified. Despite virtually continuous civil war 
and the fracturing of the AFPFL itself, in the first decade of independence, U Nu instigated a 
Buddhist revival on a massive scale. Away from Colonial neutrality and early Thakin 
secularism, symbiosis became a key word in the relationship between Buddhism and the State. 
However, in 1962 a drastic change occurred when the Myanmar military led by General Ne 
Win in a near bloodless coup took over the reigns of power and in one form or another have 
remained as head of State ever since. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to illustrate that one of the first steps taken by the state 
after the removal of colonial rule was an attempt to rebuild the symbiotic relationship between 
Buddhism and the state that had become a legitimating symbol of pre-colonial Myanmar. An 
attempt was being made under the leadership of U Nu to reconstruct the dhammic-order. 
However, in the last chapter, the problem that Reynolds and Clifford put forward of the 
possibility of the dhamma-realm collapsing when one wheel encroaches too far onto the other, 
reappeared in the first decade of independence. 1 The core lay politicians that led a Buddhist 
revival after independence, in particular, Prime Minister U Nu, became too concerned with an 
ideal and not with the pragmatic side of political rule. The lay realm had moved too far onto 
the nibbiinic wheel. At the same time because Buddhism was enjoying such a close connection 
to the State, the trend of a politically active sangha again came to the fore. The sangha 
became too involved in the pragmatics of political rule just as was seen in the early nationalist 
movement. In the last chapter it was seen that with this crossing of boundaries and potential 
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threat of collapse of the Dhamma-Wheel structure a secularist reaction occurred. This 
secularist reaction also happened after independence. This time the move was made by the Ne 
Win led military government. The patterns and problems of re-balancing the relationship 
between Buddhism and the state that had developed during the period of British rule 
continued. 
In order to illustrate these complexities that appeared through this time the first part of this 
chapter will examine some of the predominant moves towards symbiosis that occurred under 
U Nu. Of particular importance will be his view that a revival of Buddhism could be an 
effective means of attaining a socialist state, the culmination of the Sixth Buddhist Council, 
sangha reaction and involvement in politics and especially of his 1961 ruling to make 
Buddhism the State religion. The second part of this chapter will deal with the contrary 
reaction to Buddhism made by the military and Ne Win. In particular, in the replacement of 
Buddhist ideology with an ideology of State developed by the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party that was formed around the 'Burmese Way to Socialism', and the move to cut the 
sang ha off from its involvement in politics by s iisana reform. 
Independence- Re-building the Symbiotic 
The political context in which U Nu began to rebuild the relationship between Buddhism and 
the State was a troubled one. Within a few months of independence two major threats were 
brought against the government. On one side the AFPFL faced a serious communist 
insurrection by the Burma Communist Party (BCP) led by Than Tun. On the other they faced 
an ethnic Karen force. The extent of these threats to the State was serious. Sar Desai notes that 
the communist insurrections had 25,000 members in suppmi.2 Moreover, one of the more 
important factions of the AFPFL, the Peoples Volunteer Organisation (PVO) joined in the 
communist threat and out of all the Burma Rifles units only one, led by Ne Win remained 
1 Reynolds, F., and R. Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration: Burma and 
Thailand", p. 68. 
2 Sar Desai, D., Southeast Asia: Past and Present, p. 234. 
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loyal to the U Nu government.3 Matthews comments that "By February 1949, little more than 
Rangoon remained to the government".4 
The primary concern of the insurgents rested foremost on the legitimacy of AFPFL rule. The 
communists saw the AFPFL as continuing the colonial legacy in its liberal democratic system 
and viewed it as a farce of 'real' independence and a cowering away from the revolutionary 
ideas that inspired the nationalist movement. The Karens, who had fared well under the British 
and who had remained loyal to the British despite the Thakin siding with the Japanese, also 
doubted the legitimacy of the government. According to Yawnghwe, the Karens viewed the 
AFPFL' s defection to the Japanese as a sign of a betrayal and now they held the power that the 
loyal Karens thought should be more theirs.5 Alongside this betrayal there was a long history 
ofBurma-Karen fighting.6 
Despite these serious threats to the U Nu led AFPFL, the government was able to maintain 
control and prevent a collapse of the state. This was achieved partly because of the support 
given to the government by other ethnic minorities such as the Kachins, Chins and Shans. As 
Y awnghwe states, 
The staunch support of these groups bolstered the AFPFL's legitimacy, which, 
in turn, reinforced its international legitimacy and brought in much-needed 
foreign assistance and military aid. This assistance enabled both the AFPFL 
and the new state in Burma to weather a deadly legitimacy crisis.7 
The communist threat proved to be unsuccessful as well. By 1953 the BCP had been expelled 
from the AFPFL and officially banned from political activities.8 One way the communist 
threat was contained was by using a concern for Buddhism to attack communist ideals. Using 
3 Yawnghwe, Chao-Tzang, "Burma: The Depoliticization of the Political", p. 182. 
4 Matthews, B., "The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 33. 
5 Yawnghwe, "Bmma", p. 183 . 
6 Yawnghwe, "Burma", p. 183 . 
7 Yawnghwe, "Burma", p. 183 . 
8 Despite this, the BCP continued in one way or another its opposition to the government. By 1956 it had 
emerged as an undercover group within the National United Front (NUF) which opposed the Nu government in 
the 1956 elections. Later in 1958 after the splitting of the AFPFL it re-emerged throughout the country stirring up 
trouble . But on the whole the AFPFL managed to maintain its power over the communists. Yawnghwe, "Burma", 
pp. 183- 184, and Sar Desai, Southeast Asia, p. 234. 
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the premise that commumsm was anti-religious the government was able to attack it by 
claiming it would destroy Buddhism if were allowed any real power.9 
The question of legitimacy, especially regarding U Nu's democratic ideals, would however, 
come under fire again throughout his leadership. In 1958 the AFPFL split into two- U Nu's 
'Clean' faction and the socialist 'Stable' faction. In order to maintain stability throughout this 
political crisis the military led by Ne Win took over as a caretaker government until 1960. 
Nu's legitimacy was at one of its weakest points. The 1962 military coup saw it taken down 
completely. 10 But despite Nu's eventual downfall what can be considered Nu's strongest 
legacy in claiming legitimacy was his use of Buddhism. In the manner of Myanmar's 
monarchical past U Nu made enormous efforts to show how his government supported 
Buddhism and that Buddhism supported it. In this new structure of statehood Buddhism was a 
link to tradition that gave the government its Burmese authenticity. As Taylor states, "Prime 
Minister U Nu turned to religious symbols and moral appeals in order to gain support for the 
state and the perpetuation of its authority". 11 A move such as re-enacting the traditional 
ploughing ceremony was an example of this connection. 12 This ritual which was mentioned in 
Chapter One denoted the bond between the king, the natural world and morality linked 
together by the laws of karma that was encompassed by dhammic order and Buddhist 
ideology. U Nu's participation in this symbolic event was one means to reassert this link and 
to show his importance in re-building the dhammic-order. Not only did U Nu use such acts to 
promote an image of Buddhist piety but also his whole approach to politics in general became 
coloured by Buddhism. 
In the beginning of his term Nu's political orientation revolved around the bringing together of 
Buddhism and socialism. In 1952 he proposed the four-year pyidawtha (land of happiness) 
plan which would establish a Burmese welfare state based upon Buddhist and socialist ideas. 13 
9 Taylor, R., The State in Burma, p. 288 . In 1959 Ne Win also led an extensive anti-communist propaganda 
campaign of which a pamphlet called the Dhammantaraya (Buddhism in Danger) headed the attack. Smith, D., 
Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 133 . 
10 The 1962 coup will be discussed in more detail below. 
11 Taylor, R., "Political Values and Political Conflict in Burma", p . 37. 
12 Leach, E., "Buddhism in the Post-Colonial Political Order in Burma and Ceylon", p. 41. 
13 Nu's socialism however was very reserved in its Marxist influences. Unlike Nu in his early days as a thakin in 
the nationalist movement, the Nu of independence sought to remove himself somewhat from Marxist thought, 
especially considering the problem that had arisen of anti-religious sentiments being promoted by communist 
insurgents at the time. For a detailed discussion of Nu's movement away from Marxism and of the underlying 
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One of his dominant concerns was that greed and a degradation of morality had plagued 
Myanmar under Colonial rule. Both socialism and Buddhism were seen as a means to combat 
this plague. Matthews comments that the U Nu style government used "Asokan Buddhist 
ideals of society and a socialist welfare state programme remarkably similar to English 
Fabianism". 14 Harking back to the message of the Mahasammata story, Nu spoke of a golden 
age where material needs were satisfied completely but that eventually greed entered and 
destroyed the ideal state. 15 Sarkisyanz remarks further on Nu's view of the contemporary 
situation which was that, 
greed had moved them to appropriate supplies beyond their immediate 
necessities and to separate them as private property, and that this has caused 
want and misery ever since. He [Nu] emphasized that socialism is the teaching 
which can bring humanity back to that blissful past. 16 
This kind of assertion justified Nu's moves in 1948 to establish the Land Nationalization Act 
which gave the government sole ownership of all land, which would subsequently be 
distributed to the people in an equitable manner, and according to Nu, would promote general 
well-being and would "usher in the Nirval).a in this world (Lokka Nibban) ... ". 17 
Despite Nu's early espousal of a mix of socialism and Buddhism as time went on his socialist 
goals became more subdued and his Buddhist ideals came to dominate his political orientation. 
The socialist, 'Stable faction' split from the AFPFL in 1958 no doubt quickened this move. 
Taylor states that when it "came to discuss the epistemological and moral bases of the two 
doctrines they were forced to differ" and that "After the split of the AFPFL in 1958, Nu was 
no longer constrained in his use of Buddhism as a source ofpoliticallegitimacy". 18 
philosophical conflict between Buddhism and Marxism in Myanmar see Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, 
pp. 125- 136. 
14 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 33. 
15 Sarkisyanz, E. "On the Place ofU Nu's Buddhist Socialism in Burma's History ofldeas", p. 58. Sarkisyanz 
does not say explicitly that the Mahasammata story is what is being referred to here but it is reasonable to assume 
this as the Mahasammata story has exactly the same storyline. See also, Chapter One pages 24 and 25. 
16 Sarkisyanz, "U Nu ' s Buddhist Socialism", p. 58 . 
17 Mya Maung, "Socialism and Economic Development of Burma", p. 1183, and Sarkisyanz, "U Nu's Buddhist 
Socialism", p. 59. Trager notes however that this land nationalisation project was also a source of conflict for Nu 
in that there was a "conflict between Buddhist precepts, which hold it sinful to deprive persons of property 
without consent, and the government's program, which proposed to do just that". Trager, F., Building and 
Welfare State in Burma: 1948-1956, p. 14. 
18 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 289. 
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U Nu's use of Buddhism to aid his party's legitimacy and provide a frame for his political 
orientation however, was not just a tool for credibility and a recreating of the pre-colonial 
model. In his personal life Nu was devoutly Buddhist. As a young student he began his 
lifelong bond to Buddhism. Seven times throughout his life he went into the sangha, one time 
he spent six weeks there as a precursor to the 1960 election. 19 For much of his married life he 
was celibate, and abstained from drinking alcohol. On holy days he would not eat after noon 
and was vegetarian for much of the time in keeping with monastic demands. In his daily life 
he would meditate for several hours, count on rosary beads frequently and recite daily the 
payeik. 20 Moreover, his passion for promoting Buddhism led him on his own missionary 
journeys including a tour to the United States where he spoke about Buddhism at several 
universities. In his autobiography Nu wrote that one of his desires was to become a Buddha in 
a future life.21 
Overall, in Nu's personal life religion was an integral part of who he was.22 That he was 
sincere in his beliefs and practice of Buddhism few have argued with. Dissenting voices could 
only be heard in matters concerning Nu's use of Buddhism in political life with claims that his 
many public displays of Buddhist piety were bogus and used merely for political advantage_23 
Much of this criticism came from his opponents especially after the 1962 coup. There is no 
doubt that Nu's Buddhist leanings did help his quest for political legitimacy. His popularity 
and large majority win in the 1960 elections on the wave of popular support for his Buddhist 
state religion proposal illustrates this point. But even in his political life most writers conclude 
that U Nu's promotion of Buddhism was sincere in that one of his primary desires was to 
create a society where everyone had the opportunity to move closer to nibbana. Nu's very 
public demonstrations of his personal religiosity more importantly for him were considered 
necessary. As Butwell comments, 
19 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 142. 
20 Eleven sermons of the Buddha that on recitation were considered to protect one from evil. Nu, U, U Nu 
Saturday's Son, p. 95, and R. Butwell, U Nu of Burma, p. 61 - 62. 
21 Nu, Saturday's Son , p. 48. 
22 Not only did Nu support Buddhism in his personal life. His weekly routine included nat propitiation and he 
encouraged nat worship throughout the country. Nu's concern with nats fell more into the 'folk' Buddhist ideas 
that were spoken of earlier in chapter one. This aspect of Nu's religiosity became a point of contention with the 
Ne Win government that accused Nu of tainting Buddhism with supernatural impurities. Despite criticism of this 
Nu himself comments that it was on the advice of senior monks that he allowed himself to act in such a manner, 
in that "they declared that the bali natsar offering conformed with the Buddha's wishes" and could be a good 
source of merit. Nu, Saturday's Son, pp. 310- 311. 
23 Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, pp. 290, 307. 
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Nu believed that the creation of a public image of himself as a religious man 
was necessary for national salvation. "I believe that the Buddha teaches more 
by example than precept," he has said. "Hence it behooves his disciples to do 
the same. I don't see how we can improve ourselves and others without strong 
devotion to our beliefs. By 'we' I mean not only individuals but also parties, 
0 24 nations, etc. 
A Buddhist Revival 
At the very beginning of the Nu's leadership he called for a Buddhist Revival. Rather than just 
using Buddhism to pad political rhetoric he sought to establish concrete governmental policies 
that would provide for Buddhism's well being. The government was to rebuild the symbiotic 
relationship between Buddhism and the state. Nu's aims were to "(a) encourage interest in 
Buddhism, (b) disseminate the Law ofDeliverance from suffering, (c) provide the facilities to 
achieve such deliverance through the practice of prescribed disciplines".25 One of the first 
steps towards this goal was in 1950 to establish the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which 
became the primary vehicle for dealing with religious legislation.26 Secondly, also that year 
the Buddha Sasana Council (BSC) was created and it became the chief body for promoting 
Buddhism. 
The BSC's charter was to be a representative body for all Buddhists in Myanmar, to "lay a 
firm foundation for Buddhism in the country by encouraging the true practice of religion ... 
[to] defend Buddhism from ideological attack ... [and to] send Buddhist missionaries to other 
countries to propagate the Dhamma ... ".27 The BSC itself was to be made up completely by 
laymen several of whom were to be appointed by the government or were government 
officials.28 
24 Butwell, U Nu, p. 65. 
25 Nu, Saturday's Son, p. 196. 
26 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 288. 
27 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 150. 
28 As we shall see later, this significant lay involvement in Buddhism was to be a key factor in the problems ofU 
Nu's leadership that developed as time went on, both from the practical concerns of political rule and from the 
viewpoint of the sangha. But in these early stages of Buddhist promotion it had not surfaced fully. 
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One of the more important responsibilities of the BSC was in the missionary field. In its quest 
to spread the dhamma it developed close ties to the Society for the Propagation of Buddhism 
and other such groups, which worked primarily in proselytising of the non-Buddhist peoples, 
mainly in the hill areas and amongst ethnic minorities. Many other missionary activities 
occurred outside of Myanmar and were modelled on Christian and Muslim missionary 
examples. 29 But these miSSIOnary moves were not only beneficial for the cultivation of 
Buddhism - they had definite political advantages. Reynolds and Clifford note that this 
missionary activity was an important part of generating national unity in a time when the 
cohesiveness of the nation was under threat. 30 As Smith states, it was a part of "the 
government's cultural 'Burmanization' ofthe Chins, Kachins, Nagas, Shans, Karens and other 
people".31 The increased identification with the state by way of Buddhism gave identification 
with the state in other areas a stronger foothold- at least that was the theory. The reality of the 
situation was that by the end ofU Nu's time as leader it was exactly the possible secession of 
some of the ethnic minorities that was one of the main catalysts for the military take-over. In 
practice Buddhism was not strong enough to hold the country together. 
Moreover, another problem arises when looking at this missionary drive. That is, on the one 
hand Nu's government supported the conversion of non-Buddhists and on the other he 
explicitly stated that the promotion and protection of Buddhism would also be complimented 
by the suppmi of other religious traditions.32 In his autobiography he boasts of how he made 
visits to the Vatican and brought back paraphernalia for Burmese Catholics. On a visit to Israel 
he brought back crucifixes for Christians and provided the finances for Catholic and Islamic 
missions to Rome and Mecca.33 This concern for other religions also came to the fore when in 
1954 a ruling came about that allowed Islam and Christianity to be taught in state schools for 
those who wanted it. 34 This concession to other religions came at a high price. Relations 
between the government and the sangha became very strained at this point. The intricacies of 
29 Nu's personal contribution to this evangelism even went as far as trying to convert Pandit Nehru, Prime 
Minister oflndia at the time. Butwell, U Nu , p. 65. 
30 Reynolds and Clifford, "Sangha, Society and the Struggle for National Integration", pp. 86 - 87. 
31 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 154. Although there are several ethnic minority groups who are 
Buddhist, groups such as the Chins and Kachins are predominantly animist or Christian. The Karens are 
predominantly Christian, and in the Arakan state Islam has a stronghold. These groups and others like them, to 
varying degrees, have become important voices in Bmmese politics over the years . 
32 Nu, Saturday 's Son, pp. 196 - 199. 
33 Nu, Saturday's Son, pp. 196- 199. 
34 See Nu, Saturday's Son, pp. 200 - 204, for Nu's personal account of this ruling. 
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this particular situation will be discussed in greater detail below. What needs to be taken from 
this example now is that Nu's promotion of Buddhism was not as straight-forward as Smith, 
Reynolds and Clifford suggest, and issues of minority rights were never far away.
35 
Alongside missionary Buddhism one the most dominating features ofNu's contributions to re-
creating the state as patron of the religion was his determination to hold the Sixth World 
Buddhist Council. Following the example of Asoka and the pious Mindon, U Nu sought to 
bring Theravada Buddhists from throughout the world together. The legitimacy and merit that 
such a task would give U Nu was enormous. Only the strongest and most pious of mlers were 
considered capable of holding such an event. On the surface of it, Nu justified the calling of 
the Council by stating that there were several mistakes made in the texts that were written 
down in the last World Council under Mindon, and which needed correcting. Moreover, as it 
was coming up to the 25001h anniversary of Buddhism it was seen as an auspicious time to 
hold such a council. The BSC played an integral role in the organisation of the Council but 
more importantly the support of the sangha was essential to give the Council legitimacy. The 
Supreme Sangha Council (SSC) was created in order to achieve this.
36 Members of the SSC 
were representative of the main groups within the Burmese sangha at the time. Sanghas from 
other Theravada countries also needed to be enlisted to show the validity of the Council and to 
aid the re-editing of texts. Mendelson notes that there were many journeys taken by 
government representatives to India, Sri Lanka, Laos and so on for this purpose, however, he 
gives the impression that overall the enthusiasm for the Council was not abounding from these 
regions.37 He even goes on to say that overall the number of Burmese monks who participated 
in the Council was "relatively small".38 
Despite the mediocre enthusiasm the Council generated many tasks associated with it gave 
Nu's government legitimating opportunities and openings for merit making. One such task 
was the building of the Peace Pagoda that was built near to the Great Sacred Cave where the 
Council was held. The building of the pagoda reinforced again Nu's status as patron of 
35 This issue is one that comes up time and time again even in the contemporary context as shall be seen in 
chapter four. 
36 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 159. 
37 Mendelson, E. M., Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership, pp. 276 -
281. 
38 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 282 . 
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Buddhism like the kings of old. 39 Also as part of the magnitude of the event Nu declared that 
prisoners would be pardoned both at the beginning of the Council and at the end, 
slaughterhouses were to be closed for a time, animals were to be set free and so on. 40 All of 
these were signs of a good Buddhist ruler. 
Aside from these ostentatious aspects of the Buddhist revival there were several moves that 
Nu ' s government took that directly sought to reverse the lack of symbiosis felt between 
Buddhism and the state under colonial rule. One of the changes was to bring back Buddhist 
teaching into the schools. However, this could not return education to the sole responsibility of 
the sangha in monastery schools. Once the move had been made to Western style education it 
would have been difficult to find much credibility in going back to the old style of schooling 
in the pongyi kyaung. So the decision was made to bring Buddhist education into the state 
schools. However, in this move to rebuild a symbiosis between Buddhism and the state the 
issue of minority rights arose. In trying to keep in with the Panglong agreement U Nu ruled 
that Christianity and Islam would also be taught for the sake of students of those faiths. With 
this decision came an enormous outcry from both the sangha and the general public who 
thought only Buddhism should be taught. In response to this outcry Nu ruled that no religious 
instruction would be taught at all. 41 At this there was an even greater outcry. At one point 
8000 monks came together in Mandalay and called for the constitution to be changed so that 
Buddhism could be declared the state religion and religious minority rights could be 
annulled.42 Smith comments that the issue got so serious that U Nu almost had to resign from 
office.43 In the end Nu conceded to the general demands of the sangha and the public. He 
brought back Buddhist teaching into the schools but also stated that if there was enough 
demand other religions could be taught but in a completely separate place from the other 
students. However, this never happened, only Buddhism ended up being taught.44 
The difficulties that arose out of this issue bring to the surface an important factor in the whole 
process of rebuilding the dhammic-order after colonisation. That is, since independence moves 
to recreate the symbiotic relationship between Buddhism and the state have the added 
39 Taylor, The State in Burma, pp. 288-289. 
40 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 162. 
41 Nu, Saturday 's Son, pp. 200- 204. 
42 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 180. 
43 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 181. 
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difficulty of balancing support for Buddhism without ostracising minority groups. This not 
only impinges on the religious issues but also brings in the whole idea of Burmanization into 
the picture. 
The primary difference between the monarchical period and the post-colonial period that has 
effected this change is that under the monarchy the outlying areas where most of the 
minorities lived were reasonably autonomous from central rule. As discussed in Chapter One, 
the further one was from the centre the more autonomy one had. In supporting Buddhism to a 
great extent the king would not necessarily make such a huge impact on religious minorities. 
Overall, the impact of a symbiotic Buddhism and state would have been minimal. Under 
Colonial rule, this separation between Myanmar 'proper' and the outlying areas was even 
more defined. The British separated these areas out as Frontier or Excluded Areas that were 
not dealt with in the same way as central Myanmar was. Fumivall wrote that, "British rule did 
nothing to foster national unity. On the contrary, both directly and indirectly, it stimulated 
sectional particularism".45 Once independence was granted though these areas and central 
Myanmar were brought together under one administration and along with that Myanmar 
became faced directly with the need to provide equal rights for the outlying areas. This is what 
the Panglong agreement sought to uphold, and one of the reasons why Aung San's secularist 
position was politically useful. Under U Nu though, with his stress on rebuilding the symbiosis 
between Buddhism and the state, the relation could no longer be achieved without bringing 
some minority conflict into the picture.46 This conflict comes to a head when Nu made 
Buddhism the state religion - which will be discussed in detail below. Rebuilding the 
symbiosis became much more complex. 
Sangha Relations 
An integral part of the Buddhist revival and of the whole rebuilding of the symbiotic 
relationship between Buddhism and the state was the place and support of the sangha. 
Initiatives such as convening the Sixth Buddhist Council, supporting Buddhist missionary 
44 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 181. 
45 Fumivall, J. S., The Governance of Modern Burma, p. 22. 
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activities, which usually involved monks as the pnmary participants, and reintroducing 
Buddhism into the schooling system, where monks were again the main teachers, were all 
ways of strengthening ties between the sangha and the state. Despite some of the difficulties 
that arose, such as with the schooling issue, on the whole the Nu government strove to correct 
the imbalance created by the British policy of neutrality towards sangha matters. One very 
direct example of this was the introduction of the Ecclesiastical Courts Act in 1949 that took 
sangha legal matters out of civil court jurisdiction and back into the sangha 's own hands.47 
The ideal of the Ecclesiastical Court Act was to provide the sang ha a means of giving back to 
the monks the responsibility of their own behaviour and a certain amount of autonomy from 
civil control. However, at the same time the Act was an attempt by the state to set up a system 
wherein the sangha could establish a hierarchy, not unlike the Thudhamma Council and 
thathanabaing idea of pre-colonial times, that could take control of a very fractured sangha.48 
Initially it was decided that the sangha itself would elect its own judges to head the courts. 
After registering its members in each area, elections would be held to determine who would be 
the most suitable candidates. However, because of the anger of many monks at the thought of 
registration, this process failed. 49 The sangha 's view was that registration was an attempt by 
the laity to control the sangha and contradicted the whole idea of the monks renouncing the 
world.50 The whole failure of the election process eventually led to the politicians taking 
responsibility for appointing judges, opening up the whole system to political influence that 
was reminiscent of kingship days. By the late 1950s the whole ecclesiastical comi process was 
deemed a failure with many examples of court corruption and inadequacy and much protest 
from within the sangha.51 
The implication for the whole Dhamma-Wheel structure in v1ew of such moves by the 
government to recreate the symbiotic relationship between the sangha and the state was that 
lay interference became too extreme. The complaints of the sangha against registration and 
46 This is still an important issue in contemporary times with Aung San Suu Kyi's use of Buddhism in her 
political rhetoric, and it will be discussed in chapter four. 
47 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 288 . 
48 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 240. 
49 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 219. 
50 Mendelson adds to this that the 'Mindon sects', that is, the minority groups, did not involve themselves with 
the courts, therefore the unification of the entire sang ha was unlikely. Mendelson, Sang ha and State in Burma, p. 
242. 
51 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 242- 243 . 
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eventually against the problem of politically influenced ecclesiastical judges were signs of this 
problem. Just as in Chapter One where a backlash occurred against Mindon's involvement in 
sangha affairs, so too in Nu's time could this be seen. In attempting to re-balance the 
symbiotic aspect of the dhammic order neglected by the British, Nu was beginning to go too 
far. The symbiosis was being emphasised too much. The consequences of this were great. By 
the end of Nu's rule criticisms were rife. 52 Mendelson even goes as far as stating that, "the 
Revival itself became one of the major causes of the AFPFL split". 5
3 U Nu's concern with 
Buddhism came to dominate his political praxis - he became too involved with the ideal and 
did not pay enough attention to the pragmatic. 
But the problem of too much lay interference was not the only consequence of Nu's revival. 
Another serious issue came about in the whole symbiotic process, that is, as the sangha 
became open to political influence so too did the politicians become sway to certain groups 
within the sangha. In the previous chapters it was established that during the monarchical days 
the sangha, to some extent, had the ability to criticise, or to act as a 'safety valve' to the state. 
During the Colonial period this ability to criticise, the antagonistic side the Buddhism/state 
relationship, had become too extreme and the political pongyis' integrity was in danger of 
being lost, and this may have initiated in part a secular shift by Aung San and the Thakins. 
Under U Nu's leadership however, because Nu had given such esteem to Buddhism and it had 
dominated his political orientation, the sang ha, as the key representatives of Buddhism, came 
to be very politically powerful. However, unlike the kingship days where stringent siisana 
reforms made attempts to control the power the sangha had in politics, Nu did not succeed in 
any such reforms. The moves to unify the sang ha by way of the ecclesiastical court hierarchy 
did not succeed, nor did his attempts at sangha registration. Taylor sums up this problem when 
he states, 
the state lacked the power to impose its control upon the Buddhist monkhood 
and because, unlike the strong kings of the past who were able to use the 
sangha and its institutions to prop up the state, in the 1950s mobilized factions 
within the monkhood used the state for their own political purposes. 54 
52 Butwell, R. , "The Four Failures ofU Nu's Second Premiership", p. 4. 
53 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 64. 
54 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 290. 
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Moreover, rather than the sangha becoming involved in politics on the basis of upholding 
moral integrity, that is, as a safety valve for state abuses of power, like some of their 
involvement in nationalistic politics in the 1930s and 1940s they became involved more in 
pushing for their own concerns. These included stirring up anti-minority feeling, as has 
already been seen in the case of religious minority teaching in schools. The two main factions 
of pongyis that were involved politically were the Yahanpyo Aphwe that is, the Young Monks 
Association (YMA) and the Kyaungtaik Sayadaw Aphwe or Presiding Abbots Association 
(PAA). 
The YMA had its beginnings in the nationalist movement as mentioned in the last chapter and 
had become quite militant in its political activities inciting anti-Muslim riots and so on. In the 
first years after independence the activities of this group did not diminish in fervency. 
Politically they had aligned themselves with the Stable faction of the AFPFL and the army 
rather than to Nu's Clean faction. What may have connected them more closely to the army 
could have been their strong anti-communist stance.55 Mendelson notes that this stance also 
enabled them to receive financial aid from the United States for the purposes of furthering 
their anti-communist agenda.56 The aims of the YMA were primarily to ensure the survival of 
Buddhism and counteract any threat that might impinge on this goal. 57 As Matthews puts it, 
the YMA acted as "cultural police" and did not stop at violence in carrying out this role. 58 
The second main group, the P AA monks, were more aligned to the Clean faction of the 
AFPFL, and were mainly older, more conservative monks who were not so openly involved in 
political agitation.59 They acted as advisors to those politicians on Nu's side and were more 
concerned with internal sangha issues rather than political activity such as the YMA was 
concerned with.60 The PAA developed with the support of the government and its members 
had been important figures in hosting the Sixth Buddhist Council.61 
55 Matthews, B., "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 412. 
56 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 325. 
57 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 322. 
58 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 412. 
59 The alignment of the P AA with the Clean AFPFL and the YMA with the Stable AFPFL were not immovable 
alliances but fluctuated at times. Overall though, these were their main loyalties. 
60 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 190. 
61 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 190. 
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Aside from these two main political sangha groups, there were many other political pongyis' 
organisations and with varying political orientations. The Yahan: nge Aphwe or Younger 
Monks Association aligned themselves with the communist influenced National United Front 
(NUF) party.62 The Sangha Front, although small, was quite outspoken on issues of lay 
interference in sangha affairs, and there were also many sangha organisations that supported 
different ethnic minority concerns.63 
Overall, like the nationalist days of Colonial rule, in the Nu era there was a very politically 
active segment of the sangha. However, in the first decade of independence there was not one 
unified motivation for political activity as was found with the nationalist monks. Generally, 
the aims of the politically active sangha concerned increasing and maintaining the status of 
Buddhism but there were many different ways that this aim was approached. At times the 
differences led to extreme conflict. Both Smith and Mendelson note several instances where 
opposing sangha factions resmied to violence, even murder, in upholding their causes.64 
This extreme political activity increasingly led to the integrity of these monks to decline. 
Examples of the extreme political activity are many. There were instances where large 
amounts of weaponry were found in monasteries, attacks on lay people occurred and at one 
stage U N andiya, a Mandalay monk, set up his own government in an attempt to overthrow the 
AFPFL. 65 Just as was seen in Chapter Two, the political pongyis had moved too far onto the 
lay wheel focusing more on the pragmatism of politics rather than the ideal. As a consequence 
of this the transcendental ethic which gave them the power as an alternative structure to that of 
the state and upheld their ability to criticise came into question. 
Overall, Nu's Buddhist revival brought Buddhism and the state into close proximity and by 
the government's inability to control the sangha the Dhamma-Wheel structure was threatened. 
The lay boundary was broken by Nu's wing of the AFPFL becoming too concerned with the 
nibbiinic wheel and this in turn allowed the nibbiinic wheel to go too far onto the lay wheel. 
By focussing so strongly on the ideal the pragmatic suffered from neglect. But aside from the 
62 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 191. 
63 See Mendelson, Sangha and State in Politics, pp. 334-341 for details of these smaller groups. 
64 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 191, and Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 327. Ironically, 
it was the YMA, who strove for sangha purity and were seriously concerned with the survival of Buddhism, who 
were often the most violent monks and consequently threatened the integrity of Buddhism. 
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aspects looked at so far regarding Nu's Buddhist revival, the pinnacle of his re-creation of the 
symbiosis was in his quest to make Buddhism the state religion. The consequences of this 
move brought into focus most clearly the problems of moving too far onto the nibbiinic wheel. 
It brought in again the problem of a politically active sangha and the conflict of supporting 
Buddhism whilst at the same time recognising minority rights. 
Buddhism as the State Religion 
After the AFPFL split and under the caretaker government led by Ne Win, Nu made his 
strongest move in the support of Buddhism. As a prelude to the 1960 elections Nu announced 
that if elected back into power he would make Buddhism the state religion. With this as a 
campaign base the Clean faction of the AFPFL won convincingly and in 1961 two Bills, one 
to make Buddhism the state religion (the Third Amendment) and second, the State Religion 
Promotion Act, were passed. The problems that arose out of this decision were many. 
Opposition began during the election campaign. The communist influenced NUF asserted the 
need for a secular state and the Stable AFPFL accused Nu of breaking section 21 of the 
constitution that disallowed the use of religion for political advantage or causing minority 
dissension. 66 
After the Bills were passed the concerns of religious minorities was one of the main areas of 
tension that developed. The state religion issue played some role in the emerging insurrections 
by the Karens, and the Kachins, in the Kachin Independence Army, many of whom were 
Christians or animists.67 The Islamic Religious Affairs Council stated that, 
the state religion proposal .. . would create two classes of citizens - first-class 
Buddhist citizens and second-class non-Buddhist citizens. Even if the rights of 
the non-Buddhist citizens would be protected by law, in actual practice there 
would almost be certainly be discrimination in economic, political, social, and 
1. . 68 re 1g10us matters. 
65 Mendelson, Sangha and State in Burma, p. 328, and Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 197. 
66 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 239-241. 
67 Butwell, "The Four Failures ofU Nu's Second Premiership", p. 6. 
68 Islamic Religious Affairs Council, cited in Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 248. 
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Despite the concerns of the religious minorities, Nu, at least in the beginning, was more 
concerned with getting the Bills through rather than listening to those who opposed the Bill. 
He even went to the extent of threatening to expel from his party any Buddhist Member of 
Parliament who voted against the Bills and stated "I am determined to bring in the state 
religion, even ifl have to die in the attempt".69 
Very comprehensive guidelines for promoting Buddhism came out of making Buddhism the 
state religion. Pali would be introduced into state schools, Buddha images and shrines were 
required in courthouses and schools, and government offices were to be closed on Buddhist 
sabbaths.70 The Buddhist lunar calendar was to be introduced and the slaughter of cattle was 
again banned - a point of contention for Muslim communities.71 Nu certainly made every 
attempt to make Myanmar an exemplar of the Buddhist state ideal. But in this attempt the Nu 
government alienated several important groups within a precariously unified nation. This 
factor led him eventually to concede to minority demands in that he made amendments to the 
State Religion Bills that acknowledged the place of other religious traditions and guaranteed 
financial support for them. It was accepted that one did not need to be Buddhist in order to 
become a Member of Parliament, and all religions were allowed complete freedom to teach 
and practice their own faiths and that the government would protect them. 72 The negative 
reaction that followed this amendment was spearheaded by the sangha. Many of the pongyis 
that supported the Nu government throughout its term were now vehemently opposed to it 
claiming that the new amendments nullified any advantage for Buddhism that the State 
Religion Bills could have made, as Buddhism had now been reduced to the level of all other 
religions.73 Several protests with mostly monk participants were arranged, anti-government 
poster campaigns were organised and in a 2000 strong picket line monks were attempting to 
force Members of Parliament into voting against the amendments.74 A more serious incident 
took place when a large group of monks occupied a half-built mosque and after two weeks of 
69 Nu, U, The Nation, August 31, 1960, cited in Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 246. U Nu was fully 
aware of the problems that the State Religion Bills were to cause. Just prior to the Bills being passed 100,000 
pamphlets advising against violent riots were dropped by plane over Rangoon in order to quell possible 
disturbance and tanks were placed around the parliament buildings where the Bills were being put through. 
Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 261. 
70 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, pp. 254- 256. 
71 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 34. 
72 Nu, Saturday's Son, p. 205 . 
73 Nu, Saturday 's Son, pp. 205- 206. 
74 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, pp. 275 - 277. 
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failed negotiations with the government to vacate the premises they destroyed it along with 
another mosque. Four were killed in the incident - two Muslims and two Buddhists and 92 
monks were arrested. 75 
Altogether, the state religion issue had brought to a head all the elements of tension 
concernmg the relationship between Buddhism and the state during the decade after 
independence. By emphasising the symbiosis between Buddhism and the State the issue of 
minority rights in a precariously held together country entered centre stage. At the same time, 
the status given to the pongyis and the inability of the Nu government to successfully control 
the factionalised sangha, added to the conflict, not only with the minorities but also with the 
government itself- this in turn threatened Nu's legitimacy. But Myanmar had little time to 
settle into this newly established Buddhist nation, with all of its problems, as only a few 
months after the Bills were passed, in the coup of March 1962 Ne Win took over the Nu 
government and turned everything around. 
Overall, Nu's leadership and his attempts to rebuild a symbiosis between Buddhism and the 
state were fraught with difficulty. Aside from the Nu government's ability or inability, as 
many argue, to manage the economic situation, the frequent insurrections and the challenges 
to his wing of the AFPFL, his approaches to Buddhism certainly were important factors that 
contributed to his political orientation.76 But this Buddhist approach certainly did not slow 
down moves against him by his opponents, which he finally fell to in 1962. Most 
commentators, at least in part, attribute Nu's concern with Buddhism as one of the factors in 
his demise. Butwell comments that "economic questions were of secondary importance during 
the 1961 budget session of the Parliament, which was primarily concerned with making 
75 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 279. 
76There are many differing assessments of the ability or inability of the Nu government. Callahan comments that 
"the economic and social chaos that engulfed Burma in the postwar era was not caused directly by political 
mismanagement, corruption, or infighting". At the same time Mya Maung states that the economy under Nu ' s 
Pyydawtha plan "was quite impressive". Silverstein reinforces this idea and goes on to state that even concerning 
the relations with minorities, towards the end of Nu's rule his party had managed to achieve a degree of harmony 
and "ways to solve problems peacefully", although, Silverstein fully acknowledges the negatives of Nu's 
government as well. Others such as Aung Thwin and Maung Maung speak quite harshly about the failings of the 
Nu government. But whatever side is taken there is no doubt that overall U Nu's emphasis on Buddhism, was 
considered to be a sincere and genuine move by a devout Buddhist who wanted to recreate a traditional ideal that 
could be bound together in a new context of democratic socialist rule. Callahan, M., "On Time Warps and 
Warped Time: Lessons from Burma's 'Democratic Era"', p. 58, Mya Maung, "Socialism and Economic 
Development of Burma", p. 1188, Silverstein, J., Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation, pp. 29-
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Buddhism the state religion". 77 He gives a telling example of Nu's primarily Buddhist 
concerns when the country was facing a huge increase in the cost of food, Nu's reaction was to 
state "at a 1960 press conference that the high price of fish would encourage the people to stop 
eating fish, a highly meritorious thing from a Buddhist point ofview".78 Taylor points out that 
part of the reason for Nu's legitimacy failure was "partly because the society upon which he 
attempted to impose these ideas was much more religiously and educationally diverse and 
sceptical than that of the nineteenth century and before".79 The new ideas brought in with 
Colonial rule, such as the separation between church and state, the increased contact with the 
world at large and the new way minority regions were administrated became significant 
challenges to the pre-colonial ideal of the Buddhist state that Nu was unable to resolve. 
It is not that Nu was foolhardy in attempting to rebuild the nation in a traditional guise but the 
extent to which he tried to assert this tradition that caused a problem. He had shifted too far 
onto the nibbiinic wheel without enough time being spent on the pragmatics of political rule. 
The connection between the two wheels needs to be kept taut otherwise the structure itself is 
in danger of collapse. 
It is even obvious that Nu himself was aware of the difficulties of maintaining balance 
between the lay wheel and the nibbiinic path. In his autobiography he states that several times 
he planned to resign, that he felt ill-equipped to lead the AFPFL and did not really want to be a 
politician.80 At one point he discusses how he contemplated the story of Mahawthada, an 
embryo Buddha who inevitably had to use violence in order to save his people. Aware of the 
consequences of this action - an atoning time in hell - Mahawthada accepted this as his lot 
and did what he had to for his kingdom as long as the violence was done for the intention of 
good and not for power.81 This story gave Nu a model on which to base his violent moves 
against the communists - it was for the good of his people and like the embryo Buddha, he 
was willing to make the sacrifice. The decision weighed heavily on him as the tension between 
the two paths became clear. On the one hand he knew that all killing was wrong, no matter 
30, Aung Thwin, M., "The British Pacification of Burma: Order Without Meaning", pp. 255-256, and "1948 
and Burma's Myth oflndependence", pp. 19 - 33, Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win. 
77 Butwell, "The Four Failures", p. 4. 
78 Butwell, "The Four Failures", p. 4. 
79 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 290. 
80 Nu, Saturday 's Son, pp. 85- 86, 114, 135 - 136, 316- 317. 
81 Nu, Saturday's Son, pp. 148 - 149. 
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who did it- this was a demand of the nibbanic path- and on the other he had a duty to protect 
the people - the lay duty. 
It is not that Buddhism should not have had a place in politics in the post-colonial context. But 
the relationship of Buddhism and the state could not just be a duplication of the pre-colonial 
past. The difficulties of maintaining a Buddhist model of a dhamma-realm at all in a multi-
religious society needed to be addressed more effectively. Overall, the relationship between 
Buddhism and the state needed to adapt to a new context whilst at the same time assert a 
continuity with Myanmar's past to salvage some sense of cultural identity. But amidst the 
insurrections, the internal strife of the AFPFL and the general turmoil of the first decade of 
political independence, to maintain a balance between the two wheels in a such a new context 
was a huge ask and one that Nu did not achieve. 
The Ne Win Era 
After the military coup of March 1962 the symbiosis between Buddhism and the state under U 
Nu was drastically modified. Just as toward the end of colonial rule there had been a secular 
swing by the AFPFL led by Aung San, so too was there a secular swing under the rule of Ne 
Win. In Chapter Two I argued that Aung San's secularism had the effect of counterbalancing 
the extreme political activity of the sang ha -Buddhism had become too involved with the lay 
wheel - and Ne Win's secularism can also be seen in this light.82 Ne Win's Revolutionary 
Council pushed Buddhism back onto the nibbanic path, but at the same time, just like the 
consequences of Aung San's push, removed Buddhism's ability to criticise. In rejecting a 
symbiosis and by exerting a great deal of control over the sang ha it suffocated the antagonistic 
side of the relationship. This approach by the military under Ne Win towards Buddhism in part 
reflected their approach to the country at large - there was the desire for a unified and 
controlled country and a desire for a unified and controlled sangha. 
82 Of course, as has already been seen, under Nu the problem of the lay wheel crossing too far onto the nibbffnic 
path also occurred. 
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In general the 1962 coup was largely said to counteract the growing possibility of a breaking 
up of the country. 83 The state religion moves by U Nu where considered by the coup leaders as 
significantly contributing to the disunity.84 The military's theme throughout the whole of their 
rule even until the present day, has been to ensure unity and an opposition to autonomy and 
secession of the ethnic minority regions. This unity was to be partly achieved by closing 
Myanmar off to the outside world and becoming more or less a hermit land. Myanmar would 
be closed off as much as possible to outside foreign influence that might taint the Burmese 
identity. 
The structure of rule under Ne Win differed significantly from Nu's style of government with 
democratic multiparty politics being cast aside and a socialist one-party system put in its 
place. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was that one party and all other parties 
were outlawed and many opposition politicians were imprisoned for several years - U Nu 
included. 85 The structure of administration installed by the BSPP was similar to that under the 
monarchy. It established a strongly centralised state but unlike the kingship days its power did 
not dissipate the further one moved from the centre. Silverstein notes that under the monarchy 
"[t]he ordinary Burman took no interest in politics and avoided contact with the government 
and its agents".86 However, under Ne Win members of the ruling party infiltrated every area of 
society. One way this was achieved was directly through the shift from urban focussed politics 
to a rural focus and the establishment of the Workers and Peasants Council. 
87 This move 
sought to empower the rural masses to contribute to the idea of a united state that all could 
play an important part in. The military "wanted to unite the entire nation by demonstrating that 
all classes had made their contribution to the national effort . . . the peasant and worker 
meetings . . . created a sensation of participation by people who had rarely before been 
involved in matters of state". 88 By empowering the masses the government was able to 
83 There were of course many reasons for the coup but this is the one that the military themselves highlighted. It 
must be pointed out also here that there is a general consensus that in 1962 the coup itself was actually supported 
by the majority. Few protests occurred in the initial stages of military rule. Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 291. 
84 Even in current writings by the State Peace and Development Council, U Nu's state religion issue is blamed for 
beginning years of ethnic insurgency as they state that Nu's "move created rebellion among the ethnic races 
professing other religious faiths and automatically led to armed insurrection .... The fighting lasted for 45 
years". State Peace and Development Council, "Insurgency After Post-Independence Days", Information Sheets, 
pp. 5-6, http://www.myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6111101 . 
85 Sar Desai, Southeast Asia, p. 239. 
86 Silverstin, J., "The Evolution and Salience of Burma's National Political Culture", p. 13. 
87 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 304. 
88 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 307. 
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integrate itself into a major sector of the population and gave it the means to control it more 
effectively. 89 
As well as bringing the rural masses into the political picture, other means of unifying the state 
occurred through the nationalisation of virtually all aspects of society. Land, trade, goods, 
banks and so on all came under state control.90 This nationalisation was not just characteristic 
of a Marxist orientated party but, as Bechert states, was "just as much 'traditional"'.91 This 
desire for control by the state dominated the monarchical era as was seen in Chapter One. 
However, overall the Ne Win government did not fit entirely into the model completely 
reminiscent of the pre-colonial period. Smith comments that, "It was the monarch's unique 
role as defender and promoter of Buddhist religion which in the final analysis confirmed his 
legitimacy", however, under Ne Win, Buddhism served no such purpose.92 
The moves to take Buddhism out of state matters were extensive and fast. Soon after taking 
power Ne Win's government retracted many of U Nu's Buddhist promotion steps. The 
Ecclesiastical Courts Act, the Buddha Sasana Council, the observance of Buddhist sabbath 
days, cattle slaughter prohibitions and so on, were all dissolved.93 
It was the government's moves to restrict sangha interaction with the state that stood out most 
clearly in the separation of Buddhism from politics. Matthews comments that, "Monks were 
89 Taylor notes that the rural masses were "the only internal group powerful enough to bring down the state" and 
no doubt this contributed to the moves by the BSPP to control it. Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 300. 
90 One important consequence of this was the development of a very strong black market which Sar Desai says by 
the mid eighties possibly "controlled 60 percent of the country' s currency". This was one of the reasons behind 
the demonitisation of several notes in 1987 -it was a means counteract the power of the black market. Sar Desai, 
Southeast Asia, p. 242. 
91 Bechert, H, cited in Leach, "Buddhism in the Post-Colonial Political Order", p. 43. 
92 Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, p. 23. 
93 Matthews, "Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 36. Other religious traditions and foreign missionaries 
were also restricted in that the schools and hospitals that they ran were nationalised. Taylor comments that they 
did however, allow well-established foreign missionary groups to remain in the country and practice their 
differing faiths with freedom. However, the US State Department 1999 Report on Religious Freedom states, that 
"Since the 1960's, Christian and Islamic groups have had difficulties in printing or importing religious literature" 
and that, "in general, the government has not allowed petmanent foreign religious missions to operate since the 
mid-1960's, when it expelled nearly all foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and hospitals, 
which were extensive and were affiliated mostly with Christian religious organizations. However, the 
Government has allowed a few elderly Catholic priests and nuns who have worked in the country since before 
independence to continue their work". It is difficult to find out for sure which view is correct as there is little that 
I have been able to find written on this issue. Taylor, the State in Burma, p. 357, US State Department, 1999 
Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, pp. 103, 108. 
88 
just simply surgically removed from the body politic, like diseased flesh". 94 The Ne Win 
government's approach to these aspects of Buddhism was symptomatic of the wider 
ideological shift wherein Buddhist ideology was being replaced by BSPP's own party 
ideology - this is what was to unify the nation.95 Buddhism no longer had this function. Taylor 
states that the shift from Buddhist ideology to the Party ideology was "to deny the legitimacy 
of any source of power outside of the state, whether economic, social or moral, and to attempt 
to concentrate attention upon the state itself as the centre of human identity".96 
The BSPP's ideology was based upon socialist goals. At the root of these goals was the desire 
to curb greed and the egotistical nature of humans and according to the BSPP, the state was 
ultimately responsible for this. 97 The document, The System of Correlation of Man and His 
Environment (SCME) which the BSPP produced in January 1963 developed the basic ideas 
behind this desire to curb greed and egotism and became the foundation for the BSPP's new 
ideology known as the 'Burmese Way to Socialism'. One of the general ideas put forward in 
this document, that is relevant here, is that man is inherently egotistical, but at the same time is 
inevitably cast into a social situation where others' needs must be acknowledged and so 
because of this man is also altruistic. The first part of the document is concerned mainly with 
this aspect, that is, establishing the correlation between man and his social and physical 
environment.98 The document then goes on to discuss the basic economic principles of 
socialism and arrives at the conclusion that it is through socialism that a harmony between 
egotistical man and the needs of others around him in his unavoidable social environment can 
be achieved.99 
Of some importance here is that in the first part of the document wherein the correlation 
between man and his social environment is being discussed, Buddhist concepts are used to 
establish the terms of the relationship. The Buddhist concepts of ani cc a (impermanence) and 
94 Matthews, "Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 35. This aspect of governmental control will be looked 
at in more detail below. 
95 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 356. 
96 Taylor, "Political Values and Political Conflict in Burma", p. 38. 
97 It is interesting to note that Ne Win and U Nu's socialism in one way is similar in that both see greed as a core 
problem that needs to be addressed. The difference between them though is that for U Nu, Buddhism came to 
dominate over his socialist orientation whereas with Ne Win it was the socialist side that came to dominate while 
Buddhism fell completely into the background. Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 99, and Aung 
Thwin, "1948 and Burma's Myth oflndependence", p. 27. 
98 Burma Socialist Programme Party, The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, pp. 2 - 7. 
99 For a more detailed overview of the SCME's themes see Silverstein, Burma, pp. 81-87. 
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Paticca samuppikla (Dependent Origination), which the SCME translates as "the law of 
dialectics", are discussed. 100 However, overall these ideas do not form an extensive part of the 
orientation of the document but are just a fragment of several different philosophies used by 
the BSPP in formulating their ideology. Also, it is one aspect that is often thought to conflict 
with the rest of the document. 101 Moreover, at the end of the document it is stated clearly that 
the ideology has nothing to do with religion, as it states, 
The philosophy of our Party is a purely mundane and human doctrine. It is 
neither religious nor supemal. The ideology of our Party should not therefore 
be looked at from a religious or supra-mundane point of view. It should be seen 
and studied only as a worldly matter. 102 
Throughout the document they also avoid referring to religion. Even though the document 
frequently refers to spiritual man, it defines 'spiritual life' as "a collective term embracing ... 
man's desires and aspirations, thoughts and ideas, mis and sciences, policies and plans 
(political, economic, educational, social), knowledge and experiences, philosophies and 
ideologies" rather than in a 'religious' manner.103 Overall, the SCME maintains the Ne Win 
government's separation of Buddhism from politics. 
In the shift from Buddhist ideology to the Party ideology, the morality that Buddhism 
imparted on the state is also taken up by the Party ideology. 104 In terms of the antagonistic-
symbiotic structure it was Buddhism's moral status, its transcendental ethic, that gave it its 
power and stature in the political arena. A part of the BSPP's replacement of Buddhist 
ideology with the Party ideology can be understood to include the transfer of this moral aspect. 
Taylor makes this link when he states, 
The function of the ideology, like Buddhist teachings, is essentially moral and 
hortatory. The Party and its cadres, who trained in a manner of withdrawal 
from society like both Buddhist monks and modem soldiers, exist to ensure that 
the purpose of the state is successfully carried out by moral men and women 
who are able to provide the remainder of society with proper leadership. 105 
100 Burma Socialist Programme Party, The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, pp. 3 - 9. 
10 1 Yawnghwe, "Burma", p. 186. 
102 Burma Socialist Programme Patiy, The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, p. 36. 
103 Burma Socialist Programme Party, The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, p. 9. 
104 Taylor, "Political Values and Political Conflict in Burma", p. 37. 
105 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 363 . 
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Aside from the moral parallels between Buddhist ideology and the BSPP's ideology there 
remained one imp01iant difference. 106 Buddhist ideology and especially the idea of a 
transcendental ethic are based upon the idea of truths that Collins asserted were thought of as 
"structured independently of and differently from the here-and-now" .107 This transcendence is 
what gave Buddhism its superiority in the Two-Wheel structure. However, with the BSPP 
ideology the truths expounded by it, in particular those discussed in the SCME are considered 
to be only relative truths based in the here-and-now. As the SCME states that, "What man 
experiences, knows, feels, thinks, invents, designs ... are just relative or conventional truths .. 
. . The programmes of our Party are mere relative truths". 108 This difference between Buddhist 
transcendent truths and the BSPP's relative focus is important here because it reinforces on a 
more conceptual level the separation between Buddhism and the state that was desired by the 
BSPP. No longer did the state receive its moral authority and legitimacy from a transcendent 
nibbiinic wheel- no longer did the ideal matter in terms of its gift to the pragmatics of politics. 
Moreover, the separation was not only in terms of restricting the political activity of the 
sangha or practically reducing Buddhism's impact on the state, but also at a wider 
philosophical level. 
Sangha Control under Ne Win 
As stated above, Ne Win's move to separate Buddhism from the state was most clearly seen in 
the removal of the sangha from political affairs. Overall, between the inception of military 
rule in 1962 and 1988, one of the most effective ways that this was achieved was through 
several concerted efforts of s iisana reform. The first attempts at controlling the sang ha directly 
occurred in 1964 when the government declared its desire to purify the sangha of its 'false' 
monks, in particular, those inclined to political activity, and proceeded to demand that all 
monks register. 109 This move surfaced more formally in 1965 at a government organised 
106 Another difference in the BSPP's idea of morality is that they claim that, "[o]nly when the stomach is full ... 
will there be wholesome morality" whereas from a Buddhist perspective morality comes first. This whole idea 
becomes a point of contention later for Aung San Suu Kyi and her use of Buddhism in her political rhetoric 
against the military, which will be discussed in chapter four. Silverstein, Burma, p. 82. 
107 Collins, S., Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, pp. 20-21. See chapter one, page 33. 
108 Burma Socialist Programme Party, The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, pp. 38-39. 
109 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 108, and Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, p. 308. 
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council at Hmawbi at which 2000 monks participated. Matthews states that at this council Ne 
Win took on "the customary role of the head of state as a propagator of the faith" -just like 
the pre-colonial monarchs. 110 The negative reaction by the sangha to these early attempts to 
control it was substantial. Many monks reacted violently, including destroying government 
buildings. 111 There was one instance of self-immolation by a monk. 112 Sangha organisations 
such as the YMA, who had traditionally supported the military under the U Nu government, 
now swapped sides and worked against the BSPP and few registrations occurred. 113 The 
outrage was centred on the threat that Ne Win's moves had on the autonomy of the sangha 
and that it had no right to wield control over it. 114 The response by the Ne Win government to 
the sangha reaction was extreme when compared with the typical reaction to sangha 
misconduct. Rather than tread very carefully the government began a phase of rigorous action 
against politically active monks. Mya Maung discusses one example of this wherein four 
monasteries in Upper Myanmar were surrounded by armed soldiers threatening to destroy the 
buildings if the monks caused any trouble. He also states that hundreds of monks at this time 
were imprisoned and tortured. 115 
After this episode of attempted s ifs ana reform and until 197 4 the conflict between the 
government and the sangha was relatively quiet. The sangha still had no place in politics but 
there were no obvious moves on the part ofNe Win to force the issue, at least not until a new 
constitution in 1974 formally declared the separation between Buddhism and the state. The 
reason for Ne Win's avoidance of the sangha involvement issue in general may be due in part 
to the volatility that the Buddhist issues created. Under U Nu the state religion issue was to 
blame for much ethnic dissent and whenever the Ne Win government tried to force some kinds 
of control over the sangha in these early stages of rule the reaction from the sangha was 
certainly volatile. In the early stages of establishing a new government anything that could 
110 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 415 . 
111 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 108. 
112 Kitagawa, J., and F. Reynolds, "Theravada Buddhism in the Twentieth Century", p. 63, note 25. 
113 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", pp. 412 - 413 , 415. 
114 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 36. 
115 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 108. The figures of those imprisoned are not entirely clear 
though as writers such as Silverstein and Taylor only mention the arrest of 92 monks. The lesser figure may refer 
only to the specific riots where government buildings where destroyed and the larger figure a general sum of all 
the monks arrested throughout the country. None of the writers specify exactly which figures relate to which 
incidents so it is difficult to come to any precise figures. However, in looking at later examples of the 
government's moves against the sangha it seems quite feasible that the higher number is correct. Silverstein, 
Burma, p. 50, Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 357. 
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undermine the nation's unity and stability would best be avoided. Moreover, with such strong 
networks of control set up throughout the country in the early Ne Win era, unlike the Nu 
period, support from Buddhism was not needed to maintain power and control over the nation. 
Also the sangha 's silence during this period could well have been influenced by the severe 
govemmental response to the sangha 's outspoken behaviour in earlier instances. Unlike U Nu, 
the Ne Win govemment did not tread very lightly around suppressing the political activity of 
monks. Like the consequences of Aung San's secularist policy where the antagonistic side of 
Buddhism was not given an outlet, so too with Ne Win's push was the antagonistic side 
refused a place. 116 
However, despite the quashing the sangha 's antagonistic capabilities, when the opportunity 
arose, this antagonistic side did re-surface. Such an opportunity occurred in 1974 after the 
funeral of the one time Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Burmese U Thant. 
Disappointed at the low-key nature ofU Thant ' s funeral that was organised by the govemment 
the public and many within the sangha burst into protest. Silverstein's assessment of the 
incident conceming the monks was that, "[t]he event demonstrated that the monks are still a 
potential source of leadership if the military's hold on power weakens or if the people are 
pushed too far by the soldiers and civilians who exercise authority". 117 After this incident 
though the govemment reaction was again severe. Hundreds of monks were arrested and some 
killed along with the throng of lay protestors. 118 The antagonism that had found a place to re-
surface was quickly and severely stifled. 
Throughout the rest of the 1970s the sangha again remained silent. After its early failures in 
1964 and 1965 it wasn't until 1980 that the govemment's attempt at siisana reform finally 
succeeded. In May of that year a second council was convened that became labelled as the 
"First Congregation of the Sangha of All Orders for the Purification, Perpetuation and 
Propagation of the Sangha". 119 At this council a Supreme Sang ha Council was created which 
had the task of, 
116 However, given Aung San's shoti time as leader of the APFPL it is impossible to see how he would have dealt 
with this issue on a longer-term basis -so here ends the comparison. 
11 7 Silverstein, Burma, p. 51. 
11 8 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 414. 
119 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 415 . 
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unifying, purifying, developing, and stabilizing the Burmese Buddhist religion 
or church. It also set down procedures for settling conflicts over monastic 
discipline, succeeded in introducing a uniform policy for the registration of 
monks, and established control over monastic appointments through a system 
of examinations. 120 
In 1985 another council was held that ratified the decisions of the 1980 council. Due to the 
government's ruling that banned all new nikiiyas (groups) outside of the nine main orthodox 
ones, the many divisions within the sangha had lessened greatly, and resistance to the state at 
this point does not seem to have occurred.121 This state-imposed reform had succeeded. 122 
This successful siisana reform was not the only change in the relationship between Buddhism 
and the state in the 1980s. After almost twenty years of the collapse of a symbiotic 
relationship between Buddhism and the state, the Ne Win government began to reassert open 
support for Buddhism. 123 Part of the government's moves in rebuilding a symbiosis was in the 
building of two pagodas in Mandalay and Rangoon. Matthews notes that "Ne Win appeared to 
be much more interested in merit-making. . . . He also engaged in arcane magical and 
numerological practices". 124 At the 1980 sangha council he also set many political prisoners 
free, including U Nu who was appointed to head the Pitaka Translation Society, which Bechert 
states was to translate Buddhist texts into English and be "responsible for the propagation of 
Buddhism throughout the world" .125 
120 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 415. 
12 1 Bechert, H., "The Recent Attempt at a Reform ofthe Buddhist Sangha in Burma and its Implications", p. 309. 
122 The exact reason why at this point the government finally succeeded at siisana reform is uncertain. No 
commentators that I have found even ask this question. Perhaps it could be due to the resignation of the sangha 
that the state was so powerful that it had no choice other than to concede to government directives. Or perhaps 
internally the sangha had become aware of the need for reform and given the opportunity by the government 
grabbed the chance. With a difficulty of finding information about this time with the country' s ' closed doors ' it is 
impossible to know exactly why the refmm succeeded. 
123 Bechert states that about the only support the military gave between 1965 to 1980 was increasing the sangha 's 
level of education and he also mentions some support of monks who had aligned themselves with the military. 
However, I have not found any accounts of who these monks were and exactly what kind of support they 
received from the government. In general, I think it is safe to say that the support given overall to Buddhism was 
very limited, especially when compared with U Nu 's suppOti. One could definitely not say, 'the pagoda is 
fini shed and the poor country ruined' about the Ne Win regime. Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 
306. 
124 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 37. This increase in merit-making practices also continued 
through the 1990s until the present. This will discussed more in chapter four. 
125 Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 310. 
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The precise reasons for this change in attitude towards Buddhism at this time are unclear. 
However, there are three factors that may contribute to understanding this shift. Firstly, in the 
late 1970s and very early 1980s there was an economic boom. This may well have given the 
government the impetus they needed to attempt once more to reform the sangha. As Bechert 
states, "In 1979 Ne Win again took up the reform plans which he had proposed already in 
1965, because now he considered himself powerful enough".
126 Aung Thwin reinforces this 
point also when he states that "strong leaders went hand in hand with a unified and controlled 
monkhood". 127 Such a strong economic climate would provide a good base for a successful 
refmm. The government would have been in a strong position to control a potentially potent 
political force such as the sangha. A successful siisana reform at this stage would solidify Ne 
Win's status as a strong ruler. But by the mid-80s the economic climate was very grim. Herein 
enters a second possible factor. Despite an economic boom in the late 1970s and very early 
1980s this boom was short-lived.
128 Although, this boom would have placed the government 
in the initial stages of reform in a strong position it did not carry through for the entire reform 
period. By 1987 the government had a Least Developed Country Status under the United 
Nations and Badgley notes that by 1988 "the government was bankrupt".
129 As stated earlier, 
the black market had begun to take hold of a majority of the nation's currency and corruption 
throughout the government was rife.
130 Moreover, attempts to quell ethnic insurgency were 
still failing. The government was in conflict throughout the 1980s with many of the ethnic 
minorities, and also with the Burma Communist Party (BCP).
131 Under these conditions the 
legitimacy of the BSPP would have been severely weakened. The Party ideology and 
'Burmese Way to Socialism' that were established almost two decades earlier were beginning 
to fail. One way of alleviating the failure and legitimacy crisis would be to stress the 
Buddhism and state link in order to promote an image of a strong state. Buddhism would be 
useful for legitimacy in a time of economic crisis. 
The third factor in understanding the shift is the need for the government to maintain control 
of a politically powerful and at times volatile group. Even though since 1962 the sangha had 
remained relatively quiet it was always a potentially dangerous political force. In maintaining 
126 Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 306. 
127 Aung Thwin, "Order Without Meaning", p. 261. 
128 Although this boom would have placed the government in the initial stages of reform in a strong position. 
129 Badgley, J., "Burmese Ideology: A Comment", p. 71. 
130 Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 317 - 318. 
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control the government may have thought that it was protected from criticism by the sangha. 
Under state control the sangha was no longer an uncontrolled political threat. 132 There may be 
other reasons for the shift that are not entirely apparent considering the very closed nature of 
Myanmar at this time. Perhaps there was also a desire for merit making as all was not going 
well for the government. 133 It is difficult to know for certain. But I think that these three 
factors may well have had a part to play in the shift towards s iisana reform and of in the 
rebuilding of the symbiosis and which fit well into the Burmese context at the time. 
Despite the change in the relationship between Buddhism and the state in the 1980s Buddhism 
still remained largely outside of political affairs. Still in place was the separation between 
religion and the state. Overall, a pattern of conflict relations dominated the Buddhism and state 
relationship throughout the majority of Ne Win's rule. The symbiosis that was once so 
prevalent under U Nu was virtually non-existent under Ne Win. Aspects of this relationship 
can be seen in both a negative and positive light. 
In the negative one can see that pushing the sang ha out of political life and leaving little room 
for them to criticise, or to act as a safety valve for state abuses, can be detrimental to the 
morality of the state. No longer has the state got a transcendent ethical base to build its 
legitimacy on. Moreover, the manner in which this pushing occurred was extreme and one that 
had little precedent. The imprisonment, killings and threats made to the sangha were 
unusually harsh for Bmmese leaders, who usually trod very carefully around the revered 
sangha. On the positive side, by pushing the sangha away from political activity and in 
attempting siisana reform, a traditionally legitimate step, the Ne Win government was 
ensuring that the integrity of the sangha was upheld. The sectarianism and violent activities by 
several political pongyis that had plagued much of the Colonial period and the U Nu period, 
now under Ne Win, were restrained. Effectively what the Ne Win government attempted to do 
and to some extent achieved, was to push those monks who had gone too far onto the lay 
wheel and who were threatening the transcendent vision of the sang ha, back onto the nibbiinic 
path, which would inevitably reassert their integrity. But there is a complication with this shift 
131 Sar Desai, Southeast Asia, p. 241 . 
132 But with this reintroduction of Buddhism into political rhetoric came the danger of an outspoken sangha as 
shall be seen below. 
133 See previous page, Matthews, B., "The Present Fortune of Tradition-bound Authoritarianism in Myanmar", 
pp.lS-19. 
96 
that needs to be mentioned. Because of siisana refmm and re-establishing the moral integrity 
of the sang ha, this also reinforces their place as an alternative structure and gives them greater 
power to criticise. With this increased integrity and critiquing ability a corrupt and immoral 
state is in greater danger of being attacked by the sangha. In the discussion above on the 
possible factors behind the Ne Win government's shift in favour of Buddhism in the 1980s, it 
was stated that because of the government's successful control of the sangha, there may have 
been a belief that this would curb sangha antagonism toward the government. However, by 
purifying and unifying the sangha its integrity and transcendent vision becomes reinforced. 
With this its power to criticise increases and the state is in danger of Buddhist antagonism. 
This danger I think was realised in the uprising of 1988 where thousands of monks throughout 
the country came out in force against the government and that heralded the beginning over a 
decade of Buddhist antagonism against the military regime. 134 
Before concluding the chapter, there is an aspect of my assessment so far concerning siisana 
reform and the whole nature of the relationship between Buddhism and the state under Ne Win 
that needs to be addressed. This aspect concerns my view of the lack of symbiosis that 
occurred in the Buddhism and state relationship between 1962 and 1988. At issue here is Aung 
Thwin' s contrary summation of this whole period of which he states that the relationship 
between Buddhism and the state is an authentically traditional pattern of relating and that the 
"state is the patron of the sang ha and the sang ha is the legitimizer of the state" .135 Moreover, 
Aung Thwin also states that in one way "the Burmese Way to Socialism ... is an attempt to 
address traditional concerns of ultimately religious and millenarian goals". 136 Aung Thwin's 
viewpoint is based around his premise that only after the military coup in 1962 was there a 
shift to an authentically traditional Burmese style of governance and 'real' independence. He 
considers that independence under U Nu was not 'real' independence because of Nu's failure 
to model the state upon pre-colonial modes of statehood. He states that the democratic 
government between 1948 and 1962, "had no real links (structural or conceptual) to 
Myanmar's social and economic realities, to Burmese history and political experiences, or to 
134 Bechert also acknowledges the danger Ne Win's reform of the sangha brought against the government. 
Although he comes to it from a different angle, his conclusion fits into what has already been said, as he states 
that, "One major motivation behind Ne Win 's religious policy had been the intention to keep monks out of 
politics. As a result of his policies, however, he had integrated the monks into the political structure of the 
country". Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 319. 
135 Aung Thwin, "1948 and Burma's Myth oflndependence", p. 31. They are my italics on 'is '. 
136 Aung Thwin, "1948 and Burma's Myth oflndependence", p. 28. 
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Burmese perceptions of legitimacy and leadership". 137 As well as seeing U Nu's rule as 
inauthentic and viewing the Ne Win rule as heralding in 'real' independence, Aung Thwin 
seems to conclude that it was the state's attempts at siisana reform that placed the sangha as 
legitimiser of the state and the state as patron of the sangha. Aung Thwin seems to see the 
successes of the 1980 siisana reform as necessarily showing that the sangha supported the 
government enough to legitimate its complete rule and to reinforce his argument that military 
rule brought order to Myanmar with traditional meaning. 
However, I think there are several facets to Aung Thwin's argument that need to be 
reassessed. Firstly, on the issue of viewing U Nu's time leading the country as inauthentic and 
stating that there were no conceptual links to Myanmar's pre-colonial past, especially in 
regards to legitmacy, Aung Thwin seems to largely ignore Nu's very open and dominant 
concern with Buddhism. As has already been established earlier in the chapter, one of the 
main characteristics ofNu's rule was to use Buddhism to create and reinforce legitimacy and 
his win in the 1960 elections which focussed around making Buddhism the state religion 
showed the success of this use. Certainly, parliamentary democracy was not based on a pre-
colonial model of statehood but this fact seems to cover over in Aung Thwin's view any other 
forms of tradition that may have been developed. In one article Aung Thwin also states that 
Nu's form of governance had "no clear role in the relationship between natural and moral 
order" and basically discounts Nu's Buddhist activity as a poor attempt at trying to act like a 
dhammari§a. 138 And yet on the other hand he sees the military, who overall showed virtually 
no support towards Buddhism but whose main concerns were constraining Buddhism for 
political reasons, as legitimate in the eyes of Buddhist tradition. I do not think that U Nu's 
Buddhist activity can be discounted so easily. Just because U Nu in some ways may have used 
Buddhism to help Burmanise parliamentary democracy it does not necessarily mean that this 
was his only reason for appealing to it. The extent to which Nu drew on Buddhist ideas and 
values and by looking at his own personal beliefs illustrate a picture more built on an Asokan 
kingship ideal, that is strongly traditional in the Burmese sense, than Aung Thwin gives him 
credit for. 
137 Aung Thwin, "1948 and Burma's Myth oflndependence", p. 29. 
138 Aung Thwin, "Order Without Meaning", pp. 255 - 256. 
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Secondly, Aung Thwin's claims that the Ne Win government supported the sangha and that 
the sang ha supported it I think are quite flawed. Even though the s iisana reform of the 1980s 
was successful it does not necessarily follow that the sangha completely supported the 
government. As was discussed earlier, the reasons behind the reform's success are far from 
clear and Aung Thwin himself offers no concrete reason for its success. Moreover, he seems 
to forget the fact that for almost twenty years prior to this successful reform where given the 
opportunity the sangha did come out in opposition against the government. Even though there 
are large periods of silence it does not necessarily mean that this silence can be viewed as 
support for the government but rather the severe way the government imposed restrictions on 
sangha political activity should be taken into consideration when interpreting it. 139 Moreover, 
in the light of all the moves of Ne Win to disassociate his political rule from Buddhism it 
seems overzealous to view him as the patron of the sangha and Buddhism because of the 
success of one reform and especially when compared with U Nu. Aung Thwin himself admits 
that political motivation was definitely a factor in its instigation. 140 
Thirdly, Aung Thwin's comment that the Burmese Way to Socialism had religious goals in 
mind is also flawed. As has already been seen, the ideas behind the Burmese Way to 
Socialism, especially as expressed in the SCME, explicitly states that the model of 
government is completely void of any religious goals. Even though there is a moral overtone 
to the SCME and talk of the desire to combat greed it states explicitly that the BSPP's goals 
were only grounded in the here-and-now, and made no attempts to form transcendent universal 
truths. Moreover, in practice, the Ne Win government showed an opposite trend to what Aung 
Thwin seems to be suggesting here. Many moves to promote Buddhism that were established 
under U Nu were dissolved- the sang ha was pushed completely out of politics, both laity and 
monks were not allowed to go outside of Myanmar even for missionary work, and the 1974 
constitution formally separated Buddhism and the state. The continual reinforcement by the 
Ne Win government to keep religion and politics completely separate I think cements my 
point. 
139 The extensive involvement of monks in the 1988 uprising against the government also reinforces this point. 
However, Aung Thwin was writing just prior to these events so this fact could not be taken into consideration. 
140 Aung Thwin, "Order Without Meaning", pp. 260- 261 . 
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Overall, the merits of Aung Thwin's assessment of the Buddhism and state relationship in 
both the U Nu and Ne Win eras I think are limited. Even though there are positives for the 
sang ha in the government carrying out a successful s lis ana reform and traditionally a 
successful reform implies a strong and legitimate government, the situation is far from that 
straight forward in the context of Ne Win's rule. Even though it is true that parliamentary 
democracy was not a traditional form of statehood whereas military rule under Ne Win was 
more fitting into the traditional authoritarian monarch image Aung Thwin has let this fact 
distort his understanding of the relationship between Buddhism and the state in this period. In 
other words, I think he has incorrectly assessed the Buddhism and state relationship in order to 
suppmi his argument concerning the authentic Burman-ness of democratic or authoritarian 
forms of government. 
In light of this assessment I think it can be concluded that overall, the Ne Win government's 
approach can be largely summed up as a move away from Buddhism and one which 
consequently counteracted the extreme symbiosis between Buddhism and the state under U 
Nu. Moreover, in the 1980s Ne Win's successful attempt at siisana reform brought a 
potentially politically powerful force under control but at the same time rebuilt their integrity 
and inevitably reasserted their moral authority and ability to criticise. By 1988 this renewed 
moral authority and reaffirmed antagonistic ability became apparent. 
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Chapter Four 
The Threat of Democracy -1988 to the Present. 
The events of 1988 heralded in a new era in Burmese politics. In the face of economic crisis, 
mass dissatisfaction with the military rulers and the failure of the Burmese Way to Socialism, 
an onslaught of opposition came to the fore. In demonstrations between March and the 
infamous August 81h (coined the 'Four Eights Affair' - 8/8/88) millions of Burmese rebelled 
against the BSPP government in a call for democracy to replace authoritarian socialist rule. 
With such dramatic events arising on the political scene, not surprisingly, Buddhism came to 
play its part. Vast numbers of monks and nuns became involved directly with the public 
antagonism, and some of the main figureheads of the democracy movement, in particular, 
Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), began 
linking Buddhist ideals to political activism. The military government during this period has 
not been excluded from a connection to Buddhism. Since 1988, in face of a huge legitimacy 
crisis and an antagonistic public, government support for Buddhism has resurfaced. 
What will be shown in this chapter is that after the tumultuous events of 1988 and after 
decades of separation between Buddhism and the state and extensive measures taken to 
control the sangha the symbiotic relationship between Buddhism and the state began to be 
reasserted. But the reassertion of this symbiosis after such a break could not develop easily, 
especially in an environment of strong antagonism. At the same time as attempting to rebuild 
the symbiosis the military rulers had to take extensive measures to control a very politically 
active sangha. However, the conflict between Buddhism and the state throughout this period 
and up until the present has not just been fought between a politically active sangha and 
military personnel. What has been a central part of the conflict between Buddhist antagonism 
and the state is a conflict concerning morality. More specifically, in the political rhetoric of 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, of which she is one of its leaders, Buddhist morality has 
been used as a foundation to demand democratic change. This appeal to Buddhist morality 
reinforces the connection that has been asserted from the beginning of this study that what is 
central to Buddhism's ability to criticise is its moral superiority. By appealing to this aspect, 
the NLD's legitimacy is reinforced and continuity with the traditional dhammic-order ideal is 
created. 
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In examining these issues the chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first part 
provides an overall discussion of the 1988 situation and the major events of the following 
years and focuses on the military's attempted reassertion of a Buddhist symbiosis. Secondly, 
the antagonism between the sangha and the military will be looked at. Thirdly, the nature of 
the NLD's, and in particular, Suu Kyi's use of Buddhism in the fight for democracy will be 
discussed. 
1988 and the Military Response 
In 1988, after almost 30 years of single-party rule, Myanrnar's economic and political 
structures were in chaos. Myanrnar, which was once considered a promising economy, as 
stated in the last chapter, in 1987 had been categorised as having a least-developed country 
status by the United Nations. In the year from 1987 and 1988 inflation had risen to an 
estimated 30 percent average, with wage levels only increasing by 15 percent. Petrol prices 
had increased over 130 percent, medicines by 50 percent and food, an average of 28 percent. 1 
Also in 1987 the government had taken 80 percent of the country's currency out of circulation 
due to which Neher says "in effect ... the savings of the entire people were wiped out".2 
Directly after this period several student demonstrations broke out throughout the country and 
the following year saw this activity come to a head. In March of 1988 massive anti-
government demonstrations broke out after a dispute in a teashop. Many demonstrators were 
killed and 1000 or more arrested and the BSPP closed all educational establishments.3 In July 
1988 General Ne Win resigned as chairman of the BSPP and was replaced by Sein Lwin, 
nicknamed 'The Butcher'. Martial law was declared on 2 August further aggravating the 
conflict between the state and the Burmese people.4 On 8 August 1988 hundreds of thousands 
of protesters took to the streets nation-wide demanding democratic change. The government 
response was severe. Under the orders of Sein Lwin thousands of demonstrators were killed 
1 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, pp. 234- 236. 
2 Neher, C., Southeast Asia in the New International Era, p. 164. According to Neher people kept their savings 
under mattresses because of the closure of most banks throughout the country. Also rather than halt inflation the 
demonitisation caused a rush of spending because people were concerned that other notes would be withdrawn-
the result was an increased inflation. Neher, C, and R. Marlay, Democracy and Development: Southeast Asia, p. 
116. 
3 Lintner, B., Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948, p. 463 . 
4 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 245. 
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and many more were arrested and imprisoned. Of those dead, many were university and high 
school students but monks and children were also included in the fatalities. This episode 
consequently became labelled by some as the beginning of the 'killing fields' ofBurma.5 
The following months saw this pattern of public and state conflict continue. On August 12th 
Sein Lwin resigned as chairman of the BSPP and Dr Maung Maung, a legal scholar and author 
ofNe Win's biography, took over leadership. On August 26th Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter 
of independence hero Aung San, made her first public speech for the democracy movement at 
Shwedagon Pagoda. By the end of September, the country's leadership again had changed 
hands, this time in a military coup led by General Saw Maung.6 At this change the BSPP was 
dissolved and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was established to take 
control of the conflict ridden country. 
SLORC maintained control of the country until November 1997 when the military government 
took on a new look under the establishment of the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) which is Myanmar' s present day government. The shift in rule from the dissolved 
BSPP to the SLORC signified an ideological shift in Burmese politics. With the dissolution of 
the BSPP the 'Burmese Way to Socialism' was cast aside as a failure and replaced with an 
open door policy coined the 'Burmese Way to Capitalism' .7 Myanmar's long closed borders 
were now reopened and large-scale foreign investments were sought to bring Myanmar out of 
its economic crisis. Guyot and Badgley state that "Myanmar's reserves were down to $28 
million before the troubles began in March 1988, dipped below $10 million at the time of the 
September coup, then rose to $50 million by June 1989".8 Foreign investment was a 
significant factor in the increase in state reserves.9 
The second significant shift in Burmese politics under SLORC was the announcement in 1989 
that in May of the following year multi-party elections would be held. On the surface it 
seemed that the military was conceding to democratic demands. However, SLORC's main 
5 Clements, A., Burma: The Next Killing Fields?, p. 38. 
6 The coup itself is regarded usually as a fake coup as the BSPP was considered to be the political face of the 
army and therefore the change in September 1988 did not really take out a truly 'civilian' government but rather 
just changed the casing of government. Neher, Southeast Asia, pp. 164- 165. 
7 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism: Economic Growth versus Democracy, p. 3. 
8 Guyot, J., and J. Badgley, "Myanmar in 1989: Tatmadaw V'', p. 192. 
9 Guyot and Badgley, "Myanmar in 1989", p. 192. 
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opponents, the NLD that had been established in September 1988 had its prominent leaders, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, and Tin Oo put under house arrest in July 1989. Suu Kyi remained there 
until July 1995 and Tin Oo was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 10 Suu Kyi was also 
banned from standing in the elections. Other obstacles put in the way of a free election process 
were SLORC's orders that outlawed groups of five or more people from convening and 
restricted party promotion methods. 11 But despite restrictions, with a 75 percent voter turn out, 
the NLD won over 80 percent of seats (60 percent of the vote) with the National Unity Party 
(NUP)- the military's own 'civilian' party winning only 10 seats out of 485 .12 
However, despite the election results SLORC did not hand over power to the NLD but 
declared that prior to any transfer of power a new constitution would have to be developed. 
After this time a new election would be held that would establish who would actually take 
office. 13 A new constitution is yet to be completed. 
The following years saw the military ruled government become a full member of ASEAN (in 
1997), change its name officially to Myanmar, and to date 16 cease-fire agreements have been 
made and maintained between various ethnic minority groups and the government with only a 
few groups still in conflict. 14 This ability of the government to maintain these cease-fire 
agreements is an important part of the SLORC/SPDC stress on the unity of the nation. Prior to 
1988 the Ne Win government also emphasised unity and the closed-door policy reinforced 
this. However, in the contemporary context unity has been stressed as part of the justification 
for continued military rule by stating that the military's strong leadership and emphasis on law 
and order is essential in order to prevent the country from breaking apart. 15 The government 
10 Aung San Suu Kyi and A. Clements, The Voice of Hope, p. 206. 
11 Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, p. 147. 
12 Neher and Marley, Democracy and Development, pp. 118- 119. 
13 Silverstein, J., "Aung San Suu Kyi : Is She Burma's Woman of Destiny", p. 1015. The NLD itself had in July 
1990 got together for drafting a constitution, however, this was never accepted and SLORC announced in 
October 1991 that it would direct a national convention which would take responsibility for drawing up a new 
constitution. January 1993 saw the opening of this convention where all parties who had won seats in the 1990 
elections would take part, including the NLD. However, soon after the convention had begun, the 90 NLD 
representatives were removed from the drafting process and even though the convention convened several times 
over several years, a new constitution has never been finished. 
14 Amnesty International Report 2001, "Myanmar", p. 175. 
15 The importance of this ' unity ' idea will come into focus again below when Buddhism's use by the state will be 
looked at in more detail. 
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stress on "national unity, peace, stability and all-round development" is stated by them to be a 
prerequisite before taking on a democratic model of rule. 16 
Throughout the SLORC/SPDC period human rights issues have been at the forefront of 
government criticisms. From the killings throughout the 1988 protests, the arrest of thousands, 
countless reports of torture in prisons, and International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
condemnation of forced labour are just a few of the condemnations that have arisen against the 
current regime. Myanmar's drug problems, with figures from 1989 - 1996 that place 
Myanmar as the largest heroin producing country in the world, have led to the extensive 
spread of HIV I AIDS which is now thought to be at epidemic levels and increasing levels of 
drug dependency. 17 Moreover, thousands of Burmese have fled to Thailand, China, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India to escape the military. Several Western powers have placed economic 
sanctions on Myanmar and many human rights organisations continually condemn the 
military's abuses and unwillingness to transfer power to the 1990 elected NLD. 18 Relations 
between Myanmar's neighbours have been more congenial with most taking on a 'constructive 
engagement' policy rather than the harsher sanction line. 19 Economically the open door policy 
towards foreign investment has not come up to initial expectations. Many Western businesses 
have been forced to remove investments from Myanmar because of pressure from human 
rights groups and other international condemnation?0 
16 State Peace and Development Council, Information Sheets, p. 19, http://www.myanmar-
information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6/11/01. 
17 Lintner, B., "Drugs and Economic Growth: Ethnicity and Exports", p. 181. Lintner estimates that up until the 
late 1990s there were hundreds of thousands of drug addicts and that possibly over 400,000 people have been 
infected with HIV or have AIDS, and figures have been rapidly increasing since the late 1980s. Lintner, B., 
"Burma", Country Report in Review: Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 2000 Yearbook, p. 90. 
18 Since 1988 there has been ban on all non-humanitarian bilateral aid and in recent years the United States has 
limited new investments in the country. Crispin, S., and B. Lintner, "Something For Nothing", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, May 10,2001, p. 28. 
19 In 1997 Myanmar become a full member of ASEAN and this year Japan has announced it will provide the 
Burmese government with US$28 million aid package. Throughout the 1990s China has also traded heavily in 
arms with Myanmar and in June last year new trade agreements were made with Myanmar's Chinese neighbours. 
Relations with Thailand have been mixed with outbreaks of fighting on the border areas since 1988. Other 
problems such as drug trafficking and the 1999 hostage crisis in the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok fed this 
tension. However, Crispin and Lintner state that Thailand has recently rekindled interest in Myanmar's gas, 
timber and fishing resources. Crispin and Lintner, "Something For Nothing", pp. 28-29, Lintner, B. , "Burma", 
Country Report in Review: Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 2001 Yearbook, p. 90. 
20 Lintner states that by 2000 "Foreign investment slowed to a trickle" with at least part of the withdrawal 
attributed to activist pressure groups. Lintner, "Burma", Country Report in Far Eastern Economic Review 2001 
Yearbook, p. 92. 
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Despite the general outrage at the Burmese government's abuses the military have succeeded 
in maintaining control of its leadership. One way that this has been achieved is through the 
number of military personal doubling in size since 1988.21 Moreover, military intelligence has 
infiltrated every aspect of Burmese society with estimates of at least one in seven people 
thought to be government informants, with monasteries not excluded from this informant 
network. 22 House checks are regularly carried out and it is necessary to register any visitors 
with government officials - failure to do so could lead to arrest and imprisonment.23 These 
systems of control have ensured continuity with the government's pre-1988 desire for 
centralised control but, as discussed in Chapter Three, unlike the monarchical days where in 
practice many areas lived in relative autonomy, the state has infiltrated every part of Burmese 
society with much effort made to restrict autonomy. 
This restriction of autonomy and pervasive state control reinforces the military's emphasis on 
the maintenance of order, which is one of the primary justifications they use for their 
continued governance. Y awnghwe states that, 
The military's view ... is that the Tatmadaw [Burmese Army], and the Tatmadaw alone, 
has the right to rule. To the military, this right is inherent in its historic responsibility as 
the protector and defender of national sovereignty. Only the Tatmadaw, according to 
them, is capable of keeping the country together, maintaining order, and ensuring a 
suitable climate for economic development. 24 
This emphasis on order is used to legitimate military rule in a period where their legitimacy 
has come under its greatest threat. The general opposition of the international community 
towards SLORC/SPDC, and "that continued military rule is viewed by the overwhelming 
majority of the population as illegitimate" illustrates clearly a legitimacy crisis on a large 
scale. 25 But aside from an emphasis on order to counteract this legitimacy crisis, support for 
Buddhism can also be understood in this light. Just as in Chapter Three it was suggested that 
the BSPP's renewed symbiosis between Buddhism and the state in the 1980s was in part 
caused by an increasing threat to its legitimacy, so too in the even greater legitimacy crisis that 
began in 1988 is Buddhism appealed to as a means to counteract illegitimacy. 
21 Lintner, "Burma: Surface Calm", Far Eastern Economic Review, January 9, 1997, p. 24. 
22 Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields, p. 45 . 
23 Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields, p. 43. 
24 Yawnghwe, C., "Burma: The Depoliticalization of the Political", p. 189. 
25 Taylor, R., "Burma' s Ambiguous Breakthrough", p. 71. 
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The renewing of the symbiotic relationship between Buddhism and the state that began in 
1980, since 1988, has increased dramatically. The separation of Buddhism and the state 
reinforced in the 197 4 constitution has been cast aside. Matthews goes as far as saying that "if 
SLORC has any ideology, it is to balance ah na se (secular rule) with dhamma se (the 
authority of Buddhism) and to keep these two together".26 Some of the more obvious 
examples of Buddhist support have been in the restoration of Buddhist buildings and the 
building of pagodas. Since 1990 restoration has been to done to pagodas such as the Kaba 
Aye, Mahamuni, and the famous Shwedagon pagoda, and also to monasteries at several sites 
throughout the country.27 Two new pagodas, the Maha Wizaya Zeidis, one in Rangoon and 
one in Mandalay, have also been built. 28 Aside from this building increase, educational 
support for Buddhism has also increased. Two new Buddhist Universities have been created 
for the sole purpose of educating members of the sang ha and Buddhist teachings again are a 
part of the school system, with Smith noting that there have been instances where a push has 
been made to return schooling to monastic contro1.29 Moreover, the government created Union 
Solidarity Development Association (USDA) - SLORC/SPDC's civilian counterpart -
"organized courses in Buddhist culture attended by millions of persons, according to state 
owned media reports".30 In assessing other links between Buddhism and the state the US State 
Department 1999 Report on Religious Freedom states that, 
State-controlled news media frequently depicted or described SPDC officials 
paying homage to Buddhist monks, making donations at pagodas throughout 
the country, officiating at ceremonies to open, improve or maintain pagodas, 
and organizing ostensibly voluntary "people's donations" of money, food, and 
uncompensated labour to build or refurbish Buddhist religious sites throughout 
26 Matthews, B., "The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar", p. 38. 
27 Fraser-Lu, S., "A Buddhist Building Boom: Works of Merit Sponsored by the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC)", p. 4. 
28 Matthews, B., "The Present Fortune of Tradition-Bound Authoritarianism in Myanmar", p.l8. 
29 Smith, M., "Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma", p. 45, US State Department, 1999 
Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 102. 
30 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 102. 1t is likely that the figures of those 
attending the USDA run courses were exaggerated by the state media reports, as fabrication of figures is 
notoriously common in the state press. The USDA has also been attributed with playing a significant role in 
violence and antagonism against Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Lintner, "Burma: Surface Calm", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, January 9, 1997, p. 24, and D. Steinberg, "A Void in Myanmar: Civil Society in Burma", p. 
12. 
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the country. State-owned newspapers have routinely featured, as front-page 
banner slogans, quotations from the Buddhist scriptures.31 
Such moves are far removed from the early Ne Win era where association with Buddhism was 
avoided. 
Aside from these practical examples of state support for Buddhism the SLORC/SPDC has also 
made attempts to reconnect the sangha and state relationship. An important part of the 
military's ability to achieve this has been in maintaining control of at least some groups of the 
sangha despite a majority of the sangha supporting the pro-democracy movement. Matthews 
notes that older monks are more likely to support the state and are duly rewarded with gifts 
such as cars, televisions or temple donations. 32 Those monks who are at the top of the sang ha 
hierarchy are also likely to support the state. The thathanabaing position, which was recreated 
in 1994, and the State Sangha Nakaya Committee (SSNC), who are responsible overall for 
sangha affairs, are both under military control. 
According to Bechert and Clements, the SSNC and those monks who have supported the 
regime are seen by most within the sangha as puppet monks and have little respect from the 
majority of monks.33 One monk told Clements that the benevolent public displays of support 
for monks by SLORC was "[p Jure SLORC propaganda ... After raids on monasteries, some 
high ranking monks were replaced by puppets - monks controlled by SLORC. Sure, SLORC 
wants people to believe that they support Buddhism. But no one is fooled by such nonsense. 
SLORC leaders treat dogs better than they treat monks".34 
Despite the criticisms of the SSNC and its SLORC/SPDC controllers, the SSNC's anti-
democracy activities have not been stifled. According to the above mentioned US State 
Department Report there have been several instances throughout the country where SSNC 
connected monks have played integral roles in forcing resignation of NLD members.35 
31 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 102. The New Light of Myanmar, a 
government run English newspaper has many good examples of this, see http: //www.myanmar.com/nlm/ for 
copies of these. 
32 Matthews, B., "Buddhism Under a Military Regime: The Iron Heel in Burma", p. 417. 
33 Bechert, H., "The Recent Attempt at a Reform of the Buddhist Sangha in Burma and its Implications", p. 320, 
and Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields, p. 51. 
34 Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields, p. 51. 
35 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 108. 
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However, in a contrary act the same report states that SLORC's decision to hold multi-party 
elections was a direct result of a request from the SSNC to hold elections.36 So it is not clear 
here whether the SSNC is entirely against the democracy movement and for continued 
military rule. 
Another significant area that the SSNC and other pro-government monks have been active in 
is the 'Burmanisation' of ethnic minority areas. The state's focus on the unity of the nation has 
in part been aided by using members of the sangha and Buddhism in general as a means to 
assert a homogenous national culture. In some ways the rights of religious minority groups 
have been supported. For example, some of both Christian and Islamic holy days are observed 
nation-wide, once restricted travel and contact of religious minorities with the outside world 
has been reopened, and monuments and areas devoted to a plurality of religions have been 
developed. 37 But aside from these gestures most reports show that the approach taken has been 
to favour Buddhism and to use it as a means of 'unifying' the nation. Liddell reinforces this 
idea when she states that "the SLORC has an implicit 'one nation, one race, one religion' 
ideology which is clear with its dealings with ethnic and religious minorities".38 
One way the state has used Buddhism to Burmanise some of the religious minority areas has 
been through the development of Buddhist missionary outreaches in minority regions. 
According to the 1999 US State Department Report on Religious Freedom these outreaches 
have been reported to assist state forces in suppressing Christian areas. In particular, these 
suppressions have occurred comprehensively in the Chin state.39 Examples that the report 
gives of monk participation in such moves are extreme. One instance is reported where six 
monks accompanied by soldiers went into Chin villages and demanded all Christian preaching 
and services be stopped. Those who refused to co-operate were beaten and cut, and one 
Christian service was held up at gunpoint.40 The report gives other examples which include 
36 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 105. Houtman also makes note of the 
influence certain monks had in influencing the call for elections. Houtman, G., Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis 
Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, p. 159. 
37 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 103, State Peace and Development 
Council, "Myanmar accused of Exercising Religious Intolerance", Information Sheets, pp. 31 -35, 
http://myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6/11101. 
38 Liddell, Z., "No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma", p. 67. 
39 Unlikely to be coincidental is that the Chins are one of the few ethnic minority groups that have not attained a 
cease-fire agreement with the state. 
40 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 111 . 
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Christian Chin children being removed from their homes and placed in monasteries where 
they were converted to Buddhism without the their parents knowledge and cases of monks 
spreading anti-Christian material and inciting violence against Christians.41 Although one has 
to be cautious about the validity of these reports, Philip and Mercer's comments about 
"allegations of forced conversions to Buddhism in the Chin State" and building a new pagoda 
on land that was seized from a Kachin Christian group reinforce the probability of this kind of 
action by the govemment.42 This pressure on religious minorities by the state has not just been 
specific to Christian groups but Muslims communities also. Violence against the Muslim 
Rohingya in the Arakan state in 1991 led to thousands of them fleeing state forces and finding 
refuge in Bangladesh.43 There are also reports of state affiliated groups spreading anti-Muslim 
literature to Buddhist communities prior to the anti-Islamic riots which occurred in 1997.44 
Some members of the sangha were involved in these anti-Islamic riots- although the accounts 
I have found on these riots state that several of those monks involved were not actually real 
monks but disguised state personnel who helped to fuel tensions.45 
The issue of forced labour has also surfaced particularly amongst religious minority groups 
where the state has forced many villages to provide unpaid labour as well as money to aid the 
construction and maintenance of pagodas. Although this forced labour is not a specifically 
religious minority issue and has affected many Buddhists throughout the country as well, 
Philip and Mercer note in some villages that where most people are non-Buddhist the state has 
still demanded the villager's aid in pagoda construction.46 A recent International Labour 
41 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, pp. 110- 111. 
42 Philip, J., and D. Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism in Contemporary Burma", p. 44. 
43 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, p. 397. 
44 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 114. 
45 Matthews states that this move acted as a diversion away from speculation that the military had stolen valuable 
gems and gold from inside of a Buddha statue in Mandalay, Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 
50, note 61, and US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 115. However this does 
not altogether excuse monks from anti-Islamic sentiment. Since the beginning of this year and especially in the 
weeks since the September 11 attacks on the United States there have been several reports of Buddhist and 
Muslim clashes in Myanmar, in particular, in the towns ofPyi, Hinthada, Sittwe, and Taungoo. Reports state that 
the clashes have largely been between Buddhist monks and the Muslim communities. One person is reported to 
have died and 100 injured in the Pyi clash. This does not seem to have had any state fuelling but rather "were 
sparked by religious differences" and rather "that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was afraid to 
interfere, worried that the direction of the violence might shift from Muslims to the military government". Ko 
Thet, "Anti-Muslim Riot in Hinthada", and Reuters, "Muslim-Buddhist Violence Flares in Myanmar", both cited 
in BurmaNet News, no. 1905, October 24, 2001, http://www.burmanet.org, cited 24/10/01. 
46 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 45 . The forced labour issue is also not only limited to 
religious works and has been one of the main criticisms of SLORC/SPDC rule. The 1998 International Labour 
Organisation report on forced labour in Myanmar outlines many areas of state abuse of the people, in particular, 
portering for the military, the construction ofrailroads, roads and such like. The treatment that the labourers 
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Organisation report on forced labour also comments that "The situation is also particularly 
serious in northern Rakhine (Arakan) State, which is also a remote area with a large military 
presence. The Muslim population is disproportionately affected by forced labour; it reflects an 
element of discrimination against this population, which also takes the form, inter alia, of 
restrictions on movement".47 In an earlier report it stated that "The burden of forced labour 
also appears to be particularly great for non-Burman ethnic groups, especially in areas where 
there is a strong military presence and for the Muslim community, including the Rohingyas".48 
Overall, in the period since 1988 the military government has taken to recreating to some 
extent a symbiosis between Buddhism and itself. In doing so it shows an attempt to improve 
their claims of legitimacy and fosters their desire for national unity. Just like the monarchs of 
pre-colonial times the SLORC/SPDC have drawn upon Buddhism as well as the traditional 
kingly acts to assert their rightful place as Myanmar's ruling elite. The connections to kingship 
are far from subtle. Coinciding with SLORC/SPDC's Buddhist building increase, royal 
palaces in Mandalay and Pegu have been rebuilt and Philip and Mercer note that "King 
Bayinnaung, who ruled from 1554 - 1581, has emerged as a prominent historical figure 
promoted in the military regime's political propoganda".49 Moreover, in 1994 SLORC brought 
the Chinese Tooth Relic into the country and came to compare "itself with the dynastic reigns 
of King Anawrahta (1044- 1077) and King Bayinnaung (1551- 1581), who established the 
First and Second Burmese Empires, respectively, and who are also both credited with securing 
sacred Buddhist objects". 5° In view of what has been discussed so far though regarding the 
recreation of a symbiosis between Buddhism and the state there are two questions that need to 
be asked. That is, does the ideal that Buddhism provides for political life appear in this 
Buddhist and SLORC/SPDC relationship and is the extent of the symbiosis created enough to 
receive is horrendous according to this report, for example sending porters in minefields to test paths, beatings, 
raping of women and so on, and in one of its concluding statements it states that "It is a story of gross denial of 
human rights ... from which they [the people] find no escape except fleeing from the country". International 
Labour Organisation, "Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma)" Report of the Commission of Inquiry, No. 29, 2"d 
July 1988, pp. 4, 6, http: //www.ilo.org/public/englishlstandards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar5.htm, cited 
6/11101. 
47 International Labour Office, "Developments concerning the question of the observance by the Government of 
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29)", 282"d Session, November 2001 , p. 14, 
http:/www.ilo.org/public/Englishlstandards/relm/gb/docs/gb282/pdf/gb-4.pdf, cited 18/11/01 . 
48 International Labour Organisation, "Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma)" Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, No. 29, 2"d July 1988, p. 4, 
http://www. ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar5 .htm, cited 6/11 /01 . 
49 Fraser-Lu, "A Buddhist Building Boom", p. 4, and Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 42. 
50 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 43 . 
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bring the Dhamma-Wheel structure back into balance? In Chapter One it was established that 
the ideal that Buddhism offered the state was strongly connected to the moral authority of the 
nibbimic wheel. It is the moral authority that gave Buddhism its importance as a legitimiser 
and allowed it its place as an alternative structure. Under SLORC/SPDC, despite many 
attempts to recreate the symbiosis between Buddhism and the state and to connect itself to 
traditional kingship, these moves have not generally had a moral emphasis. The state's moves 
to recreate the symbiosis is rarely seen as a sincere gesture at recreating dhammic-order and 
promoting an ideal Buddhist state, as it can be argued that U Nu personally wanted to achieve, 
but rather their actions are viewed as political propaganda and tools of oppression. This use of 
Buddhism itself is not new to Burmese history as was seen in Chapter One regarding the 
atrocities that many Burmese kings did whilst at the same time building pagodas. As 
Matthews asserts that paradoxes occurred "with the traditional despotic rule . . . [such as] 
appropriate 'Buddhist' behaviour alongside ofutterly degraded, bestial actions. [And that] Ne 
Win and the military heads of state who have followed him fit this model nicely". 51 Indeed, in 
the present context the extensive use of violence against huge numbers of Burmese whether 
they be the Burman majority or ethnic minority groups illustrates this clearly. As a 
consequence of this lack of moral authority displayed by SLORC/SPDC, the re-balancing of 
the Dhamma-Wheel structure is not possible. Although the symbiosis has been recreated to 
some extent, lacking moral authority the antagonistic side of the relationship has come to 
outweigh any reconnection between Buddhism and the state. To date most commentators still 
note the extensive anti-government hostility throughout the country and those members of the 
sang ha who do support the government are seen by many as 'puppets' and not representing 
the majority of monks. Overall, the legitimacy of the military rulers remains suspect. 
Matthews' interpretation of the military's link with Buddhism is that aside from the legitimacy 
aspect of the relationship, SLORC/SPDC's concern with Buddhism has to do with the idea of 
an "unhappy conscience".52 Matthews asserts that the military's increased Buddhist concern 
and merit-making practices are an attempt to counteract accumulated bad karma from immoral 
actions carried out against the population. However, he states that these moves to accumulate 
good karma do not cancel out the inevitable consequences of bad kamma, as "atonement in the 
51 Matthews, "Authoritarianism in Myanmar", p. 12. 
52 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 41. 
112 
sense of 'forgiveness' of sins is not possible in Theravada Buddhism".53 In order to reduce the 
effects of bad kamma supernatural forces, such as nats, astrology and ghosts are appealed to as 
many Burmese believe that "the devotee [of these] can hopefully gain protection and success 
from the animistic powers, thus in a sense bypassing the Buddhist dhamma with its strict 
notions of unalterable causality (paticcasamuppada) and karmic penalty ... [- these are 
called] yadaya chay, the 'outwitting of fate by prompt action"'. 54 This appeal to 
supernaturalism is well founded amongst the ruling elite. In particular Ne Win, is noted to 
have a strong concern with astrology, numerology and the supernatura1.55 A good example of 
superstitious concern occurred recently when a white elephant was found. Traditionally, a king 
who was in possession of such an animal was thought to be a great ruler. The elephant has 
been paraded around the country and the government and news reports stated that it was "a 
sure sign the impoverished country was on a path to peace and prosperity ... [and] it is said 
the white elephant brings peace, stability and prosperity to the nation, that it prevents all 
hazards and dangers and that the country enjoys bumper food harvests".56 
Matthews' interpretation views the Burmese understanding of kamma as meanmg each 
individual action will unavoidably have its consequence whether good or bad. No merit 
making can change having to face the retribution of bad kamma. Thus he suggests that this is 
why they have appealed to supernatural forces outside of Buddhism to aid their yadaya chay. 
This interpretation has its merits and may explain why supernaturalism has been appealed to 
so frequently. Although it must be pointed out here that this is only one interpretation of the 
Burmese understanding of kamma. Spiro states that for many Burmese another interpretation 
dominates, that is, one that sees kamma as being accumulated and which at the end of one's 
life all good and bad kamma is 'tallied' and that by an accumulation of good kamma one can 
change the retribution of bad kamma.57 If using this interpretation of kamma the renewed 
53 Matthews, "Authoritarianism in Myanmar", p. 18. 
54 Matthews, "Authoritarianism in Myanmar", p. 19. 
55 Matthews notes that the production of the 45 and 90 kyat notes in 1987, which are quite unusual numbers, were 
made because of the supernatural significance of the number nine to Ne Win. Moreover, there are also 
suggestions that Ne Win may have carried out unusual rituals such as "shooting his own image in a mirror; 
bathing in human blood and marrying a young Arakanese maiden (which he did on the advice of his astrologer)". 
Matthews, "Authoritarianism in Myanmar", p. 20, notes 29 and 30. For further examples of Ne Win's fascination 
with the supernatural see, Mya Maung, The Burmese Road to Poverty, pp. 227- 230. 
56 Reuters, "Lucky White Elephant Found", Nov. 8th, 2001 , http://www.reuters.com/printerfriendly.jtml?type 
=humannews&StoryiD=356203, cited 10/11/01. 
57 According to Spiro, the Burmese usually believe in both interpretations no matter how contradictory this may 
seem. Spiro, M., Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes, pp. 119, 122- 123. 
113 
support for Buddhism by the state can be simply understood to be an attempt to counteract bad 
kamma and that the appeal to supematuralism is just another means of ensuring protection and 
success. Either interpretation could work here. 
Aside from Matthews' interpretation of the Buddhism and state link that has increased 
significantly since 1988, the economic factors should also be considered. Philip and Mercer in 
their writing on the use of Buddhism in tourist promotion in Myanmar, conclude that 
Buddhism has become a financial draw-card as well as a means of attaining legitimacy for the 
state.58 In particular, traditional rich Buddhist cultural sites such as Pagan with its sprawl of 
pagoda and temple ruins, are being revamped in preparation for the relatively new tourist 
market. This revamping is often done by the use of forced labour, which the SLORC/SPDC 
claim should not be seen in a negative light but as a traditional means of working for the sake 
of Buddhist merit making. 59 However, this is argued against by Philip and Mercer in that, 
According to a report on slave labor by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (1996), 
the crucial historical point [and difference] was that monarchical rule was that [sic] they 
were pre-modem cashless societies operating on the basis of obligations and return 
benefits for the populace. Under the contemporary system of wage labor relations, a 
justification comparing the old traditions and the modem systems of compulsion labor is 
extremely tenuous. 60 
In Pagan, this rebuilding has also come at the expense of the homes of the local people who, in 
1990, were forced to relocate. This is part of what Philip and Mercer call a 'sanitization' of the 
area for the sake of the foreign visitor. 61 Supporting Philip and Mercer's argument that tourist 
dollars are an important motivating factor behind the SLORC/SPDC restoration of Buddhist 
sites, is the fact that in areas outside of the main tourist route, in particular, in minority areas, 
Buddhist monuments and structures "when not destroyed, have been allowed to deteriorate".62 
It can be argued that support for Buddhism in this manner is being dictated by financial 
concerns instead of sincere concern for the preservation and promotion of Buddhism. 
58 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", pp. 39-47. 
59 State Peace and Development Council, "Allegations on Exercising Forced Labour in Myanmar", Information 
Sheets, pp. 24, 28, http://myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6/11101. 
60 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 42. 
61 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 35. 
62 Philip and Mercer, "Commodification of Buddhism", p. 46. 
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So far an assessment has been made that despite a large increase in support for Buddhism the 
sincerity of this move can be doubted. In such a legitimacy crisis which came to a head in 
1988, in a quest for a homogenous state, and in search of financial reward, Buddhism can be a 
useful tool. But its use by the SLORC/SPDC does not come up to the standard of the moral 
ideal that the Dhamma-Wheel structure alludes to. This is further reinforced by the fact that 
despite the SLORC/SPDC support, the antagonistic capabilities of Buddhism that have 
surfaced since the events of 1988, far outweigh any symbiosis that has been created. Also, 
when the sangha majority came out in opposition to the military government, rather than 
being listened to and revered, SLORC/SPDC violently attacked them. These antagonistic 
reactions will now be discussed, firstly, regarding the antagonism between the sangha and the 
state and secondly, regarding the reinforcement of Buddhist morality in the political rhetoric 
of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. 
Sangha and State- the antagonism of 1988 to the present. 
The anti-government demonstrations of 1988 not only brought millions of the Burmese public 
out in force but thousands of monks also took to the streets in protest. Overall, figures suggest 
that 60 percent of monks participated directly in the demonstrations and up to 80 percent are 
thought to support the democracy movement in general. 63 The activity of these monks seems 
far from passive. Although it is generally agreed that the monks did not lead the 
demonstrations, Bechert notes that they were considered to be at the central core of the 
antagonism. 64 Throughout the events several monasteries were thought to harbour weapons 
and ammunition for opposition groups and there was an instance were monks are said to have 
taken control of Mandalay. 65 At this time the Yahanpyo Aphwe (Young Monks Association), 
63 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 38, and Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", 
p. 419. 
64 Matthews states, with the backing ofLintner who he had interviewed, that monks never led the demonstrations. 
However, Bechert states that they were often "described as leaders and the organizers of the demonstrations". 
Bechert himself doesn't actually state that they were leaders so Matthews' and Lintner's perspective will be held 
here. Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", pp. 38, 49, note. 55, and Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist 
Sangha", p. 320. 
65 Bechert, "Reform of Buddhist Sangha", pp. 320-322. 
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spoken of in earlier chapters, and which was now called the All-Burma Young Monks Union 
(ABYMU), also resurfaced. 66 
The consequence of this involvement in the demonstrations for many monks was that they too 
had to flee to Myanmar's border areas in order to escape the military's violent reaction. 
Matthews estimates that in 1988, along with the 10,000 students who fled to the Thai border, 
300 monks also escaped and that by 1992 there were up to 6000 monks along the Thai 
border.67 
The most significant anti-government activity carried out by the sangha was in 1990. Two 
years after the 'Four Eights Affair', on August 81h under the auspices of a typical "morning 
alms round", thousands of monks took to the streets in Mandalay.68 Lintner's description of 
the day is that, 
[Although] it was not officially a demonstration . . . the choice of date and the 
vast number of monks who took part in the ceremony made the intention 
obvious enough. Tens of thousands of people showed up in the streets to offer 
food to the monks, while nervous soldiers looked on. At one point along the 
route, some students hoisted a peacock flag, the symbol of Burmese 
nationalism and now also of the NLD and the pro-democracy movement. Some 
soldiers apparently overreacted. They orened up with their automatic G-3 rifles 
and bullets ripped through the crowds. 6 
Many of those wounded in this event where monks and several were arrested and beaten.70 
The consequences of this action against the monks led up to 20,000 monks nation-wide to 
boycott all state personnel for two months. The monks turned up their alms bowls and refused 
to accept offerings from all military staff and their families. They refused to officiate at 
funerals and such like and even refused to teach military families. Matthews states that this 
66 Although I have been unable to find much detail about what they have been doing since 1988. No doubt 
information is limited because of the government ruling that banned all such groups. Clements notes one case 
where a monk, on suspicion of being an ABYMU member was arrested and tortured. Up until the government 
had taken control of the area in 1995 they were based in Manerplaw, and Matthews notes that there are thought to 
be at least 200 members in Thailand. I have not found any details about where they are based now. Clements, 
Burma: The Next Killing Fields, pp. 49-50, and Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 421. 
67 Matthews, "Buddhism Under a Military Regime", p. 421, and Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation In Myanmar", 
p. 39. 
68 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, p. 385. 
69 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, p. 385. 
70 Lintner states that some of the wounded went missing and were also considered to be dead. Lintner, Burma in 
Revolt, p. 385. 
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was "in effect an act of excommunication".71 In such an action the monks were preventing the 
personnel and their families from attaining merit- a necessity for the Burmese Buddhist. Mya 
Maung also notes that "It was also reported that in the streets the monks pay [sic] homage to 
the soldiers and military commanders as Buddha. This action is sacrilegious and harmful to 
Buddhists who extol the clergy as equal in rank and reverence to Buddha himself in Burmese 
Buddhism".72 Thus the monks were shaming and bringing negative kamma upon those 
soldiers and commanders whom they paid homage to. 
Since 1990 there have been several reports of further monk protests against SLORC/SPDC. In 
March 1997, November 1998, and also reports that in January 1999 monks broke out in 
protest against continued SLORC/SPDC rule.73 There were also reports in May 2000 of 
further tensions arising. 74 
But with this extensive antagonism, attempts to control the sangha have increased 
significantly. Like the decades following the 1962 coup, the government did not hold back on 
violently suppressing politically active monks. After the 1988 demonstrations many monks 
were arrested and imprisoned, some were transferred from politically active monasteries to 
more passive ones and accusations were made that the CIA, the Burma Communist Party and 
also the NLD had infiltrated the sangha.75 After the boycott and protests of 1990 the sangha 
suffered massive attacks by the state. One hundred and thirty three monasteries were raided, 
many were closed and many monks were arrested and imprisoned. 76 After the boycott affair 
the state also banned all anti-government Buddhist organisations and allowed only the nine 
SSNC recognised organisations to legally exist. In 1989 all monks were banned from standing 
for elections or becoming a member of a political party. Moreover, military commanders were 
legally given the authority to detain and even order execution for any monks who would not 
uphold the state ruling on Buddhist anti-government organisations.77 Frequently monks who 
71 Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 39. 
72 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty, p. 303. 
73 The possible protest in 1999, according to the US State Department Report, has not been able to be verified. 
US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, pp. 106- 107. 
74 Bames, W., "Hundreds of Monks to March on Capital", South China Morning Post, Friday, May 26,2000. 
75 Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 322, Matthews, "Buddhism and Nation in Myanmar", p. 39, and 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, p. 199. 
76 Linter, Burma in Revolt, p. 386. 
77 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, p. 386, and US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, p. 
105. 
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had been detained were also defrocked. 78 elements cites several examples where monks on 
suspicion of being involved in anti-government activity were arrested, imprisoned and tortured 
and he includes one horrific account where an abbot "was stripped and his body sliced with 
knives. The soldiers filled the bleeding wounds with salt before tying the naked abbot to a 
tree".79 The US State Department 1999 Report on Religious Freedom recounts other such state 
atrocities against monks including examples of monks being brutally tortured and killed, 
although it also states that many accounts have been unverified as yet. 80 Verified reports have 
at least 100 monks detained since 1990, and at least 18 deaths occurring whilst in custody, 
although considering the number of other accounts the numbers are probably much higher. 81 
Overall, consistent with its earlier pre-1988 methods and desire for sangha control, 
SLORe/SPDe since 1988 have made every effort to restrict what could be a potent political 
threat to its legitimacy and to its rule. Whilst it can be argued that the state has ensured the 
purity of the monkhood by expelling 'bogus' monks- and this is what the SLORe/SPDe 
claim - in light of the horrendous violence used to quell such monks any pride taken in 
controlling the sangha in this way, I think, is negated. Moreover, unlike the extreme political 
activity of the YMA and other militant monks of the 1930s and 1940s, I have come across few 
reports of violent protests by monks. The harbouring of weapons in some monasteries and 
some anti-Muslim agitation, as discussed earlier in the chapter, are the only instances I have 
found. Overall, the protests have been carried out peacefully, and very little provocation has 
been needed for a monk to be arrested. elements illustrates this in the example of "[t]hree 
young monks [who] were arrested solely for the poems they'd written in their joumals".82 
Rather than being seen as a legitimate act of siisana reform, SLORe/SPDe controlling moves 
against the sangha, are most frequently seen as unjust acts of violence used to quell a political 
threat. As Buddhism's antagonistic ability has resurfaced and increased in its force so too has 
the state's attempts to restrict this ability.83 
78 Bechert, "Reform of the Buddhist Sangha", p. 322. 
79 Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields?, p. 58. 
80 US State Department, 1999 Report on Religious Freedom in Burma, pp. 105- 107. 
81 The tight control of all outside access to information of this sort in Myanmar makes verifying the kind of 
reports difficult. Much of the information that does come out is by way of exiled Burmese on Myanmar's border 
areas, and neighbouring countries. 
82 Clements, Burma: The Next Killing Fields?, p. 50. 
83 In the conflict between the military government and the democratic opposition, in particular the NLD, the 
monks since 1988 have also acted in some ways as mediators or as pacifiers to tensions between the two. Nemoto 
asserts that it was a revered monk U Rewata Dhamma "who had mediated the first dialogue between SLORC and 
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Buddhism, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy 
A politically active sangha is not the only way Buddhism's antagonistic ability has resurfaced 
since 1988. Another major medium for Buddhist antagonism has been through the main 
democratic opposition, the NLD, and in particular with one of its leaders, Aung San Suu Kyi. 
The NLD's and Suu Kyi's use of Buddhism has primarily been concentrated around Buddhist 
morality. Buddhist ethics have been used as a platform for attacking the SLORC/SPDC and 
for highlighting its human rights abuses, and has also provided the NLD with a model of 
organisation and leadership that can be seen to base itself on the concept of the ideal Buddhist 
ruler. Moreover, by linking Buddhism with the democracy movement, legitimacy for a 
democratic model of rule is reinforced. 
In dealing firstly with the moral appeal to Buddhism, the NLD and Suu Kyi's approach begins 
by contrasting itself with what it considers to be the moral decay that has permeated 
SLORC/SPDC rule. In relating SLORC rule to the nature of kingship Suu Kyi makes the link 
between Myanmar's problems and immorality when she states that, 
When the king does not observe the dhamma, state functionaries become 
corrupt, and when state functionaries are corrupt the people are caused much 
suffering. It is further believed that an unrighteous king brings down calamity 
on the land. The root of a nation's misfortunes has to be sought in the moral 
failings of the government. 84 
According to Suu Kyi, the lack of righteous rule or dhammic law has contributed significantly 
to the current condition of Myanmar. 85 The prevalence of human rights abuses carried out by 
Aung San Suu Kyi in September 1994". Barnes also reinforces this mediatory role in reporting that a chief abbot 
of a monastery in Mandalay in 1999 wrote letters to both Suu Kyi and the military leaders requesting both to 
begin negotiations with a "clean slate". Matthews also states that in the demonstrations of 1988-1990 "the 
omnipresence of monks probably lessened the incidents ofviolence . .. having on occasion prevented the 
summary execution of government agents caught by the crowds". As the focus here is on the antagonistic side of 
sangha reaction to the government I have kept this out of the main discussion. Nemoto, K., "Aung San Suu Kyi: 
Her Dream and Reality", p. 16, note. 6, Barnes, W., "End grudges and rebuild nation, abbot tells junta, 
opposition", South China Morning Post, Wednesday, December 22, 1999, Matthews, "Buddhism Under a 
Military Regime", p. 420. 
84 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear and Other Writings, p. 171. 
85 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, p. 234. 
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the state smce 1988 have fed this perception of moral decay. But it is not just the 
SLORC/SPDC's moral poverty but a more widespread poverty that comes into the picture 
here. Oishi notes that without "the moral foundation of the rule oflaw" Myanmar's youth have 
lost sight of the traditional Buddhist values that should underpin Burmese society.86 He quotes 
Suu Kyi as saying that the young people "feel so alienated from the rest of society and ... feel 
that the only thing that is real for them are [sic] material goods".87 The moral decline of 
Burmese society in general is also discussed by Mya Maung who asserts that SLORC/SPDC's 
tourism policies have resulted in increases in prostitution, heroin trade, beer drinking and the 
increased spread of AIDS.88 Moreover, the general economic decline of the country and 
increased need to rely on illegal activities, such as bribery and drug trafficking and production, 
in order to supplement inadequate incomes, leads to an environment conducive to moral 
decay. More specifically Suu Kyi links the Buddhist teaching about the four causes of decline 
with the present state ofMyanmar. These four causes are described by Suu Kyi as the "failure 
to recover that which has been lost, omitting to repair that which has been damaged; disregard 
of the need for reasonable economy; and the elevation to leadership of those without morality 
or learning". 89 
The difference in moral approach and an understanding of development of political freedom 
between the military government and Suu Kyi and the NLD can be based around the phrase 
"Morality (sila) can be upheld only when the stomach is full". 90 Suu Kyi argues that the 
military have taken on this approach by asserting that democracy and political freedom - and 
consequently for Suu Kyi, basic human rights - will come only after they have been able to 
secure a healthy economic climate and a politically unified nation.91 This is interpreted by Suu 
Kyi as a means of justifying the military's own immoral action where morality comes 
secondary to economic and political development. In opposition to this view several times Suu 
Kyi has referred to her own and the NLD's understanding of development in general as 
encompassing economics, morality and mental well-being rather than just economic concern 
86 Oishi, M., Aung San Suu Kyi 's Struggle: Its Principles and Strategy, p. 15. 
87 Aung San Suu Kyi, "You Could Start by Convincing a Friend", Shambala Sun interview, January 1996, cited 
in Oishi, Aung San Suu Kyi 's Struggle, p. 14. 
88 Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism, pp. 165- 166. 
89 Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, p. 161. 
90 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, p. 241. 
91 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, pp. 241-246. For a precise declaration of this by the SPDC see, State 
Peace and Development Council, "Human Rights Issues and Democracy", p. 22, and "Basic Universal Human 
Rights", p. 23, Information Sheets, http://www.myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6/11/01. 
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and need for national homogeneity. She replaces the need for economic development with the 
need for 'human' development.92 According to this approach morality comes in unison with a 
full stomach and may well increase the possibilities of economic growth and such like whilst 
at the same time ensuring "its results are wisely and happily distributed".93 In arguing against 
the military's viewpoint she explicitly uses Buddhist teaching to reinforce her argument when 
she states that if economic increase is achieved without moral grounding there is a danger of 
one ofthe Ten Impurities and causes of suffering, that is, greed, taking hold.94 
Overall, Suu Kyi and the NLD, have drawn upon Buddhist teachings about moral decay and 
moral increase as a way to promote and aid their cause. The moral integrity that Buddhism 
provides for political life and which gives it its antagonistic capability, as discussed already in 
this study, is being employed as a force to push for democratic change. Buddhist morality is to 
some extent strengthening the ability of the NLD to be an alternative structure, or stand 
outside of the state and criticise those in power. There are several concepts that Suu Kyi, in 
particular, has brought out in her political stance that draw heavily on Buddhist morality. The 
most dominant of these is her use and call for metta (loving kindness), her demand for 
'freedom from fear', and her claim that for a successful change for democracy to be achieved 
there must be, not just a revolution of political structures, but a 'Revolution of the Spirit' that 
will bring about a change in political values. 
The first of these, metta, one of the ten perfections of the bodhisatta path, Suu Kyi defines as a 
"disinterested love, a love that seeks to give and to serve, rather than to take and demand."95 
92 Silverstein, J., "The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political Thought ofDaw Aung San Suu Kyi", p. 226. 
93 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, p. 244. 
94 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, p. 242. Interestingly, Aung San also said this phrase "Only when the 
stomach is full, can morality be observed" in one of his speeches. In the speech he refers to the need and 
importance of politics in everyday life as the ability of the people to act morally is aided by a having one's 
practical needs met which politics is concerned with. As he states, "In truth, politics belongs to the realm of the 
mundane, and it is not the means to nibbana. Nevertheless, within the mundane the supramundae can have a 
presence. It can remain within loki. Only when the stomach is full, can morality be observed. Therefore, politics 
is a principal matter. That is why we must not let this issue slip from our grip. It is relevant to everything". Rather 
than seeing Suu Kyi's criticism of the phrase as in opposition to her father's own viewpoint how she interprets it 
modifies its meaning somewhat from how Aung San used it. For Aung San, he was not saying that he and the 
politicians at the time need not act morally but rather stressed the importance of material well-being as conducive 
to moral behaviour. Suu Kyi's claim against SLORC/SPDC is that they use the phrase to justify their own lack of 
moral behaviour rather than to stress the importance of material well-being for morality in general. Thus, her 
comments don't exactly conflict with her father's words. Aung San, cited in Houtman, Mental Culture in 
Burmese Crisis Politics, pp. 255- 256. 
95 Aung San Suu Kyi, "Heavenly Abodes and Human Development", 11 th Pope Paul VI Memorial Lecture, given 
on Nov. 3rd 1997, cited in Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 363 . 
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When asked what are some of the most important Burmese cultural aspects that should be 
maintained Suu Kyi answered, "The Buddhist values of loving-kindness and compassion. A 
respect for education" should be preserved.96 Moreover, in speaking about the NLD Suu Kyi 
states that "metta is the core of our movement - a desire to bring relief to human beings" and 
that it promotes an environment of "mutual understanding and goodwill".97 She claims that it 
is one of the primary reasons for her party maintaining their cohesiveness, despite over a 
decade of attempts by SLORC/SPDC to destroy it.98 If one has an attitude of loving kindness 
and goodwill towards others, according to Suu Kyi, differences can be overcome and 
compromises can be sought. As a consequence of mettaa path opens up for compassion and 
reconciliation. But this is seen to apply not only to the mechanisms for keeping the democracy 
movement together, but also should be the approach taken towards the military rulers. As she 
states, "Metta is not only to be applied to those that are connected with you. It should also be 
applied [to] those who are against you. Metta means sympathy for others. Not doing unto 
others what one does not want done to oneself ... Let me be frank. We don't even want to 
harm SLORC".99 According to this view, the consequence of hate and vengeful feelings 
towards the regime will only bring Myanmar back into a habit of oppression. 
Sarkisyanz' discussion on the social ethics of Theravada Buddhism examines these issues 
further. 100 He makes note of the importance of "the awakening of Universal Love 
(Mettabhavana)" in the Buddha's path to enlightenment and that it is essentially bound to the 
realisation of the non-duality of existence, or in other words the illusory nature of the self. 101 
Through metta a notion of self-hood can begin to be overcome as one loses a sense of 
'mineness' by focus sing on the other. This in turn aids the path to enlightenment where a 
complete non-substantiality is realised. This ethic of metta grounded in a principle of non-
substantiality, Sarkisyanz goes onto state, becomes the basis of a Buddhist political ethic. 
There becomes an "elimination of distinction between the experience of happiness and sorrow 
of 'others' and the happiness and sorrow of 'one's self'" .102 This is precisely the 
96 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, p. 56. 
97 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, pp. 134, 144. 
98 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, p. 118. 
99 Aung San Suu Kyi, statement made at closing ofNLD Congress, October 151h, 1997, cited in Houtman, Mental 
Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 362. 
100 Sarkisyanz, E., Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution, pp. 37-42. 
101 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 39. 
102 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds, p. 41. 
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understanding of mettathat Suu Kyi espouses here, that is, it is the "desire to bring relief to 
human beings". 103 A Buddhist notion about the attainment of nibbiina and the nature of self 
provides the pragmatic world of political rule with a moral ideal. Thus the pattern of the ideal 
merging with the pragmatic, or in other words, the link of the Two Wheels of Dhamma 
continues to play an important role in contemporary Burmese politics. 
One of the most important functions of metta that Suu Kyi insists upon is that it has the 
capacity to eliminate fear. Fear is what she sees is at the heart of the regime's power. Their 
capacity to incarcerate, their record of killings, corruption and the ability to manipulate the 
legal system to their own advantage, Suu Kyi says has brought the Burmese people into a 
habit of fear. 104 In such a context the masses become subjugated, abuses go unchallenged, and 
the status quo is kept. The logic of Suu Kyi's argument that metta can alleviate fear is that 
"fear is rooted in insecurity and insecurity is rooted in lack of metta" .105 Fear is seen as an 
impurity of the mind. It is argued that to practice loving kindness towards oneself is a means 
to not be controlled by this fear. More importantly, in the context of authoritarian rule, to have 
feelings of loving kindness towards an oppressor is to remove his power of authority, to 
remove his ability to frighten. With this attitude one has the ability to confront the oppressor 
and challenge the status quo. This does not mean that one feels no fear at all but rather it 
ideally should not control one's thoughts or actions. With this a sense of freedom can be 
obtained. As Suu Kyi states, "Freedom from fear means that you don't let fear dominate you. 
It does not mean that you don't know fear. It does not mean lack of knowledge of fear. It 
means that you are not controlled by it". 106 
Alongside Suu Kyi's emphasis on mettaand its ability to counteract the power of fear is her 
conviction that what is needed is not just a change of government, a revolution that changes 
just the political order but what she calls a 'Revolution of Spirit'. What she means by this is 
that, "The quintessential revolution is that of the spirit, born of an intellectual conviction of the 
need for change in those mental attitudes and values which shape the course of a nation's 
103 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, p. 134. 
104 The Voice of Hope, p.l8 . 
105 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope p. 4. 
106 White, J., "Leadership Through Compassion and Understanding: An Interview with Aung San Suu Kyi", p. 
291. 
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development." 107 Her view is that this change in mental attitude will provide a genuine, long 
lasting change in the political landscape. As she explains, this uprooting o~ mental attitude "is 
a necessary safeguard against an Animal Farm syndrome where the new order after its first 
flush of enthusiastic reforms takes on the murky colours of the very system it replaced." 108 
Material benefits are not enough for a truly successful revolution in her view. It is essential 
that people's values are reformed and ultimately in the Burmese context Buddhism is seen to 
provide the orientation for these changes. What has been said so far regarding mettii is an 
important example of this. According to Suu Kyi, and other NLD members such as Tin Oo 
and Kyi Maung, by practising loving kindness the 'habit of fear' is uprooted, a mental attitude 
is changed. 109 This change in mental attitude must primarily be a change of the intellect and 
not of the emotions. Suu Kyi argues that when attitudes of love, compassion and so on are 
procured by mindfulness (sati), that is, through the intellect, they become objective states of 
mind.110 With objectivity comes consistency in thought. An important consequence of this is 
that if one has consistent values procured through the intellect then one cannot easily be 
swayed and in the context of a struggle against an authoritarian regime this is a useful tool. 
The flip side of this is that if the emotions are allowed to rule, subjectivity comes into play and 
in this case Suu Kyi claims that "prejudices start multiplying" and with this one can never 
fulfil a 'true' revolution, one that will be long-lasting and genuine. 111 
This focus on the need for the changing of mental attitudes also has the effect of demanding a 
personal responsibility for all ofthose involved in the 'revolution'. Suu Kyi states that it is not 
enough to pay lip service in the desire for democracy.112 For a Revolution of Spirit to work 
one actually has to modify one's values, one's psychological perspective. This demand of 
personal responsibility fits in well with Buddhism, where essentially one is personally 
responsible for one's own salvation. As Suu Kyi explains that, "Buddhism, the foundation of 
traditional Burmese culture, places the greatest value on man, who alone can achieve the 
supreme state of Buddhahood. Each man has in him the potential to realize the truth through 
107 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, p. 183. 
108 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, p. 178. 
109 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, pp. 122, 186. 
110 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, pp. 30- 31, 162, and Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis 
Politics, pp. 340- 342. 
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his own will and endeavour and to help others realize it." 113 What was once about a personal 
quest for nibbiina has changed into a personal responsibility for a new political order. 
Overall, the image portrayed in Suu Kyi's approach to politics as discussed so far is a taking 
of a moral high ground and style of rule modelled on notions consistent with an Asokan style 
ideal Buddhist ruler. This connection to an ideal Buddhist ruler is made explicit in her essay 
'In a Quest for Democracy', where she writes at length about the Ten Virtues of the good 
king, which she translates as, "liberality, morality, self-sacrifice, integrity, kindness, austerity, 
non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-opposition". 114 Moreover, her frequent 
references to the observing of dhamma as essential to good leadership reinforces this position. 
It appears that many people within Myanmar also view her in this light. Nemoto states that 
"the Burmese people ... recognise her as a traditional ideal Buddhist leader". 115 Moreover, 
her rise to political life became coloured with supernatural events where Buddha images all 
over the country were thought to have expanded chests signifying to many a woman's, in 
particular Suu Kyi' s, prompt rise to power. 11 6 She has also been called a female bodhisatta, 
although she denies this. 117 The NLD's espousal of non-violence in their political approach 
reinforces this whole ideal image that is portrayed. Although the non-violent approach is 
viewed by Suu Kyi, Kyi Maung and Tin Oo as just as much a political tactic than a conscious 
effort to maintain a Buddhist ethic, and the NLD's position on it could be modified if 
necessary. 118 But despite this it still adds to the image of an ideal ruler. 
Much of what has been said so far in Suu Kyi's approach to politics and her appeals to 
Buddhism has not been without criticism. In particular, at times she has been challenged on 
the practicalities of employing Buddhism in a political context and that her thinking and 
drawing upon spirituality is naYve and unproductive in the world of politics. 119 It is all very 
well thinking loving thoughts towards someone but it may not stop you from being shot or 
tortured, or help the rate of inflation to come down. Suu Kyi's response to these criticisms has 
11 3 Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 301. 
114 Aung San Suu Kyi, "In a Quest for Democracy", in Freedom from Fear, pp. 170- 173. 
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been to speak of 'Engaged Buddhism' as the approach she follows. The term, which according 
to Queen was first used by the Vietnamese Zen Master, Thich Nhat Hanh, and likened to 
Christian Liberation Theology, emphasises compassion and the need to alleviate suffering as a 
key justification for demanding political action by Buddhists. 12° For her it is not enough to 
think loving thoughts or think 'oh, how awful it must be' in sympathetic tones. Rather she 
demands that in practising mettii, in calling for a 'Revolution of Spirit' and forgiveness, 
passivity should play no part. She further explains it as "active compassion or active metta. It 
is not just sitting there passively saying, 'I feel sorry for them.' It means doing something 
about the situation by bringing whatever relief you can to those who need it most, by caring 
for them, by doing what you can to help others". 121 One needs to go out of one's way to help 
those suffering. This may be providing a place for those exiled, providing financial support for 
families of those in prison or participating in rallies. 122 Even the sang ha are not exempt from 
this demand, as she states that monks and nuns can preach on principles of democracy and 
attempt to persuade the authorities to change the system. 123 The 1991 boycott where monks all 
over the country turned up their alms bowls is a good example of this. 124 With active mettii, 
active compassion and other such attitudes Buddhism becomes a tool in the democratic quest. 
But with this stance of taking a moral high ground and being portrayed as an ideal Buddhist 
leader, as far as the Two-Wheel structure is concerned, there is also danger of too much 
emphasis being placed upon an ideal. We saw in Chapter Three that U Nu's extensive use of 
Buddhism in political life contributed to the eventual failure of his government, and it was 
concluded that he had crossed the boundaries and had gone too far onto the nibbiinic wheel. 
Nu's Buddhist quest can be compared with Suu Kyi in her Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance 
Speech, given on her behalf by her son, in which she states that her quest for democratic 
change is "basically spiritual". 125 It is difficult, albeit impossible, to know whether or not Suu 
Kyi's use of Buddhism will have the same problem as Nu's did with a crossing over too far 
onto the nibbiinic wheel. Their political contexts are very different. But aside from a different 
context there are some basic differences about their use of Buddhism that may prevent Suu 
120 Queen, C., and S. King, Engaged Buddhism: Liberation Movements in Asia, pp. x, 2. 
121 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice ofHope, p. 17. 
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Kyi from encountering the same problem. Firstly, the greatest factor in U Nu's link with 
Buddhism was his extensive moves to promote Buddhism. Throughout his term in government 
he went to great lengths to incorporate Buddhism into the structures of politics, and into 
society in general. This excessive promotion caused increasing conflict with religious 
minorities. However, Suu Kyi's use of Buddhism is in a much less zealous manner. Her goals 
are not focussed around promoting Buddhism in total but rather by appealing to it as an ethical 
base from which to orientate her political activity. Moreover, her understanding of 'Engaged 
Buddhism' demands that the practicalities of the democratic quest are attended too and not 
ignored. Moreover, a major difference between Suu Kyi's and U Nu's link with Buddhism is 
the extent to which they view their own status as Buddhists. The difference becomes obvious 
in an interview between Suu Kyi and former monk Alan Clements. I will quote the whole 
question and answer in order to get a complete picture. 
Clements: Many years ago I interviewed ... U Nu who stated as a matter of 
fact that he was a committed Bodhisattva ... I asked him what was it like being 
the Prime Minister with full control of the army and to have made the vow to 
become a Buddha. He said rather explicitly ... that it was a major burden, a 
nearly constant moral dilemma. What he was saying was that being a devout 
Buddhist was incompatible with being a political leader who had a 
responsibility to use the armed forces. Don't you feel any such dilemma? 
Suu Kyi: No, I don't see a dilemma. I would not think that I'm in any position 
to even contemplate taking the Bodhisattva vow. My first concern is to abide 
by Buddhist principles in my worldly dealings. Of course, I do meditate .... 
Overall, I think of myself as a very ordinary Burmese Buddhist who will devote 
more time to religion in my older years. 126 
What is clear here is that Suu Kyi is placed in a more 'down to earth' position as a Buddhist, 
than Nu was during his time in government. This may prevent her from crossing too far onto 
the nibbiinic wheel as U Nu did. On the ethnic issue however, it is not so clear whether Suu 
Kyi's appeal to Buddhism in time will cause difficulty. It is difficult to speculate on this unless 
the NLD were actually to come to power. The NLD's policy toward ethnic minorities in 
general sets out that "no single ethnic group would have special privileges" and that there 
would be "equality among all peoples, the right to autonomy under the constitution, and the 
assurance of democracy and human rights" .127 From this and Suu K yi' s lack of promoting 
Buddhism in general other than a moral base it can be assumed that no attempts would be 
126 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope, p. 59. 
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made to make Buddhism the state religion or give it priority over other religions. Also Suu 
Kyi comments that she has "a great respect for other religions" and throughout her writings 
she speaks favourably of them. 128 But in practice such a neutral stance could well come under 
fire from some quarters of the sangha or from missionary minded lay Buddhists, just as Nu's 
attempts to support the minority religions caused him so much difficulty. This issue remains a 
continuing point of difficulty of the idea of a Buddhist dhamma-realm in a multi-religious 
society. 129 
It also must be considered though that the sang ha 's involvement with the state if the NLD 
were ever to come to power may cause a problem. Since 1988 the sangha has played a crucial 
role in the democracy movement as stated early on in the chapter. Suu Kyi also speaks 
frequently in her books of receiving advice from notable monks and as we saw in the 
discussion on 'Engaged Buddhism' she demanded that both monks and nuns had to play their 
part. In 1994 the monk, Rewadatta Dhamma, even mediated talks between SLORC and the 
NLD. 130 Given this close connection between the sangha and the NLD and with Buddhism in 
general it is possible that given the opportunity the sangha could place demands on the NLD 
like what developed under U Nu. Herein lies the potential danger of the nibbanic wheel 
crossing too far onto the lay boundary as well. Once again it is impossible to know for certain 
both how the sangha would react to NLD and how the NLD would react to sangha demands 
without the NLD actually being in power. However, these possibilities of the crossing 
boundaries are certainly not out of the equation if democratic rule does come to Myanmar. 
But aside from the possible negative implications of Suu Kyi's and the NLD's appeal to 
Buddhism, there are several ways that using Buddhism can be seen to benefit Suu Kyi and the 
democracy movement. Gustaf Houtman suggests several ways that this appeal to Buddhism 
has aided Suu K yi' s quest. 131 For example, it has been one method of countering the 
SLORC/SPDC's claim that Suu Kyi is essentially a foreigner and as such she has no right to 
127 Silverstein, J., "The Evolution and Salience of Burma's National Political Culture", p. 28. 
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play any part in Burmese politics. 132 By speaking frequently on Buddhist practices and beliefs 
she can be viewed by the people as not leaving her Burmese background behind. The common 
phrase, 'To be Burmese is to be Buddhist', as applied to Suu Kyi, may have the effect of 
reinforcing her loyalties in the eyes of the population. Moreover, by using Buddhist terms and 
ethics to reflect on democracy and human rights issues she is making these issues applicable to 
Myanmar against the SLORC/SPDC attack that they too are foreign and irrelevant to Burmese 
life. One specific way she has achieved this link is by pointing to the example of the elected 
king Mahasarnrnata, (mentioned in Chapter One) who would reverse the process of decline in 
the world. The fact that the people elected him and installed him into what Suu Kyi calls "the 
Buddhist version of government by social contract" which required him to uphold the 
dhamma, is used as a traditional Buddhist justification for democratic and moral rule. 133 Just 
as in the 1940s and 1950s some Buddhist terms were used to indigenise Marxist thought, as 
with reference to a Marxist Abhidhamma, one could say that the same is being done with 
democracy and human rights. 
The most crucial benefit of Suu Kyi's appeal to Buddhism is that in the present context of 
restriction, Buddhism is considered one of the few remaining outlets the democracy movement 
has for political activism. As Suu Kyi says "We don't have any weapons, no money, no rights. 
The laws in this country are used to crush us. What can we rely on?" 134 Her answer to this is 
Buddhism or more specifically, the values it promotes which she states "are the chief weapons 
against armed repression."135 Or in Houtman's words Buddhism can be called "the last bastion 
offreedom". 136 Whether or not this 'last bastion' is successful or not is another matter, but this 
whole idea of Buddhism being one of the few remaining outlets for political activity ties in 
well with the idea of Buddhist antagonism that has been developed throughout this study. That 
is, an essential component of Buddhism's ability to criticise lies in its place as an alternative 
132 The SPDC refused to allow Suu Kyi stand for election in the 1990 election, stating that on three counts she 
was legally refrained from contesting. One of these reasons was that "Persons who are under any 
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign power, or are subjects or citizens or entitled to the 
rights and privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power" [their italics] are disallowed to stand for 
election. As Suu Kyi was married to a British citizen and had citizenship rights this removed her from the 
election. State Peace and Development Council, "Practising Universal Rules in the Protection of National 
Security and Interest", Information Sheets, pp. 17- 18, http://www.myanmar-
information.net/political/english.pdf, cited 6/11/01. 
133 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear, pp. 169- 170. 
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Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 363. 
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structure. Moreover, what maintains this alternative structure and gives Buddhism its integrity 
and allows it its antagonistic ability is its moral superiority. This moral superiority is exactly 
what Suu Kyi and the NLD have appealed to in their use of Buddhism against the military 
government. 
A useful example which helps clarify how Suu Kyi and the NLD create this alternative 
structure by appealing to Buddhism is by looking at their use ofvipassana(Insight) meditation 
with a focus on mindfulness (sati) in order to cope with imprisonment and abuse. Suu Kyi 
practised it throughout her years under house arrest and other NLD members Win Htein, Tin 
Oo and Kyi Maung, and no doubt many more, have also used it. 137 Mindfulness itself is the 
seventh factor on the Eight-Fold Path and has an important place in Buddhist practice in 
general. The Majjhima Nikiiya states that it is one way "for the overcoming of sorrows and 
griefs, for the going down of sufferings and miseries, for winning the right path, for realizing 
Nirvana". 138 Thus in this light it aptly fits the context of political persecution. Vipassana 
practice centres on what are called the 'four foundations ofmindfulness' which are the "body, 
feelings, states of mind, and dhammas, which comprise all aspects of personality". 139 Tin Oo 
explains the practice of mindfulness meditation and its practicality in coping with solitary 
confinement and imprisonment in general when he states, 
Like in the Buddha's teachings, obstacles can be seen as advantages; the loss of one's 
freedom can inspire reflection on the preciousness of freedom. This filled me with joy. 
Also, I knew from my years as a practising monk the benefits of sati - mindfulness 
meditation [and] ... with mindfulness everything you see, hear, taste, think, and smell 
becomes simply an experience, without anything extra placed upon it. Just phenomena. 
So in that way too, the thought of imprisonment, is seen as just a thought. It comes and 
goes. And without attachment to it there's no problem. It's just thought. That's all. ... 
Just do everything you do with mindfulness and there is no room in one's mind for 
negative thoughts. I approached every day in prison as I did as a monk in a monastery, 
mindfully. . . . In this way I could keep my mind free from obstructive emotions that 
might otherwise upset me. This is basic dhamma. 140 
This non-attachment through mindfulness allows one to be unaffected (at least mentally) by 
abuse and harsh conditions that several NLD members have been placed under. It becomes a 
136 Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, p. 293 . 
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way of detaching oneself from the effects of oppression by way of transcending the loki 
[mundane] and allows an alternative structure to exist. It is this alternative structure that gives 
the ability to criticise without fear of reprisal. Another way of viewing this situation is put 
forward by Houtman who states that, 
vipassana practice permanently uproot[s] mental 'impurities' or 'defilements' (kilesas) . 
. . vipassana punctures the loki as defined by the regime through their tight control over 
loki pafifia. The result is that the military are left, like Mara (as representing loki) 
attacking the Buddha (as representing lokuttara) in order to keep the people from 
leaving loki. 141 
Through the practice of vipassana and attention given to mindfulness, the whole idea of 
Buddhism providing an alternative structure through its 'transcendental vision' and its ability 
to criticise is reinforced in the contemporary political context. The whole structure of the Two-
Dhamma realms becomes highlighted in the NLD member's practice of vipassanaas the ideal 
directed toward non-attachment and nibbiina impacts on the pragmatic. It allows the 
practitioner to turn to back towards the pragmatic and point out its inadequacies without fear. 
It allows a space for criticism. It is in this context that the benefits of the Two-Wheel structure 
become accentuated and the impact of the ideal on the pragmatic world of politics works most 
effectively. 
In the context of crisis politics such as exists currently in Myanmar, the antagonistic ability of 
Buddhism and the promotion of a moral ideal has become significantly integrated into the 
mechanics of opposition and a striving for political change. Buddhism goes beyond being just 
a source of legitimacy, although this is certainly part of its offerings, as it has become one of 
the "chief weapons against armed repression". 142 This whole idea further reinforces the 
potency of Buddhism in the field of politics. If it can be used to modify people's thoughts, can 
demand from them a responsibility to act against state abuses, can uproot their fear in 
challenging those in power it is no wonder that since 1988 extensive efforts have been made 
by the SLORC/SPDC to control it and use it for their own advantage. However, pagoda 
building, offerings of robes and using Buddhism to promote a unified and ordered nation are 
not enough to reap the maximum benefits Buddhism offers. The superiority of Buddhism in 
the Two-Wheel structure, and hence its power, lies most poignantly in its morality and after 
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over a decade of state abuses towards the Burmese people and restriction of freedoms and 
without the provision of many basic human rights the SLORC/SPDC had failed to access this. 
For a successful balance of the Two-Dhamma Wheel structure the symbiosis must include the 
moral authority of Buddhism. The symbiosis must not just be of material 'showmanship' but 
should incorporate Buddhism's most useful offering to politics- an ethical base to stand upon. 
132 
Conclusion. 
Since the earliest establishment of the Burmese nation we have found that Buddhism has 
surfaced time and time again in the affairs of the state. In its earliest forms it provided a 
cosmology that supported the structures of the kingdom, it legitimised kingly rule and offered 
a moral ideal to the realm of politics. The influence of Buddhism in politics did not just flow 
one way. In return Buddhism was supported, protected and maintained by the ruling elite. 
Structurally the relationship between Buddhism and the state centred around the Two-Wheels 
of Dhamma, the wheel of sa1J1Sffra and the wheel of nibbiina, the wheel of the lay political 
leaders and the wheel of the sangha. Integral to the relations of this model the idea of 
antagonistic-symbiosis came to the fore as the balancing of the wheel structure became 
reflected by the need for Buddhism to be able to criticise the political rulers and act as a 
'safety valve' against state abuses. At the same time a symbiosis between Buddhism and the 
state was needed for Buddhism to be maintained and protected and for the state to be 
legitimised and its structures justified. The ideal of dhammic order was dependent on the 
correct balancing of this antagonistic-symbiosis. 
However, we have found the balance of this structure was far from solid and fixed. It has the 
ability to shift its weighting from one wheel to the other and also can be threatened by a 
complete collapse. Even throughout pre-colonial times the balance was far from even and the 
ideal model of rule Buddhism offered the state was rarely realised. The very fact that it is an 
ideal infers this to some extent. 
The difficulties in maintaining the balance however, are neither about a deficiency in the 
theory behind the model, nor a deficiency in human capabilities but rather the difficulties 
derive out of the problems of an ideal merging with the pragmatic. That is, something 
transcendent that locates itself beyond the here and now is impacting on something located in 
only the here and now. It was established though in Chapter One that this connection is a 
necessity- nibbiina can only be reached by being sought in salJlSffric existence. In historical 
terms this connection, along with its difficulties, has shown itself clearly throughout Burmese 
political history. What can be extracted as a metaphysical model can also be seen to express 
itself in the real history ofMyanmar. Much of this study has been about examining the playing 
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out of the difficulties and benefits of the Two-Wheel structure in this real context. The 'other 
worldliness' ofBuddhism and Weber's conclusions ofthe irrelevance of canonical Buddhism 
for political life fade into the distance when one looks at the actual history of a Theravada 
Buddhist country such as Myanmar. Buddhism has impacted significantly on the culture of 
politics in Myanmar and as we saw in the last chapter, this is still the situation today. In its real 
history however, we have found that Myanmar has not been isolated in its political functions 
nor in its ideas. It has not been a Buddhist state closed off from foreign ideas of politics nor of 
religion. Since the inception of colonial rule and the consequential modification of traditional 
structures, including the Buddhism and state relationship, the Burmese were forced to reassess 
and in a way conscientize the nature of the relationship as Myanmar struggled to find a 
uniquely Burmese identity under overwhelmingly foreign influences. Rather than Buddhism 
being taken over by the thrust of secularism and modernisation the antagonistic-symbiotic 
structure became more pronounced as we saw in Chapter Two, the reactions of the political 
monks came to the fore and dramatic swings from one side of the Wheel structure to the other 
became obvious. Independence again did not see the Two-Wheel structure subside into the 
background. The symbiosis became pronounced under U Nu and so too did the problems of 
imbalance in the relationship. The difficulties of the ideal merging with the pragmatic could 
not be ignored and eventually led to another counter-balancing shift under the 'Burmese Way 
to Socialism' in Ne Win era. In the last chapter the interplay between an attempt to recreate 
the symbiosis and a strikingly direct appeal to the antagonistic side of Buddhism stressing its 
moral ideal and superiority showed that even in the contemporary context the Two-Wheel 
structure and its antagonistic-symbiotic fulcrum is still apparent. 
From the classical beginnings of the Burmese state under Anawratha through until the 
contemporary context there has been a consistency in the way that Buddhism and the state has 
related. The interplay of the dhamma-realms is that consistency. But at the same time the 
context the model has been situated in has changed. Since independence the issue surrounding 
ethnic and religious minorities has been a constant problem when a Theravada Buddhist state 
is being stressed. This issue is just as obvious today as in U Nu's time of making Buddhism 
the state religion. On the issues of democracy and the future of the Burmese state in general 
there are countless differences from the structures of statehood where the Two-Wheel 
relationship had its beginnings. No doubt the culture of Burmese statehood will be confronted 
with many more issues that will put a strain on the state and Buddhist relationship. The huge 
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narcotic problems, the increasing spread of AIDS, the widespread levels of corruption that 
have permeated the state and so on, will no doubt challenge the moral appeal of Buddhism. 
Even if or when democracy comes to Myanmar, it is most unlikely that the ideal Buddhist 
state that Suu Kyi and others like her direct themselves towards would ever be realised. But 
despite this and despite comments by some that the Buddhist influences in Burmese politics 
are lessening in their relevance for political life, there still exists a place for Buddhism. 
However, these criticisms do have a share of validity. Indeed, the very balancing of the Wheel 
structure requires that there be a distance between Buddhism and politics. We have already 
seen the dangers to both Buddhism and politics when one realm crosses too far onto the 
boundaries of the other. Buddhism' s purity and alternative nature becomes threatened and on 
the political field the basic necessities of mundane existence need to be met- people still need 
to eat, to have housing and at times people need to fight. But in the long run I do not think that 
either the impact of the political on Buddhism and the impact of Buddhism on the political can 
be or will be ignored. They cannot be separated out completely. Whilst each need their 
distance and their own space each is unavoidably connected. This has been shown by looking 
over centuries of historical events in what one might call 'real time', and also metaphysically 
in the Buddhist idea of the Two-Wheels of Dhamma. Moreover, the most important offering 
that Buddhism can give political life, that is, an ethical base to stand on, I think will always be 
relevant, or at least should always be relevant. 
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